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Interactions between trade and the environment have been studied extensively as 
a reaction to the pressure that the accelerated pace of globalization is placing on 
environment and trade. Distinguishing itself from previous studies, this research 
addresses issues, methods and policy implications concerning the interrelationship 
between trade and environment first in a comprehensive literature survey, and then 
focuses on a modeling analysis on the interactions between trade and the environment in 
China. 
 The literature review provides a perspective on received and future research by 
employing a dual approach: not only are major issues concerning trade and environment 
analyzed, but also progress in the methods necessary to examine those issues is assessed. 
In both parts, the attempt has been to suggest new possibilities for research and policy 
goals. 
 To investigate the interactions between trade and the environment in the Chinese 
case, a nonlinear simultaneous equations trade and environment model (TEM) is 
developed. The theoretical framework of the TEM is an expansion of Deans (1999) four-
equation model by adding international trade and  foreign direct investment relationships. 
This model can be used not only to analyze the trade impact of an environmental policy 
and the environmental impact of trade, but also to identify the sources of those 
influences. In addition, the nonlinear specification of the relationship between emissions 
and economic scales allows for an explicit test of the environmental Kuznets curve. 
 The TEM is estimated with a Chinese provincial panel data set. The empirical 
results suggest that there may indeed have existed a tradeoff between economic growth 
and environmental protection in Chinas development. That is, increased trade and rapid 
economic growth may have led to more pollution emissions on the one hand, while 
environmental policies may have led to reduced economic growth and reduced trade on 
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 There exists an increasingly large body of literature on the interactions between 
trade and the environment, both in determining how growth in trade and changes in trade 
regimes affect the environment and in determining how stricter environmental regulations 
and enforcement affect trade. This has greatly increased the level and scope of our 
understanding of the issues involved and challenges they pose to policy makers. 
Frequently, however, one finds that the existing literature is limited because the relations 
between trade and the environment are complicated and causality, let alone simultaneity, 
is difficult to establish. In theory, trade could either improve a countrys environmental 
quality or aggravate a countrys environmental problems. Likewise, strict environmental 
regulations could be either a detrimental or a beneficial factor to a countrys 
competitiveness in international markets. The analysis of such impacts provides 
important insights into the complicated interrelationships between trade and the 
environment. But what is the nature of these relationships for a particular country and 
how quantitatively important are these impacts? This is simply unknown in many cases 
due to the absence of necessary quantitative and empirical research. There is no doubt by 
most professionals that there is an increasingly greater need for more country-specific 
empirical research. This research attempts to help fill this gap focusing on an application 
to the Chinese case. 
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 The major goal of this research is to investigate issues, methods and policy 
implications regarding the interactions between trade and the environment in general and 
to focus on the case study of China in particular. More specifically, this research is 
intended to: 
1. review the issues concerning economic interactions between environment and trade; 
2. review the methods for analyzing interactions between environment and trade; 
3. identify the causal relations among the variables linking trade and the environment 
that are relevant for policy purposes; 
4. statistically investigate the interactions between the trade and environmental variables 
for the Chinese case; and  
5. explore policy implications that are derived from the empirical Chinese case study 
and provide guidance for policy makers in areas of trade regimes and environmental 
policy formation and enforcement. 
These objectives are accomplished through analyses of the interrelationship 
between trade, economic growth and the environment. These analyses include the 
development of a simultaneous equations trade and environment model (TEM), 
computation of the impacts between trade and environmental variables using the results 
of the model, and recommendation of appropriate policy responses to mitigate the 
adverse impacts. The TEM model is specified, estimated and evaluated based on a 




  It has been widely accepted that economic globalization is here and that 
international commerce plays an increasingly important role in determining relative 
economic growth among countries. International trade has grown considerably in recent 
decades. For example, over the period 1979 to 1991, world real export growth averaged 
4.4 percent per year, while real output expansion averaged only 2.9 percent per year 
(Markusen et al. 1995). Since 1990, the average growth of international trade has 
exceeded 6 per cent while world merchandise output growth has averaged only 3 per 
cent, confirming that globalization is continuing at a rapid pace (WTO 1996). World 
integration is thus being accelerated through international trade in goods, services, 
resources and capital. Not only can trade help to optimize the utilization of global 
resources but it can benefit all participating countries. This realization has caused the 
General Agreement on the Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to evolve into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In addition, free trade zones have been expanding. More European 
countries now belong to the European Union (EU); and the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico have created the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).  
          Growth in trade has influenced the quality of the environment principally in 
exporting but also in importing countries. The notion that free trade among countries 
leads to welfare maximization becomes questionable when environmental degradation 
lowers that welfare. While comparative advantage implies that a country might specialize 
in the production of a pollution intensive commodity, such pollution would cause the 
environmental quality of the country to deteriorate. In this case there is a trade-off 
between gains from trade and environmental deterioration in this country compared to a 
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country producing non-polluting goods, since income will increase only if gains from 
trade overcompensate welfare losses from environmental damage. Stricter environmental 
policies in the first country would thus affect its comparative advantage and consequently 
its economic growth. 
          Such interactions between trade and the environment have produced an 
increasingly greater need for a careful and balanced assessment of the issues involved 
and the challenges they pose to policy makers. Investigation of the interactions between 
trade and the environment can be traced back to the early 1970s and was stimulated by 
the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Some earlier 
studies tracing this history include Baumol (1971), Blackhurst (1977), GATT (1971), 
Pethig (1976), Siebert (1973), Markusen (1975), and Walter (1975, 1976). Since the 
1980s, concerns about increasing world economic development, trade liberalization, and 
environmental stabilization have become globally important. This reflects the growing 
recognition of the global impact of industrial development and related problems of 
environmental deterioration on sustainable development. Worldwide attention to these 
issues can be found in works of Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), Beghin et al. (1994), 
Bhagwati (1993), Dean (1992, 1999), Low (1992), Muzondo et al. (1990), Siebert et al. 
(1980), Jaffe et al. (1995), and Antweiler et al. (1998) among others.  
  In addition to a comprehensive literature survey of the issues concerning the 
relationship between trade and the environment and a review of the various 
methodologies or quantitative approaches that have been applied to evaluate those issues,   
this research examines the interactions between trade and the environment in one 
particular case of Chinas development. This development perspective is interesting for a 
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number of reasons. Since the inception of economic reform in 1978, China has achieved 
remarkable economic progress at a highly sustained growth rate. Promotion of trade and 
attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been central to the countrys efforts to 
modernize its economy. The contribution of foreign trade to Chinas economy has also 
grown at an extraordinary pace. Since 1997, China has become one of the top ten 
exporters in the world, and since 1993, the largest recipient of foreign direct investment 
after the United States. While export-led economic growth has brought many benefits to 
China, the environment has suffered. As the World Bank (1997a) reports, Moreover, the 
large scale and rapid growth of Chinas economy have exposed a growing population to 
serious air and water pollution. 
Unfortunately, though some interesting attempts have been made to analyze this 
problem (Dean 1999, and Wu 2000), the environmental implications of the surge in 
foreign trade and investment are complex, very largely contested, and not fully 
illuminated by existing empirical data and analysis. At the same time, Chinas 
environmental protection agencies, aware of its pollution problems, have responded by 
enforcing regulatory standards for wastewater and air pollutant discharges. It is worth 
noting that an extensive water and air pollution levy system has been in place in China 
since 1983 (Wang and Wheeler 1996). How the enforcement of environmental policy in 
China affects its trade and foreign direct investment is also an interesting topic of 




 In order to achieve the stated objectives, this research uses econometric, 
simulation and comparative static methods to estimate, analyze and evaluate the Dean 
model investigating the interrelationship between trade, environmental and other 
economic variables. Specifically, the following procedures are applied: 
1. A simultaneous equations system is extended to model the interactions between trade 
and the environment. This system consists of six equations, that is, a production 
function including emissions and trade; equations explaining emissions demand and 
supply; an equation for the share of pollution intensive goods in total output; an 
equation for international trade; and an equation for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows. 
2. Based on the trade and environment model (TEM), flowgraph analysis and 
comparative statics are employed to identify the causal effects among the variables 
relating trade and the environment that are relevant for policy purposes. 
3. The structural model is adapted and specified according to Chinese provincial-level 
economic interactions and a descriptive panel data set. 
4. The specified TEM system is estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS). Since a 
provincial panel data set is used, three estimation approaches are applied and 
compared in order to exploit the advantage of panel data. First, the system is 
estimated simply by pooling the data with no fixed or random effect specifications. 
Second, provincial and time period fixed effects are included in the estimation. And 
third, the system is estimated with a two-way error components 2SLS (EC2SLS) 
method. 
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5. Finally, the impacts of trade and FDI variables on environmental variables and vice 
versa are evaluated with computer simulation and comparative static methods. The 
stability and consistence of the TEM model is also examined by performing 
deterministic and stochastic simulation. 
 
1.4 Contribution 
 Given the above-stated objectives, methodological approaches employed and the 
nature of problems investigated, this research is expected to contribute to the trade and 
environment literature in the follow aspects. 
 From a subject-matter perspective, this research contributes with an extensive 
review of issues concerning and methods used to analyze the interactions between trade 
and the environment. Because of the diversity and complexity of these issues and 
methods, they traditionally have been only in separate areas of concentration. 
Consequently few major surveys have covered all of them in a comprehensive manner. 
Though there exist several valuable surveys (Dean 1992, de Boer 1994, Ulph 1994, van 
Beers and van den Bergh 1996 and Xing and Kolstad 1996), they tend to emphasize 
particular aspects of the total area and do not reflect recent advances in the literature. This 
research provides a more comprehensive survey of this area and helps to fill this literature 
gap. 
 This study also contributes to the literature by focusing on the interactions 
between trade and the environment within a single developing country. Most empirical 
studies have tended to analyze cross-country or panel data typically for a sample of both 
developing and developed countries. Relatively few quantitative analyses have been 
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published on the trade and environmental interrelationship of a dynamic developing 
country such as China. This research enriches the trade and environment literature by 
providing a specific case study which analyzes how trade growth in China has affected 
different pollutant emissions and how Chinas pollution levy system has affected its trade 
values and FDI inflows. 
 In addition, this research contributes to the existing environmental Kuznets-curve 
literature in two aspects. First, it shows for the first time that an inverted-U relationship 
may also exist between pollution and economic scales both in absolute terms. The 
existing environmental Kuznets-curve literature usually measures pollution and economic 
scales in relative terms such as pollution intensity and GDP per capita. Second, it 
explicitly associates the existence of an inverted-U relationship with the effectiveness of 
environmental policies. In conventional environmental Kuznets-curve literature, since the 
effectiveness of environmental policies is usually approximated by relative economic 
scale variables themselves such as income or GDP per capita, the importance of 
environmental policies in this inverted-U relationship can not be separately identified. 
 Methodologically, one of the contributions of this study is the use of an expanded 
simultaneous equations trade and environment model. Most previous studies are based on 
single equation models and hence only a one-directional relationship between trade and 
the environment is examined, i.e., either how trade would affect environmental quality or 
how environmental policies would influence international trade flows. In reality, trade 
and the environment are interrelated and interact with each other. Moving a step forward, 
this study models the interrelationship employing a simultaneous system that enables one 
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to investigate both the environmental impact of trade and the trade impact of an 
environmental policy. 
 Another methodological contribution is a non-linear specification of the 
relationship between pollution and economic scales. The existing environmental Kuznets 
curve literature suggests that there may exist an inverted-U relationship between 
pollution and economic scales. To test this hypothesis, a squared output term is 
incorporated into the emissions demand equation and the trade and environment system is 
thus made non-linear. 
 Finally, this research methodologically contributes to the literature through the 
incorporation of panel data. Due to the lack of long environmental and economic time 
series for China as a whole, a provincial-level panel data approach is not only necessary 
but also important for effective econometric estimation. Moreover, due to computational 
complexity, a non-linear simultaneous equations model plus a panel data set is relatively 
new and has found few applications to economic and social problems; this is particularly 
true for modeling the interactions between trade and the environment. 
 
1.5 Outline for the Study 
 The remainder of this study consists of five chapters. 
 Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature divided into the major topic or policy 
issues surrounding interactions between trade and the environment. These topics and 
issues have been organized to include: (1) the nature of macroeconomic impacts, (2) 
patterns of trade and comparative advantage, (3) terms of trade, (4) patterns of production 
and consumption, (5) linkages between trade, environment and the economy, (6) 
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pollution redeployment to developing countries, (7) environmental degradation, and (8) 
factor rewards. 
 Chapter 3 contains a review of the various methodologies or quantitative 
approaches that have been applied to analyze the issues concerning trade and 
environment interactions. These include: (1) computable general equilibrium models, (2) 
international trade models, (3) input-output models, (4) welfare analysis models, (5) 
game theoretic models, (6) optimization models, (7) spatial GIS models, and (8) 
econometric models. 
 Chapter 4 describes the trade and environment model expanded for the case study 
of China. Specifically, this chapter is divided into four sections: (1) model theory and 
equations; (2) interactions between trade and the environment; (3) model application; and 
(4) model specification. 
 Chapter 5 deals with model estimation and application. This chapter includes six 
sections: (1) data sources; (2) model identification; (3) model estimation; (4) model 
validation; (5) empirical relationship between trade and the environment; and (6) model 
simulation. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the study focusing on major findings, policy implications and 
concluding remarks. 
 The appendices feature the detailed analytical and empirical results of analyses 
involved in this research. Specifically, Appendix A provides the derivation of the causal 
relationships between trade and the environment from flowgraph analysis and 
comparative statics; Appendix B consists of the EViews codes written for the estimation 
of the TEM; and various estimation results are reported in Appendix C to G.   
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Chapter 2 
ISSUES CONCERNING ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
          Economic interactions between environmental and trade polices concern the 
effects that these policies have on resource allocation, income distribution, and 
environmental consequences, both among and within trading countries. Economic 
analysis of these interactions treats environmental and trade policies as having both 
positive and negative consequences depending on the economic mechanisms involved. 
Our survey of these many different topics or areas that studies have analyzed suggests 
that the following questions are most frequently addressed: (1) What are the 
macroeconomic impacts of environmental trade policies? (2) How do these policies 
determine the patterns of trade and comparative advantage? (3) How do environmental 
policies affect terms of trade? (4) What are the implications of these policies for patterns 
of production and consumption? (5) What is the relationship between trade, environment, 
and the economy? (6) Are environmental policies a determinant of industrial 
redeployment? (7) Does trade result in environmental degradation? And (8) How 
environmental trade policies affect returns to factors? The issues germane to these 
questions are further outlined in tables 2.1. This chapter evaluates previous research 
aiming to answer these questions, focusing on the economic theories that provide insights 
and possibilities for making policy recommendations. 
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Table 2.1 Issues Concerning Economic Interactions between Environment and 
Trade 
 
        1  Macroeconomic Impacts 
          Impacts on National Income 
          Impacts on Employment 
          Impacts on Other Economic Variables 
          Impacts on Balance of Trade and Payments 
          Impacts on Sustainable Development 
        2  Patterns of Trade and Comparative Advantage 
          Patterns of World Trade in Environmentally Sensitive Goods 
          Comparative Advantage 
        3  Terms of Trade 
          Impacts of Emission Standards in One Country 
          Impacts of Pollution Taxes in One Country 
          Transnational Pollution case 
        4  Patterns of Production and Consumption 
          Structural Change of Production Sectors 
          Impacts on ProductionSupply Side 
          Impacts on ConsumptionDemand Side 
        5  Linkages between Trade, Environment, and the Economy 
         Conflicts between Trade Policy and Environmental Policy 
         Transnational Pollution and Trade 
         Natural Resources and Trade 
         Hazardous Substances and Trade 
         Global Warming and Trade 
        6  Pollution Redeployment to Developing Countries 
         National Environmental Policy and Capital Mobility 
         Environmentally-Induced Industrial Relocation 
        7  Environmental Degradation 
         Trade and the Global Environment 
         Trade Induced Environmental Degradation 
        8  Factor Rewards 
         Capital and Labor Rewards 
         Resource Rewards 




2.2 Macroeconomic Impacts 
2.2.1 Impacts on national income 
           The impacts of domestic environmental control policies on national income were 
first assessed by DArge (1971). For example, if environmental policies in the form of 
effluent charges are imposed on individual firms, the impact on comparative advantage 
will usually arise from two sources. First, substitution of relatively cheaper imports for 
domestic commodities will decrease the level of domestic production and, thus, domestic 
income. Second, these initial shifts in domestic demand and income through multiplier 
effects will result in further adjustments in domestic income and imports. Using the trade 
model, DArge estimated such domestic income effects resulting from changes in export 
prices due to the imposition of domestic environmental policies. He found that the impact 
on domestic income stemming from international feedback effects was negative and 
came primarily through impact multipliers.  
          Using general equilibrium models that include trade between countries, Siebert et 
al. (1980) also analyze the effects of domestic environmental policies on national income. 
They consider two cases: one is that the home country is small, which implies a given 
relative price for the home country; and the other is the two-country case, in which the 
home country is assumed to be no longer a small country but it affects the relative prices 
in the world market. Assuming non-inferior commodities and using a two-sector 
economy model, they conclude that environmental policy will reduce resources used in 
an emission-intensively producing sector and in production activities in both sectors. 
Resource use in abatement will increase. This holds for both the small- and the two-
country case. For a given relative commodity price, national income will decline. If the 
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relative price is variable, national income will decline when either the emission intensity 
of a sector is relatively high or when it has a high price elasticity of demand. 
           Many other studies also reveal the negative effects of environmental policies on 
national income, e.g. Manne and Richels (1991a), (1991b), and (1992); Manne (1992); 
Dervis et al. (1982); Rose et al. (1994); Yao et al. (1994); and Zhang (1998). The 
economic theory implied in those studies is that pollution abatement policies reduce 
production and thus decrease national income. However, when we talk about the negative 
impacts of environmental policy on national income, we should also keep in mind that 
this does not mean a definite decrease in welfare. Due to the implementation of 
environmental policies, the supply of environmental goods increases; however, to a large 
extent, such impacts are not considered in national income account evaluations. In 
addition the production of pollution abatement equipment can offset losses in industrial 
production due to more stringent environmental standards. 
 
2.2.2  Impacts on Employment 
           There has been substantial debate and confusion about whether environmental 
policies do or do not influence domestic employment (Hopkins 1992). So far it is difficult 
to come to any precise conclusions, though at least in the short run, negative effects 
caused by a cutback in production will lead to a considerable decline in employment 
(Zhang 1998). However, in the long run, environmental policies will result in investment 
in pollution control equipment and thus create more employment opportunities. 
According to the OECD (1985), with few exceptions employment levels rise with 
pollution-control expenditure, particularly under some variants in the United States, 
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France, and Norway. Jobs are created by the production, installation, and maintenance of 
pollution control plants and equipment. However, this additional labor input does not 
generate additional measured output and capital stock is diluted with the portion of 
capital required to control pollution. The implication of this result is an implicit 
worsening of productivity growth. This occurs because national income growth rates are 
either somewhat lower, or only slightly higher, than they otherwise would have been, 
while labor inputs increase because of environmental measures.  
 
2.2.3 Impacts on Other Economic Variables 
Denison (1979) and Crandall (1981) show that environmental regulations adopted 
in the 1970s had a negative effect on U.S. productivity growth. Investigations on five 
OECD countries reveal that productivity levels are usually lower than they would have 
been without environmental programs (OECD 1982). However, the validity of these 
results is weakened by the underlying assumption that environmental policies increase 
production costs since capital and labor invested to comply with environmental policies 
do not contribute to measurable output, nor do the efforts required for paperwork and 
legal formalities of compliance. Many empirical studies show that, in general, the impact 
of environmental polices on industrial production costs is very small because pollution 
abatement costs constitute a very small portion of industrial costs on average, e.g. see 
Tobey (1990), OECD (1985), Smith and Ulph (1982), and Jaffe et al.(1995). Moreover, 
in some industries the implementation of environmental policies is accompanied by 
positive productivity effects. For instance, pollution reduction with energy saving and 
material recovery may lower the unit cost of production and increase product sales 
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because in some cases recovered materials can be profitable by-products. Recent wisdom 
is that environmental policies induce more cost-effective processes that both reduce 
emissions and the overall cost of doing business(U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1992). Porter and Linde (1995) further point out that, from a dynamic view, 
environmental regulations provide incentives for technical innovation and hence in some 
industries productivity will rise in response to properly crafted environmental 
regulations. 
          The impact of environmental protection costs on product prices also has received 
attention, e.g., Pasurka (1984), Mutti and Richardson (1977), Walter (1973), and 
Robinson (1988). Most studies of this kind utilize an input-output framework and assume 
that all costs pass through into prices. The price changes caused by environmental 
policies can be derived simply by multiplying the abatement cost vector by the standard 
total requirements matrix. Robinson (1988) argues that the assumption of full-cost pass-
through into prices is reasonable in the long run. He also points out that greater than full-
cost pass-through is possible in oligopolistic industries, while in highly competitive 
industries, price increases smaller than cost increases might occur. Moreover, the use of 
the full-cost pass-through assumption helps ensure that the estimates of the price changes 
are, in fact, upper bounds.  
 
2.2.4 Impacts on Balance of Trade and  Payments 
          Among the contributions to the impact of environmental policies on the balance 
of trade and payments, works by Baumol and Oates (1975) and Robinson (1988) are 
important. Based on a two-final-good model, Baumol and Oates (1975) analyze the trade 
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impacts of industrial pollution abatement costs and derive the balance of trade conditions 
for a two-good, two-country world. In doing so, one good has pollution associated with 
its production, while the other does not. According to this model, only direct abatement 
costs have an impact on prices and thus on the balance of trade and payments. Robinson 
(1988) extends Baumol and Oatess (1975) two-good model to a seventy-eight sector 
model with all interindustry effects considered. Using this extended model, Robinson 
applies an ex-post partial-equilibrium method to measure the impact of marginal changes 
in industrial pollution abatement costs on the U. S. balance of trade in general, and on the 
balance of trade with Canada in particular. Robinsons work shows that environmental 
policy has a significant negative effect on the balance of trade if environmental costs are 
fully reflected in commodity prices. 
 
2.2.5 Impacts on Sustainable Development 
          As is well known, free trade policy is designed to allow markets to allocate 
resources according to their most efficient uses, while environmental policy seeks to 
manage and maintain the earths resources efficiently. Though conflicts may arise where 
the same resources are subject to both trade and environmental purposes, on the most 
fundamental level, trade and environmental policy must meet in the concept of 
sustainable development. Both trade policy and environmental policy must serve that 
concept as their ultimate goal. (EPA Trade and Environment Committee 1991). 
          Hudson (1993) provides a useful starting point from which to examine the issues 
related to trade, environmental policy, and sustainable development. He begins with a 
philosophical approach to trade and environment. He argues that an environmental 
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perspective on trade should not be construed as anti-trade, since trade can be an important 
instrument with which to achieve development that is economically and environmentally 
sustainable. He points out that in the long run environmental policy will not be successful 
if it ignores the development needs of the worlds poor; and on the other hand, the 
benefits of a more liberalizing trading system cannot be sustained over the long-term if 
environmental and natural resources considerations are not taken into account. 
 The impacts of trade liberalization and globalization on sustainable development 
have been examined by recent empirical case studies, i.e., Dragun and Tisdell (1999) and 
Jha, Markandya, and Vossenaar (1999). Though trade liberalization and world economic 
globalization portend an international win-win situation, those studies find that there is 
substantial evidence to suggest that trade liberalization and globalization appear to have a 
negative impact on agricultural sustainability in developing countries. The reconciliation 
of trade and the environment is the key to achieve sustainable development,. Moreover, 
special attention needs to be paid to local issues in poor countries in the face of trade 
liberalization and globalization. 
 
2.3 Patterns of Trade and Comparative Advantage 
2.3.1 Patterns of World Trade in Environmentally Sensitive Goods 
          Economic analysis would suggest that environmental policies raise production 
costs and hence encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs 
in countries with more stringent environmental regulations, e.g. Pethig (1976), Siebert 
(1977), McGuire (1982). That is, countries with less stringent environmental policies 
could increase their comparative advantage in the production of environmentally 
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sensitive goods. However, this standard trade theory is challenged by a more recent 
revisionist view. Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that tight environmental policies 
are actually positive forces driving private firms and the economy as a whole to become 
more competitive in world markets by spurring innovation in environmental 
technologies. These conflicting views have since then led to a heated debate (see Stewart 
1993 for an overview). 
          Tobey (1990, 1993) approaches this problem empirically by examining 
environmental policy and patterns of world trade. Following earlier studies on shifting 
patterns of international trade by Leamer (1984) and Bowen (1983), Tobey employs a 
cross-section Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model to test the hypothesis that the 
stringency of environmental policies is directly related to the exports of pollution-
intensive commodities. Pollution-intensive commodities are defined by Tobey as the 
products of those industries whose abatement costs in the United States are equal to or 
greater than 1.85 percent of total costs. According to this criterion, among the 64 
agricultural and manufacturing commodities under investigation, 24 are labeled as 
pollution-intensive commodities. Using econometric methods, Tobey aggregates the 24 
commodities into five groups and regresses the net exports from each group on US 
endowments of 11 resources and a dummy variable which indicates the stringency of a 
countrys environmental policies. The statistical results indicate that there is no 
significant linear relationship between the stringency of environmental policy and the net 
exports of the pollution-intensive commodities. That is, environmental policy has no 
significant impact on patterns of world trade. Tobey also tests the impact of 
environmental policy on trade patterns by investigating the bias in the regression 
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residuals when the variables representing countries environmental endowments are not 
included in the HOV model. If environmental policy does have an impact on net exports, 
then countries with stringent policy should have a negative expected sign in the error 
term, while the residuals of the countries with lenient policy should be positive. By 
examining the residuals, however, Tobey finds no assumed distribution of the error terms 
and thus concludes that the impact of environmental policy on world trade patterns is not 
significant. 
 
2.3.2 Comparative Advantage 
        According to classical trade theory, a countrys comparative advantage stems from 
differences in technologies and in factor endowments (as compared with the respective 
conditions of its trading partner). That is, a country may have a comparative advantage if 
a country has technology by which it can produce a product with relatively low cost, or it 
is rich in certain resources. Since the 1970s, numerous theoretical studies have tried to 
examine the impact of environmental policy on comparative advantage, e.g. see Siebert 
(1977), Siebert et al. (1980), Pethig (1976), McGuire (1982), Baumol and Oates (1988), 
Krutilla (1991), Carraro and Siniscalo (1992), Brander and Taylor (1997), and Markusen 
(1997). 
          Siebert and his co-authors (1980) have employed a two-commodity-two-country 
model to investigate possible different technologies as determinants of comparative 
advantage. Their major result confirms the intuitively expected result that a countrys 
technological comparative advantage to produce less pollution-intensive goods is 
strengthened by environmental policy. In addition, if one country has a technological 
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comparative advantage for pollution intensive goods before trade, it can negate this 
advantage by adopting a sufficiently stringent environmental policy. That is, if a country 
exports and specializes in a pollution intensive good and if it has appropriate 
technologies, it generally can switch its trade flows by enforcing a sufficiently stringent 
environmental policy. This group also investigates comparative advantage stemming 
from differences in relative factor abundance, which include divergences in the quality of 
resource endowments and in demand conditions. The most interesting feature of their 
analysis was the treatment of a countrys emission standards as a factor endowment. With 
this interpretation, they apply the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory of pure 
trade to the case of two countries, both of which implement an environmental price and 
standards system. They then point out that, given certain qualifications, even the Factor-
Price-Equalization theorem applies to the emissions taxes. That is, the two countries 
relative emission taxes also equalize in a trading equilibrium, even though both countries 
pursue stringent environmental policies in different ways. 
          Baumol and Oates (1988) also confirm conventional views on this issue. In their 
model, both countries produce an identical traded good and its production generates 
pollution in both countries. Using partial equilibrium analysis, Baumol and Oates 
demonstrate that if a country does not impose environmental policy when the other 
country does, then the first country will increase its comparative advantage or decrease its 
comparative disadvantage in the pollution-intensive industry. This change in comparative 
advantage will lead the first country to specialize in that industry at the cost of 
environmental degradation. 
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          Brander and Taylor (1997) more recently examined the question of whether 
countries with low standard (LS) resource management policies might have a 
comparative advantage over countries with  high standard (HS) resource management 
policies. They construct a trade model between an LS country (countries possessing weak 
resource management) and an HS country (countries possessing rational resource 
management). Both countries are endowed with an identical renewable natural resource 
and both countries are identical except for their resource management policies. Using 
general equilibrium analysis, Brander and Taylor (1997) demonstrate that with no trade 
(autarky) there are two steady-state harvesting rates for the LS country: mild overuse and 
severe overuse. With the introduction of trade between the two countries, in the mild 
overuse case the LS country has a comparative advantage and thus is a net exporter of the 
resource good in steady state. This result confirms the received view on the relationship 
between environmental policy and comparative advantage. However, in the case of 
severe overuse in autarky, the LS country becomes a steady state importer of the 
resource good after trade opens. The result in this case contradicts the received view.  
          As mentioned before, Porter and van der Linder (1995) challenge the received 
view relating environmental policy and comparative advantage by arguing that 
comparative advantage does not depend on static efficiency or on optimizing within fixed 
constraints; rather it is a function of the capacity of a firm to initiate innovation and 
improvements in order to shift those constraints. Moreover, tight environmental policy 
can, at times, act as an incentive to domestic firms with a strong home base to create a 
first mover-type of comparative advantage. Since such contradicting views result from 
applying theory alone, empirical studies can play a role in settling such disputes by 
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measuring both the magnitude and sign of the impact of environmental policy on 
comparative advantage. However, so far the empirical results have been ambiguous, i.e. 
Ugelow (1982), Tobey (1990), and Jaffe et al. (1995). 
 
2.4 Terms of Trade 
2.4.1 Impacts of Emission Standards in One Country 
          According to trade theory, a change in terms of trade may increase or lower the 
social cost of attaining a given target of environmental quality from what it would have 
been if the terms of trade had remained constant. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine 
whether a country will be able to share its costs of the imposition of environmental 
policies with the rest of the world via a terms-of-trade improvement. Siebert and his co-
authors (1980) investigate the analytical links between alternative levels of the emissions 
standards in a country and any possible resulting changes in terms of trade. 
          Siebert and his co-authors use the well-known two-country model of trade as their 
framework of analysis. They assume that the home country undertakes an emissions 
standard policy while the rest of the world employs no environmental policies and that 
environmental policy affects comparative costs in the case of a binding emissions 
standard. Using comparative statics, they show that under their assumptions free trade 
with direct pollution control in the form of an emissions standard enables the acting 
country to improve its terms of trade if the production of the exportable good is relatively 
emissions intensive. They argue that the initiation of a pollution control policy of the 
home country decreases the relative abundance of the good affected by the policy and, in 
order to equalize world demand and output, the relative price of the good has to increase. 
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The home countrys terms of trade improve because its total output is smaller, while that 
of the foreign country remains unchanged. They interpret this result as signifying that 
trade enables a country which undertakes an environmental policy to transfer a share of 
its real costs of pollution control generated entirely within its own borders to the rest of 
the world. In the opposite case where the import is relatively emissions intensive, they 
obtain a deterioration effect of the terms of trade, which implies an additional component 
of social cost to achieve the policy goal. In reality, however, just as the authors 
themselves point out, the trading partner would likely also undertake a control policy so 
that the outcome on terms of trade must be different. A formal analysis of this case would 
be much more complicated. 
 
2.4.2 Impacts of Pollution Taxes in One Country 
       Magee and Ford (1972) provide a fruitful analysis of the implications of alternative 
pollution abatement taxes for the terms of trade in the United States. The authors divide 
the U.S. economy into an import sector and an export sector and then set up a simple 
four-equation model of the demand for imports into the United States and the supply of 
imports from abroad. Throughout, the authors use partial equilibrium analysis, i. e., 
import and export price changes are assumed to be independent. 
           According to Bhagwati (1971), a production tax is the most efficient solution to 
controlling production pollution, while a consumption tax is the optimal response to 
consumption pollution. Using this principle, Magee and Ford (1972) first examine the 
consequences of government taxation to combat either production or consumption 
pollution in the import sector. They demonstrate that if pollution occurs at the production 
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level, a production tax on U.S. import-competing production will unambiguously result in 
an increase in the quantity, the price and in the value of U.S. imports. This leads to 
deterioration in the U.S. terms of trade. In the case of pollution derived from goods 
consumed in the import sector, if U.S. imports are complementary to domestic non-
import-competing production, then the consumption tax increases the price, the quantity 
and hence the value of the import. Again, the U.S. terms of trade deteriorates. If, on the 
other hand, U.S. imports are substitutes with domestic non-import-competing production, 
then the consumption tax reduces the quantity, the price and the value of U.S. imports; 
this means that the consumption tax improves the U.S. terms of trade. 
         Magee and Ford then turn to a similar analysis of the case where pollution occurs 
in the export sector. Their results show that if a production tax is imposed on the export 
sector, export prices and the price of domestic goods will increase and hence the tax 
improves the U.S. terms of trade. If a tax is levied on domestic consumption of the 
exportable product in the United Stated, the authors illustrate that the U.S. terms of trade 
will deteriorate (improve), if exporter marginal costs are increasing (decreasing). The 
results are less clear in this case since it is difficult to empirically decide whether costs 
are increasing or decreasing for the U.S. exporters. 
          There appear to be no studies explaining how pollution taxes influence the terms 
of trade of the developing countries. 
 
2.4.3 Transnational Pollution Case 
          Due to the spatial characteristics of environmental issues, transnational pollution 
issues (e.g., acid rain and the pollution of the Great Lakes or industrial pollution and the 
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Rhine river) have inevitably become a serious problem for governments throughout the 
world. The solution to this problem usually requires that the countries involved adopt 
some abatement strategies appropriate to control transborder pollution. 
          To examine the impact of these strategies on terms of trade, Merrifield (1988) 
constructs a two-country general equilibrium (GE) trade model with pollution and 
introduces two abatement strategies, production taxes and the abatement equipment 
standard. Merrifields model represents an advance over previous work (e.g. McGuire 
1982), in that pollutants, goods, and capital are assumed to be internationally mobile, and 
prices of factors, goods and terms of trade are determined endogenously. The key to this 
analysis is the impact of abatement strategies on prices and, hence, on the movement of 
goods and productive resources between the trading countries. By means of comparative 
static analysis, Merrifield finds that, in general with internationally mobile goods, capital, 
and pollutants, the comparative static results are ambiguous except that the abatement 
equipment standard strategy has an unambiguous impact on pollution flows. He thus 
employs the model to analyze the impact of  abatement strategies in the context of the 
acid rain deposition problem between the U.S. and Canada. 
          Merrifield illustrates that if the two countries jointly and simultaneously levy a 
production tax, production in both countries will not be altered and, consequently, the 
terms of trade will not change. Similarly, if both countries agree to raise their abatement 
equipment standards, there will be no change in the terms of trade if the elasticity of 
substitution of capital for labor is similar in the two countries. He also demonstrates that 
if Canada adopts a stricter abatement standard, the terms of trade will be shifted in 
Canadas favor. However, since much attention is paid to the analysis of the effect of 
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abatement strategies on transnational pollution, many related questions, such as how a 
countrys production tax influences the terms of trade or whether a country with a stricter 
abatement standard can improve its terms of trade, are not fully explored. 
 
2.5 Patterns of Production and Consumption 
2.5.1 Adjustments in Production Sectors 
          Environmental protection policies may lead to sectoral structure distortion in the 
conservationist country. This distortion is reflected by changes in product prices and in 
sectoral production. In general, with the imposition of environmental protection costs in 
one sector, the product price of that sector will increase and the rise in product price tends 
to be spread over the whole economy. Similarly, a reduction in emissions of certain 
pollutants may cause a change in sectoral production. 
          Utilizing a partial equilibrium input-output framework, Pasurka (1984) analyzed 
the magnitude of the impact of environmental protection costs on U.S. product prices in 
1977. The advantage of the input-output framework is that the effects of the abatement 
costs that are passed along in the form of higher prices of intermediate goods can be 
observed. In his analysis, Pasurka divides the US economy into 79 production sectors. 
Pasurkas study reveals that the total percentage increase in product prices ranges from 
0.12 percent for real estate and rental to 6.58 percent for electric, gas, water and sanitary 
services. The average weighted price increase is found to be 0.97 percent. This result 
shows that for most U.S. industry sectors, environmental protection costs do not result in 
significant price increases. However, the accuracy of the result is discounted by several 
of the assumptions made in order to conduct the input-output analysis. In particular, the 
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assumption of fixed input-output coefficients, when there are changes in relative prices 
due to environmental protection costs, leads to imprecise results. 
          By means of a CGE model, Zhang (1998) empirically investigates the impact of 
CO2 emission limits on Chinas sectoral production. According to Zhang, aggregate gross 
production tends to contract at an increasing rate as carbon dioxide emission targets 
become more stringent. However, changes in sectoral gross production differ 
significantly among sectors in both absolute and relative terms. For example, under 
alternative scenarios that Chinas CO2 emissions in 2010 will be cut by 20 and 30 
percent, the coal sector is affected most severely; its gross production falls by as much as 
26 and 38 percent, respectively. The gross production of the agricultural sector is the least 
affected; it falls by only 0.49 and 0.28 percent respectively. In contrast to these 
negatively affected sectors, gross production increases are observed for the service sector. 
Moreover, its expansions rise at an increasing rate as CO2 emissions reduction become 
greater (1.71 and 5.53 percent in the two scenarios respectively). The results indicate that, 
given reductions in CO2 emission, an economy will restructure toward labor-intensive 
sectors.  
 
2.5.2 Impacts on Production 
The literature on environmental supply impacts has been inconclusive. According 
to Leontiefs (1970) input-output study, in a closed economy assuming that the 
elimination of pollution can be achieved by use of intermediate products from sectors 
other than anti-pollution and that final deliveries to households remain constant, the 
output of all the productive sectors clearly will increase. Moreover, the more complete 
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the elimination, the greater the magnitude of the increase. Siebert, Eichberger, Gronych 
and Pethig (1980) have studied the impacts of an emission standard on the supply side of 
a closed economy using a two-sector-two factor model. When a given commodity price 
ratio is assumed, the authors conclude that the restriction of the emissions standard 
reduces the output of the relatively emissions intensive sector and increases the output of 
the other sector. The authors further examine changes in relative commodity supply and 
show that the restriction of an emissions standard brings about a rise in the output of the 
capital intensive (labor intensive) sector, if it is much more difficult to substitute capital 
(labor) in both sectors with emissions relative to the other factor. The impact of the 
restriction on the total production of the economy is not discussed. 
          The OECD (1985) investigated the effects of various environmental programs on 
the levels of GDP in selected OECD countries. Its findings show that a period of initial 
GDP growth (0.1 and 0.2 percent in the Netherlands and the United States, respectively) 
is followed by a decline during the final program year and beyond (up to 0.7 and 1.1 
percent). The GDP trend indicates that production is affected by environmental programs 
via two forces. The first force is generated by additional demands for goods and services. 
The installation of pollution controls increases capital investment and the services 
required to operate it. The second force is created by the multiplier and accelerator effects 
of these additions to demand. Both forces interact to promote production expansion in the 
early years of the programs. Over time, however, the expansion places pressure on the 
utilization of productive capacity and hence on costs and prices. Rising costs and prices 
begin to offset the favorable impact on production. And, when the programs are over, 
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only negative price effects remain, and production levels fall below those without 
environmental programs. 
 
2.5.3 Impacts on Consumption 
          There are also few studies that analyze how environmental policy influences 
consumption. Using macro econometric models, the OECD (1985) examined the impact 
of environmental protection programs on the aggregate demand components of some of 
its member countries. They found that four out of five case studies showed that in the 
final year of a pollution control program, total private consumption decreased only 
slightly, from 0.1 per cent in France to about 1.0 percent in the Netherlands and the 
United States, compared to consumption without the program. This decrease is caused by 
factors such as the impact of additional costs on consumer prices, and the rapid reduction 
of favorable multiplier effects on disposable income induced by taxation in some 
programs. Only in Norway does private consumption rise (by 0.3 per cent after the first 
few years and 0.7 per cent in the final year) as a result of environmental programs. 
Usually, the impact of abatement costs on prices has an unfavorable effect on real 
consumer spending. In the Norwegian case, however, this is more than offset by a higher 
overall level of activity leading to favorable multiplier effects on employment and 
household income. In addition all studies they reviewed report a slight decline in exports 
of goods and services (by 1 percentage point or less in the final year of a program) due to 
the adoption of environmental programs. Finally, the effects on private non-residential 
investment differ widely from study to study. While a negative effect is observed in the 
Netherlands, in the Finnish, French, and the U.S. studies, environmental programs lead to 
 31 
an increase in private non-residential investment. However, what causes this difference 
among these studies is not explored. 
 
2.6 Linkages between Trade, Environment and the Economy 
2.6.1 Conflicts between Trade Policy and Environmental Policy 
          The basic objective of trade policy is to liberalize international trade and to attain 
the benefits of comparative advantage. Taking this advantage leads a country to 
specialize in the production of goods and services that it can produce more efficiently. 
Accompanying the process of specialization, however, environmental problems may arise 
due to the externalities of specialization. In order to solve those problems, governments 
often have to provide certain kinds of environmental regulations or incentives that can 
either clash with trade policies or can alter them significantly. The conflicting 
relationship between trade and environmental policies has received both an economic and 
a political focus since the 1990s, e.g. see Housman and Zealke (1992), Jackson (1992), 
and Saunders (1994). 
           Audley (1997) points out that the conflicts between trade and environmental 
policy often involve the competitive differences between national and international 
environmental policies. Business leaders from multinational firms worry that competition 
with manufacturers operating in countries where they are not required to internalize 
similar environmental costs may enjoy price advantages created by such policy. On the 
other hand, developing countries argue that trade policies that require imports to meet 
domestic environmental standards effectively restrict access to larger markets, e.g. Snape 
(1995), Pearson (1993), and McAlpine and Le Donne (1993). The rise in non-tariff 
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barriers reported by the WTO sparked concern that environmental policy would become a 
new form of non-tariff protection (Runge 1990, 1993). Under the guise of environmental 
policies, foreign products might be prohibited from access to markets where domestic 
products are more expensive (Snape 1995, and Stokes 1992). Policy standards such as 
auto emissions, agricultural regulations controlling pesticide residues, and product 
component quality, have been criticized by trading countries that believe these policies 
are designed to restrict market access for foreign products under the guise of insuring 
food safety or promoting cleaner air. The focus adopted by environmentalists, however, 
varies from that described above. In effect, in the name of trade liberalization, 
competitive pressures present adverse impacts on efforts to set higher environmental 
standards. Therefore, environmentalists have to pressure their governments to set 
standards and to impose those standards on their trading partners as part of their effort to 
set international standards for environmental protection. Due to the absence of an 
effective international enforcement mechanism, some countries have to resort to 
unilateral actions. Under most circumstances, unilateral actions are a violation of existing 
WTO jurisprudence (Bhagwati and Patrick 1990, and Durbin 1995). 
           Housman and Zaelke (1992) discuss some options for reducing or eliminating the 
conflict between trade agreements and environmental policy. The main points of those 
options are to incorporate environmental considerations into trade agreements. For 
example, the former GATT did not view a partys application of lower domestic 
environmental standards that allow the partys industries to externalize their 
environmental costs as a subsidy (or dumping when the product is exported) that could be 
countervailed by another party whose industries are harmed by the subsidy (or dumping). 
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Some options suggest modifying or interpreting GATT Articles VI and XVI and the 
Subsidies Code to permit the imposition of countervailing duties or antidumping duties to 
counter such practices. However, Housman and Zaelke argue that quantifying the effect 
of differing environmental standards could pose additional administrative problems 
beyond those already associated with countervailing and antidumping statutes. 
Unfortunately, not much progress has resulted from research in this area. 
 
2.6.2 Transnational Pollution and Trade 
          The recent interest in transnational pollution and trade is concentrated on two 
issues. First, does free trade increase transnational pollution? Second, is green trade 
policy an efficient way to regulate transnational pollution? 
          Copeland and Taylor (1995b) examine the first issue using an approach different 
from earlier studies such as Merrifield (1988) and Rauscher (1991b). They develop a 
multi-good, many-country trade model in a general equilibrium setting. Assuming that 
global environmental quality is a pure public good whose supply responds endogenously 
to trade-induced changes in relative prices and incomes and by dividing the countries into 
North and South groups, the authors use the model to explore how welfare and pollution 
levels are affected by free trade in goods and pollution permits, by international income 
transfers, and by international agreements limiting or reducing pollution emissions, 
respectively. They also demonstrate that, in a factor price equalized trade equilibrium, 
trade raises the level of pollution generated by each Southern country, lowers the 
pollution level generated by each Northern country, and leaves world pollution 
unaffected. They also show that if trade does not equalize factor prices, then free trade 
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increases global pollution in a equilibrium under specialization and the supply response 
to the factor-price movements created by trade leads to reduced pollution in the North 
and increased pollution in the South. The authors further investigate the effect of income 
on trade and world pollution and find that the pre-trade world income distribution 
determines how trade will affect the environment. If the world distribution of income is 
highly skewed, then free trade increases world pollution; but if countries have relatively 
similar incomes, then free trade has no adverse effect on pollution. 
           There is also an extensive literature on the second issue concerning the efficiency 
of green trade policy. Baumol (1971), Markusen (1975b), and Rauscher (1991b) have 
shown that it may be in one countrys interest to use trade policy in order to reduce 
transnational pollution from abroad. Recently, Maestad (1998) goes further by arguing 
that the use of green trade policy may be desirable from a global point of view as well 
because such measures may promote global economic efficiency. He assumes: firstly, 
that the trade provisions are implemented jointly with full Pigouvian taxes on domestic 
sources of environmental degradation; and secondly, that the trade provisions do not have 
any direct effect on the environmental policy pursued by a foreign government. Based on 
the analysis of a two-country partial equilibrium model, the author concludes that when 
some countries are reluctant to internalize environmental costs, efficiency in the global 
economy may be enhanced by regulating the trade with these countries; note that Baumol 
and Oates (1988) also obtain the same result. Efficient green trade policy may take the 
form of trade restrictions or trade promotions, depending on the type of environmental 
problem and on whether the domestic net import of the relevant commodity is positive or 
negative. The policy implication of this study is that international trade agreements such 
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as those formed under the WTO should be revised in order to accommodate the demand 
for discriminating green trade measures to some extent. This study also shows that the 
usefulness of green trade policy is not restricted to the transnational pollution case; trade 
provisions may promote global economic efficiency when some countries take unilateral 
steps towards solving local environmental problems as well. 
 
2.6.3 Natural Resources and Trade  
          There are many studies that evaluate the relations between natural resources and 
trade, e.g. see Withagen (1985), Puttock and Sabourin (1992), and Park and Labys 
(1999). In fact, the theoretical linkages between natural resources and international trade 
are many and varied. Research attempting to integrate natural resources and international 
trade usually captures one or both of the two essential features of the asset nature of 
natural resources. These include the rate of change of the resource stock over time and /or 
the long-run equilibrium condition on the rate of return from holding the resource 
(Dasgupta et al. 1978). There are two general approaches to this integration. The first 
places trade possibilities into the standard closed-economy model of resource use to 
determine whether the results obtained from the closed economy carry-over to the open 
economy. In the second approach, natural resources are added to a standard trade model 
to determine how they affect trade and whether standard trade theory carries over to 
economies that have natural resources. 
          In surveying these linkages, Segerson (1988) summarizes that, intertemporally, 
the existence of an externality associated with resource use implies a divergence between 
private and social comparative advantage. As a result, market-determined production and 
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trade patterns are no longer Pareto optimal. The same is true if intertemporal externalities 
associated with user costs are not fully internalized. She further concludes that even if an 
intertemporal externality is fully internalized, the dynamic aspects of natural resource use 
can still affect international trade. In particular, it can: (1) cause resource production and 
trade decisions to be closely linked to capital markets and thus create an additional link 
between capital markets and trade,  (2) force small countries that are dependent on 
imports of essential exhaustible resources to export more and more of their agricultural 
commodities to cover the increasing cost of resource inputs,  (3) direct resource-rich 
countries to increase the degree of processing of natural resources prior to export to avoid 
rent extraction by resource-poor importers,  and (4) increase the possibility of complete 
specialization due to relative resource endowments or differing rates of time preference. 
 
2.6.4 Hazardous Substances and Trade 
          Hazardous substances usually refer to those which have a direct or indirect 
negative impact on environmental quality (pesticide, chemicals, and hazardous wastes for 
example). Since the 1980s, there is an increasing evidence of potential or actual damage 
due to exports of hazardous substances. Scherr (1987) and Azevedo (1982) survey the 
evolution of U.S. regulations of such trade. The main issues in the U.S. involve the listing 
of ingredients or chemical components of exports and imports, explicit bans on drugs 
which are domestically prohibited, and procedures for altering importing countries of the 
export of hazardous substances. 
          Oates and Schwab (1988) propose four necessary conditions to achieve optimal 
trade in wastes: (1) the exporting country should inform the receiving country of the 
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content of the wastes and their potential risks, (2) the reservation price must include not 
only the opportunity cost of the land but also the full social cost caused by the disposal of 
the waste, (3) transportation costs must incorporate the full social cost of shipping the 
wastes from the generating site to the destination, and (4) developing countries must 
effectively enforce environmental regulations to reduce the illegal dumping that creates 
substantial social costs. Xing and Kolstad (1996) point out that patterns of waste trade 
include two routes. One route is from a high-income country to a low-income country. 
The other route is between industrialized countries where the waste flows are from a 
country with abundant assimilative capacity to the one that has scarce assimilative 
capacity. 
 
2.6.5 Global Warming and Trade 
            In the past two decades, academic and policy concerns over the risks of global 
warming have led to numerous publications addressing this issue. However, there is no 
discussion about the role of trade in the global warming process. On the contrary, there 
are many studies on the trade effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement and the use of 
trade measures to limit GHG emissions in order to slow down the global warming 
process. 
          Whalley and Wigle (1991) quantitatively investigate the effect of GHG abatement 
on the terms of trade between fuels and final goods. They illustrate that the terms of trade 
between fuels and final goods are potentially sensitive to GHG abatement. Abatement is 
bound to lower the supply price of carboniferous fuels relative to business-as-usual, but it 
will also raise the demand price of such fuels, directly if it is pursued by taxes or tradable 
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carbon permits or indirectly by raising shadow prices if it is pursued by regulation. 
Burniaux et al. (1991a, b) and Symons et al. (1990) have conducted similar research. 
These studies also show that the terms of trade between fuels and other goods will be 
altered no matter how abatement is achieved, but the direction of change depends on 
whether the (explicit or implicit) carbon tax is collected  and kept by consumers or by 
producers. 
          The issue of how GHG abatement influences changes in international 
competitiveness has also received some consideration, e.g. see Glomsrod et al. (1992) 
and Blitzer et al. (1990). Competitive issues arise if abatement falls unevenly across 
countries. Unfortunately, the greater the abatement, the higher are industrial costs and the 
less competitive the economy. 
          In recent years, various forms of international GHG emissions trading systems 
have been studied, e.g. see Manne and Richels (1996), and Edmonds et al. (1997). It is 
believed that emissions trading can bring about substantial potential abatement cost 
savings compared with abatement measures such as international GHG taxation and 
quotas. However, one challenge in achieving such benefits in practice is that emissions 
trading requires an international allocation of emissions rights. International negotiation 
on this issue would be very difficult. Implementation and enforcement of such an 
emissions trading system are also a problem in an international setting. 
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2.7 Pollution Redeployment to Developing Countries 
2.7.1 National Environmental Policy and Capital Mobility 
          The relationship between national environmental policy and capital mobility has 
been studied extensively since the 1970s, e.g. see Cumberland (1978) and (1981), 
McGuire (1982), Oates  and Schwab (1988), Sinn (1994), Wellisch (1995), and Schneider 
and Wellisch (1997). It is generally believed that in an open economy, the strictness of a 
countrys environmental policy may influence the countrys competitiveness for mobile 
capital. An earlier investigation into the issue was conducted by McGuire (1982). In 
order to analyze the movement of capital across frontiers caused by environmental 
regulation, McGuire incorporates an environmental factor, in the form of effluent output, 
as an input of the polluting industry into a two-factor-and-two-country Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. The environmental regulation is represented by the marginal product of the 
effluent, which is a variable determined by the public. In the absence of regulation the 
marginal product of effluent is equal to zero. Thus, the effect of the environmental 
regulation on the polluting industry is equivalent to negative neutral technical progress. 
That is, for the same bundle of labor and capital inputs, the polluting industry will 
produce less if an environmental regulation is applied. Therefore, if capital is freely 
mobile across boundaries, the least differential regulation between countries will entirely 
drive out the regulated industry from the more to the less regulated economy. 
          A recent interesting discussion on environmental policy and capital mobility is 
presented by Schneider and Wellisch (1997). In their analysis, an economy consists of a 
traded-good and a non-traded-good sector. Furthermore, free capital mobility is allowed 
between countries. According to the study, given that production technologies are the 
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same in both sectors and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 
positive, it is unambiguously the case that, in order to keep the outflow of the factor 
rewards to emissions low, the non-traded-good sector receives relatively more emissions 
permits. This counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that prices can be adjusted for non-
traded but not for traded goods. Suppose that emissions allowances are increased in the 
traded sector at the expense of the non-traded-good sector, holding the overall emissions 
level constant. The traded-good sector experiences a capital inflow while the non-traded a 
capital outflow and fewer non-tradables will be produced. This drives up the price for 
non-tradables. Thus, due to the flexible output price for non-tradables, capital inflows 
into the traded-good sector are not fully offset by capital outflows of the nontraded 
sector. Restricting the outflow of emissions rents implies a limiting of the inflow of 
capital, since the implicit factor reward on emissions is part of the interest payments 
flowing out of the country. Hence the authors conclude that restricting the outflow of 
emissions rents results in relative generous pollution allowances in the non-traded-good 
sector. 
 
2.7.2 Environmentally-Induced Industrial Relocation 
The industry flight hypothesis suggests that since the developed countries 
impose tougher environmental policies than do the developing countries, polluting 
industries shift operations from the developed to the developing countries; developing 
countries thus become pollution havens. According to Xing and Kolstad (1996), this 
hypothesis is based on three arguments. First, environmental policies will increase the 
production costs of the polluting industries. Second, tough environmental policies 
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discourage new investment away from the polluting industries. Third, since some policies 
directly confine the range of products or the inputs of production, producers have to 
relocate their production in other areas. 
          However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies in most cases support the 
industry flight hypothesis, i.e. for overviews, see Dean (1992), Xing and Kolstad (1996), 
and Ulph and Valentini (1997). Ulph and Valentini (1997) probe the issue using a model 
of two countries, two industries, an upstream and a downstream sector, and two firms in 
each industry. The authors carry out their analysis through a three-stage game: in the first 
stage the two countries set their environmental policies; in the second stage the firms in 
both industries choose how many plants and where to locate; and in the third stage firms 
choose their output levels, with the demand for the upstream firms being determined 
endogenously by the production decisions of the downstream firms. Based on their 
analysis, the authors come up with some surprising results. The effect of environmental 
policy imposed in one industry can sometimes be positive: i.e., a country imposing a 
small emissions tax can attract firms from other industries to locate in that country. In 
addition, environmental policy may have important hysteresis effects: once a countrys 
emission tax is high enough to drive firms out of the country, the country is unlikely to 
attract the firms back by lowering its emission tax. The authors attribute these results to 
the multiple-equilibrium feature of the models and to incentives for agglomeration. 
          Leonard and Duerksen (1980), Walter (1982), Pearson (1987), Leonard (1988), 
Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992), and Low and Yeates (1992) empirically investigate 
the industry flight hypothesis. Leonard and Duerksen (1980) analyze trade and 
investment data to find whether the differences in environmental control costs have led to 
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industrial flight toward developing countries. Their study shows that, instead of 
developing countries, the receivers of most foreign investment in polluting industries 
such as paper, chemicals, metals and petroleum refining are other industrial countries. 
Moreover, the percent of U.S. foreign direct investment in polluting industries in 
developing countries compared to developed countries did not show a significant increase 
over time. Hence they conclude that there is no evidence of the flight of U.S. industries to 
developing countries. Based on his study on the trend in foreign direct investment by 
firms from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States in the 1970s, Walter (1982) 
reaches the same conclusion. Although there exists a large amount of overseas production 
in polluting industries, there is little evidence that it has been caused by differing 
pollution abatement costs and that foreign direct investment is fleeing to countries with 
less stringent environmental policies. Pearsons (1987) survey also supports the 
conclusion that there is little evidence of industrial flight to developing countries. 
          According to Leonard (1988), the industrial flight and pollution haven hypotheses 
are not convincing because they are based on too static and too narrow a definition of 
comparative advantage. Therefore, in his case studies of foreign direct investment in 
Ireland, Spain, Mexico, and Romania, Leonard includes in his analysis factors such as the 
product cycle, industrial location decisions by firms, bargaining processes between 
multinationals and host countries, and development strategies. Again, the author finds no 
supportive evidence for the industrial flight and the pollution haven hypotheses. The four 
investigated countries seemed to react in accordance with the pollution haven hypothesis 
in the 1970s. However, gains obtained from lenient environmental policies were not great 
enough to change the locational preferences of multinationals since other considerations 
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such as labor supply, infrastructure and political stability appeared much more important 
in location selections. 
          Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige (1992) econometrically test the hypothesis that 
environmental policies drive polluting industries from the OECD countries to developing 
countries. In their study two regression models are employed. The first model regresses 
the toxic emissions density on GDP per capita and a time trend variable. The second 
regression is the growth rate of toxic emissions density on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita and an economic structure variable, the ratio of domestic prices to world prices, 
which is usually considered a measure of the openness of an economy. Though the two 
regressions reveal that the poorest countries have the highest growth rate of toxic 
emissions density, the results are insufficient to draw the conclusion that environmental 
policies lead to a flight of polluting industries to developing countries. The estimates 
show that economic growth has a significantly smaller effect on toxic emissions in open 
economies than in closed economies. If the industrial flight hypothesis held, then 
developing countries with open economies would have experienced a rapid growth of 
toxic emissions density. Their investigation finds no support for this. 
          Low and Yeates (1992) support the industrial flight hypothesis. The authors 
examine the worldwide redistribution of polluting industries with two indicators: the 
share of polluting industries exports in total world exports and the revealed comparative 
advantage of an industry, which is defined as the ratio of the industrys share in the 
countrys exports to the industrys share in total manufacturing exports. A country is said 
to have an advantage in an industry if the industrys revealed comparative advantage 
indicator is greater than one. According to this study, the worlds polluting industries 
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share of exports in total world exports shrank from 18.9 to 15.7 percent between 1965 
and 1988. For all developed countries, this share also declined from 20.4 to 15.9 percent 
during the same period. From 1966 to 1968, only 11 percent of the 109 countries sampled 
had a revealed comparative advantage indicator greater than one in their polluting 
industry. From 1986 to 1988, however, 22 percent of these countries had an indicator 
greater than one and most of the increase in the percentage was from developing 
countries. In contrast to the decreasing share of polluting industries (especially in 
developed countries), the authors conclude that stringent environmental policies in 
developed countries probably lead to the shift of polluting industries from developed to 
developing countries. 
 
2.8 Environmental Degradation 
2.8.1 Trade and the Global Environment 
The close linkages between trade and the global environment hava been widely 
recognized yet remain heavily disputable, e.g. see Baumol (1971), Grossman and 
Krueger (1993), World Bank (1992), French (1993), Bhagwati (1993), Daly (1993), 
Chichilnisky (1994), Copelead and Taylor (1994, 1997, 1999), Perroni and Wigle Taylor 
(1994), Lopez (1994), and Selden and Song (1994). In cases such as the shipment of low-
cost tropical timber from Malaysia to Japan and the U.S. exportation of lead car batteries 
to a plant near Sao Paulo, one could infer that trade affects the global environment 
negatively. However, in many other cases, world trade has demonstrated positive 
environmental effects as well. For example, fuel-efficient Japanese cars not only reduce 
air emissions in the United States but also force U.S. manufacturers to develop more fuel-
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efficient models. French (1993) summarizes that, for better or for worse, trade and trade-
induced integration of the world economy are shaping global environmental trends in at 
least three ways. First, trade intensifies the environmental impacts of domestic production 
by expanding international markets. Second, trade makes it possible for countries to 
obtain from other countries the desired products that are domestically either unavailable 
or protected by strict laws and hence effectively pass the environmental effects of 
consumption to someone else. Third, since national environmental policies and even 
some international environmental treaties are often attacked as nontariff barriers to 
trade, efforts to restore environmental quality within countries and to protect the global 
commons, such as the atmosphere and the oceans, are erroneously misjudged. 
In the debate over the environmental consequences of free trade, Bhagwati (1993) 
argues with Daly (1993) that environmentalists are wrong to fear the effects of free trade 
because both trade and environmental protection can be advanced by imaginative 
solutions. In responding to the widespread fear among environmentalists that free trade 
accelerates economic growth and that growth harms the environment, Bhagwati points 
out that the fear is misplaced since growth enables governments to tax and to raise 
resources for objectives such as pollution abatement and the general protection of the 
environment. For instance, rich countries today show greater concern about the 
environment than do poor countries. In addition, an empirical study by Grossman and 
Krueger (1993) also shows that some environmental quality indicators improve as 
income increases. Therefore, in Bhagwatis opinion, international trade should generally 
help protect the environment rather than harm it. 
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On the other side of the debate, Daly (1993) contends that the free traders seek to 
maximize profits and production without taking into consideration social and 
environmental costs. He further argues that by separating the costs and benefits of 
environmental exploitation, international trade makes the comparison between them more 
difficult and hence may mislead economies beyond their optimal scale. In this case 
environmental costs would rise faster than would any production benefits and the 
economy would enter an anti-economic phase that impoverished rather than enriched 
itself. Whats worse, Daly points out, since evidence shows that we have already passed 
that point, the faster we run the farther we fall behind. 
Chichilnisky (1994) addresses the trade and the global environment issue in a 
different way. She thinks that the problem reflects a North-South dimension. Developing 
countries in the South tend to over-produce and export environmentally intensive goods 
even if they are not well endowed with them. Developed countries in the North, on the 
other hand, tend to over-consume, even if trade equalizes all traded goods and all factor 
prices worldwide. According to Chichilnisky, the patterns of North-South trade in the 
global economy can be explained by differences in property rights, a factor previously 
neglected in the literature on trade and environmental issues. Her analysis proves that, if 
the South has ill-defined while the North has well-defined property rights, this property 
right difference can create the above-mentioned patterns of trade between the North and 
the South, even if the two region were identical in technologies, resource endowments, 
and preferences. She also examines some environmental policies and shows that taxing 
the use of environmental resources in the South is not always reliable since it can lead to 
more over-extraction if the resources are exploited using labor from a subsistence sector. 
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The author suggests that property-rights policies may be more effective for improving 
environmental and trade linkages. 
 
2.8.2 Trade-Induced Environmental Degradation  
As discussed in the previous section, in response to Bhagwatis (1993a) argument 
that trade promotes economic growth and that growth improves environmental quality, 
Daly (1993a) proposes that trade can induce environmental degradation and that 
degradation can lead to income losses and these income losses can result in further 
environmental degradation. Copeland and Taylor (1997, 1999) refer to Dalys conjecture 
as the trade-induced degradation hypothesis and work out a theoretic framework for 
this hypothesis. The authors examine the environmental consequences of trade by 
studying the role that trade plays in industries that are not only spatially separated but 
also functionally incompatible. They base their analysis on a simple two-industry 
dynamic model. Two incompatible industries are assumed to be a polluting 
manufacturing industry compared to an environmentally sensitive industry. If there is no 
trade, the productivity of the environmentally sensitive industry will be harmed by the 
production of the polluting manufacturing industry. Once trade exists, the two 
incompatible industries can move away from each other. Hence, trade can help to reduce 
cross-industry production externalities and to improve global productivity gains. 
However, all countries do not always benefit from any increase in global productivity, 
since changes in productivity can cause changes in terms of trade. The authors show that, 
if the share of world income spent on polluting goods is high, the environmental effects 
of trade will be positive in case of two identical, unregulated countries. When that share 
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is low, trade may worsen environmental degradation and result in a real income loss for 
the polluting goods exporting country. 
Lopez (1994) investigates the economic growth, trade, and environmental 
degradation relationship in a different setting in which unilateral trade liberalization in a 
small open developing economy is focused on. The study employs a neoclassical model 
with assumptions that have been widely applied to conventional general equilibrium and 
growth analyses (such as the existence of an aggregate function of capital, labor and 
technology, and constant return to scale of the production technology). In the macro 
production function environmental resources are incorporated as input factors represented 
by the level of pollution. The results of the analysis show that the stock effects of 
environmental resources on production and whether producers internalize such effects are 
closely related to the impacts of economic growth and trade liberalization on the 
environment. If and only if individual producers internalize the stock feedback effects on 
production, will economic growth and trade decrease environmental degradation. If 
environmental factors do not have stock effects on production, economic growth can 
harm the environment when preferences are homothetic. In the non-homothetic case, the 
level of the elasticity of substitution in production between conventional and 
environmental factors and the relative degree of curvature of utility in income inversely 
affect the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation. That is, 
the lower are the former, the worse the degradation that growth brings about. 
Empirical studies on this growth, trade, and environmental degradation issue are 
few and most draw similar conclusions. The World Bank (1992) concludes that 
international trade as such cannot be regarded as a cause of environmental degradation, 
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but what causes this degradation is the absence of appropriate environmental protection 
policies. And indeed, trade could improve the allocative efficiency of environmental 
goods among and within countries and hence reverse environmental degradation, if 
environmental costs are adequately internalized by removing domestic and international 
distortions. Lucus, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) focus their empirical study on air 
pollution and economic growth using data from both developing and developed countries 
over 1960-1988. The authors find that air pollution, in general, does not decline with 
economic growth. Specifically, the income effect on pollution intensity tends to be 
negative in more open countries while it is positive in closed economies. However, total 
emissions increase with income even in the most open countries, though in these 
countries pollution intensity declines. Since the openness of an economy directly reflects 
its extent of trade liberalization, this study implies that even though trade may not 
improve the environment, it at least does no harm to the environment. 
Perroni and Wigle (1994) have developed a numerical general equilibrium model 
of the world economy with local and global environmental externalities to examine the 
effect of trade on environment degradation. The authors group countries into North 
America (U.S. and Canada), other developed countries, and low and middle income 
countries. Population, trade, demand, and value-added data used in model calibration 
stem from 1986. Perfect competition and capital immobility are assumed in the analysis. 
In addition, three trade-policy scenarios--benchmark trade barriers, free trade, and trade 
wars, are designed for simulation. The numerical results of the study clearly show that 
compared to environmental policies, trade policies have little impact on environment 
quality. Though free trade may more or less deteriorate the environment, its relative 
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contribution to environmental degradation is quite small. The study also suggests that it 
would be very costly to use trade measure for environmental purposes.  
 
2.9 Factor Rewards 
2.9.1 Capital and Labor Rewards 
The costs incurred by environmental policies can be passed forward to the 
consumers of the polluting products, and/or backward to their factors of production. It 
seems, however, that the issue of how environmental policies affect factor rewards has 
not yet received much attention in the literature. Moreover, studies on the issue have been 
theoretical and general equilibrium in nature, e.g. see Yohe (1979), Siebert et al (1980), 
McGuire (1982), and Merrifield (1988). Another common feature of these studies is the 
use of a two-commodity and two-sector framework in which one sector is polluting and 
the other nonpolluting. Siebert et al. (1980) is an exception, and assumes that both sectors 
generate homogenous pollution. More often, pollution or environmental factors are 
incorporated in these studies as a production input into the polluting sector. 
 Yohe (1979) takes such an approach in his closed economy analysis. At first, he 
examines the incidence of stricter pollution standards on labor and capital rewards, given 
the assumption of fixed output prices in both sectors. With prices fixed, Yohe concludes 
that real returns to capital and labor move in opposite directions and that the shadow 
price of pollution increases when environmental policies become more restrictive. 
Especially, if the non-polluting sector is labor (capital) intensive, the transfer of 
production factors from the polluting to the non-polluting sector leads to a higher capital-
labor ratio and an increase (decrease) in labor reward, and at the same time a decrease 
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(increase) in capital reward. Further, the author re-examines the issue by setting output 
prices flexible and derives the same qualitatively identical result as with the presumption 
of fixed output price, but the magnitude of the effect of more restrictive pollution control 
on capital and labor rewards varies with the relative and weighted price elasticities of 
demand in both sectors.  
Based upon almost the same framework as Yohe (1979), Siebert et al. (1980) 
investigate the case where both sectors produce homogenous emissions. Their study 
shows that if one sector is strongly pollution intensive while the other is strongly capital 
(labor) intensive, then a tighter pollution standard results in a rise (decline) in the capital 
reward and a decline (rise) in the labor reward. If neither of the sectors is relatively 
pollution intensive, a tighter standard reduces the rewards of both factors. 
McGuire (1982) also develops an approach similar to Yohes (1979) concerning 
the environmental regulation and factor reward issue. However, he also introduces 
international trade and emissions damages and assumes a fixed marginal social cost of 
pollution. Prior to the incorporation of international trade, McGuire analyzes the effect of 
regulation on factor rewards in an autarchic equilibrium. It is not surprising that  the 
author comes to conclusions close to those of Yohe (1979) and Siebert et al. (1980): 
environmental regulation results in movements of capital and labor rewards in opposite 
directions and the rewards of capital and labor depend on the elasticity of demand for the 
polluting good and on the relative capital/labor intensity of the polluting good in 
comparison with the non-polluting good. After introducing international trade, the author 
separately analyzes the regulation effect on factor rewards in a coordination and an 
uncoordition case. When the two countries coordinate, a uniform shadow piece is levied 
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on emissions in the production of the polluting sector. The analysis demonstrates that the 
coordinated control does not change the outcome of factor price equalization obtained in 
the autarchy case. In the uncoordination case, however, factor price equalization no 
longer exists; it is destroyed by non-uniform regulations between the two countries. The 
author concludes that, for a small country with no influence over world commodity 
prices, pollution control regulation definitely decreases the reward of the factor used 
intensively in the production of the polluting sector and unambiguously raises the reward 
of the other factor. For a large country, its uncoordinated regulation will increase the 
world price of the regulated commodity, and the reward of the factor used intensively in 
the production of the regulated commodity will unambiguously enjoy a worldwide 
increase. 
Merrifields (1988) research follows up and advances the above studies. The 
model used by Merrifield is basically the same as that of Yohe (1979) and McGuire 
(1982). However, the author additionally allows pollution, commodities, and capital to be 
internationally mobile and output prices and factor rewards to be endogenous. The author 
also improves the model by including more restrictive emissions control equipment 
standards. In a general case, the analysis reveals that a production tax will cause changes 
in factor rewards. Specifically, if a countrys exporting commodity is taxed, the 
consumers price rises and the producers price falls, and both capital and labor rewards 
decrease in that country. If a restrictive abatement equipment standard is adopted in either 
country, the relative scarcity of products in the adoptive country may increase. The 
scarcity will be reduced if the country can absorb the excess capital supply released from 
the reduction in pollution. Therefore, if the production of pollution control equipment is 
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sufficiently capital-intensive, the excess capital supply will lower the rewards for capital 
and raise the rewards for labor in both countries. If the non-acting countrys share of total 
income is large and there is easier substitution of capital for labor in the acting country, 
labor rewards may decrease. The author also applies his analytical framework to the 
North American acid deposition issue in order to illustrate his theoretical results and finds 
that if Canada levies a production tax on its output, the pollution abatement effort reduces 
both capital and labor rewards. Similar results are derived if the U.S. acts alone. In case 
that two countries act jointly, the price of capital and wages in both countries fall. 
 
2.9.2 Resource Rewards 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, resource endowment is the key factor 
leading to trade. However, the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model usually includes 
only two resource factors of production, namely labor and capital. Some economists now 
recognize that other resources such as the environment, as well as other productive 
resources such as land and other natural resources, should be taken into consideration for 
more realistic models and theories, i.e. see Abbott and Haley (1988), Lopez (1994), 
McGuire (1982), Merrifield (1988), and Yohe (1979). 
Environment as a resource has been incorporated into the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
as a factor of production by Yohe (1979), McGuire (1982), and Merrifield (1988). Lopez 
(1994) uses a different neoclassical general equilibrium set up but the treatment of the 
environmental resource is about the same. The environmental factor is usually measured 
in those analyses in physical quantity of emissions to the environment as a result of 
production. The relationship between environmental policies and the prices of this factor 
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revealed in those studies is rather straightforward. In the case of no environmental policy, 
firms can discharge whatever amount of effluent generated in production into the 
environment without any costs. Thus, the price of the environmental factor is virtually 
zero. With an environmental policy, firms will use the environmental factor to the point 
where the value of its marginal product is equal to its price, which is determined by the 
marginal costs of pollution abatement. In general, the stricter an environmental policy, 
the higher the marginal abatement costs and hence the higher the price of the 
environmental factor. Obviously, those studies underestimate the price of the 
environmental resource because they neglect the marginal social costs of pollution. A 
reasonable determination of the environmental resource price should include not only the 
marginal costs of abatement but also the marginal social costs of pollution. 
There is little evidence on how environmental policies affect the rewards to land 
and other natural resources such as energy and materials when treated as factors of 
production. Lopez (1994) does model land and forest as two productive factors in his 
analysis. However, the authors interest is mainly on the stock feedback effect of those 
resources on economic growth and trade liberalization. The rent of land and the rewards 
of forest remain unconsidered.  
 
2. 10 Conclusions 
 Though approaches taken in the above studies are sufficiently varied to make 
comparisons among them difficult, together they constitute a body of knowledge that 
enables us to better understand how and to what extent environmental policies influence 
world trade and the degree to which interactions occur between trade and the 
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environment. To this end, it has been found that environmental policies can have an 
impact on a countrys domestic income and balance of trade and payments. However 
their impacts on employment are less clear. Whats more, their impacts on production 
costs and prices are still in dispute; theoretically, the enacting of environmental policies 
increases commodity prices and production costs, but this has not been fully supported by 
empirical studies. Second, according to conventional trade theory, environmental policies 
should affect patterns of world trade in environmentally sensitive goods and this would 
result in loss of comparative advantage. However, this conventional view has been 
challenged by recent theoretical and empirical studies. Third, the above studies show that 
impacts of environmental policies on the terms of trade depend on the type of policy and 
economic conditions under which a policy applies. In some cases, an environmental 
policy can improve the terms of trade, but in other cases, it may deteriorate the terms of 
trade. 
          The message these studies have sent to policy-makers is not unreasonable: there is 
no convincing evidence from empirical studies to support the hypothesis about the 
negative impact of environmental policy on international trade. Therefore, environmental 
policies which are usually designed to serve social objectives, at least, shouldnt seriously 
cause adverse trade effects. However, since the quantitative models employed for 
studying trade and environmental issues are always the result of abstractions and 
simplifications, it is difficult to directly apply the conclusions obtained from any 
theoretical or empirical study to other kinds of policy situations. Instead, one should 
evaluate results from several different studies, each shedding a specific light on the policy 
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issue of interest, in order to better understand what policy alternatives we have and how 





METHODS OF ANALYZING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 
 
3.1 Problems of Measuring Trade and Environmental Interactions 
 
 Among the various environment and trade issues reviewed in the previous 
chapter, attempts to analyze them have lacked robustness, e.g. Smith and Espinosa 
(1995), Copeland and Taylor (1995), and Perroni and Wigle (1994). This has led more 
recently to studies focused on developing and applying more effective quantitative 
approaches. Such efforts, however, have encountered a number of difficulties. First, any 
attempt to model trade and environmental interactions requires an interdisciplinary 
approach and hence knowledge of subjects such as economics, environmental science, 
international relations, and scientific law. Second, not much theoretical research has been 
quantified sufficiently to provide functional relations suitable for hypothesis testing. 
Third, little empirical evidence exists globally concerning the degree to which economic 
activities such as trade affect the natural environment and how individuals value 
environmental quality. Fourth, it is very difficult to link economic to physical 
dimensions, that is, to define and to estimate unambiguous indicators for environmental 
effects, specific environmental factors, strictness of environmental policies, or even of 
trade strategies. This problem includes the suitability and availability of comparable 
environmental data and indexes at the global level. And fifth, where it is possible to test 
qualitative relations, the nonlinear and other confounding effects make it difficult to 
apply conventional parametric or nonparametric test statistics.  
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Nonetheless, researchers have attempted to evaluate important environment and trade 
issues. The methods they have employed, as shown in Table 3.1, appear to concentrate on 
the following modeling approaches: (1) computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, 
(2) international trade models, (3) input-output models, (4) welfare models, (5) game 
theory models, (6) optimization models, (7) spatial GIS models, and (8) econometric 
models. Below we review each of these methods and discuss their applications in an 
environment and trade context. The results concerning possible policy implications also 
are discussed.  
 
3.2 Computable General Equilibrium Models 
3.2.1  Market CGE Models 
          Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been frequently used in 
studies of this kind, e.g., see Lee and Roland-Holst (1994), Perroni and Wigle (1994), 
Dessus and  Bussolo (1998), Davies et al. (1998),  Felder and Rutherford (1993), and 
Beghin et al (1997). CGE models have evolved from linear programming-based planning 
models. These models describe Walrasian equilibrium with many goods and factors. 
Typical market models use production structures based on profit-maximizing producers 
and demand structures derived from utility-maximizing consumers. The general 
equilibrium theory employed is the same as in trade theory, where open economies are 
modeled. A prominent advantage of CGE models lies in the possibility of combining 
detailed and consistent real-world databases with a theoretically sound framework. 
       Perroni and Wigle (1994) have constructed a CGE model of the world economy with 
local and global externalities to investigate the impacts of international trade on 
 59 
Table 3.1 Methods for Analyzing Interactions between Environment and Trade 
 
        1  Computable General Equilibrium Models 
          CGE Models 
          Non-Market CGE Models 
        2  International Trade Models 
         The Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
               Empirical Trade Models 
        3  Input-output Models 
               I-O Models, Multipliers and linkages 
               Trade and I-O Models 
         Environmental I-O Models 
        4  Welfare Models 
               Welfare Analysis and Impact Measurement 
               Welfare Analysis of Gains from Trade 
               Welfare Analysis of Environmental Policy 
         Impact of Environmental Policy on the Net Benefits from Trade 
        5  Game theoretic Models 
               Cooperative game Theoretic Models 
               Noncooperative Game Theoretic Models 
        6  Optimization Models 
               Searching for Optimal Trade and Environmental Policies 
         Lack of Applications 
        7  Spatial GIS Models 
               Spatial Analysis 
               GIS Model Theory  
         GIS Model Applications 
         8  Econometric Models 
               Trade and Environment Linkages over Time 





environmental quality. Their results show that, though free trade may have a negative 
impact on environmental quality, its relative contribution to environmental degradation is 
very small. The authors also find that the magnitude of the welfare effects of 
environmental policies is not significantly affected by changes in trade policies. What's 
more, the size and distribution of gains from trade liberalization appear to be little 
affected by change in environmental policies.         
          Dessus and Bussolo (1998) have employed a CGE model to examine whether 
there is a trade-off between trade liberalization and pollution abatement in Costa Rica. 
Unlike previous analyses, their model embodies a high level of disaggregation for 
pollutants, products, sectors, and types of households. They also explicitly include 
dynamic features in the model to reveal the temporal interdependencies of environmental 
and trade policies by comparing the trends of outputs and emissions obtained from 
different scenarios. Furthermore, their model allows for substitution between 
nonpolluting and polluting factors which other similar studies usually fail to include, e.g., 
see Lee and Roland-Holst (1994). Using this model, the authors show that further 
integration of Costa Rica into the world economy presents a great risk of environmental 
degradation if not accompanied by voluntary environmental reforms. These reforms 
could achieve significant pollution abatement without hampering economic growth or 
international competitiveness through targeted fiscal policies related to the utilization of 
polluting goods. Moreover, free trade combined with appropriate effluent taxes enhances 
factor reallocation towards competitive industries, and hence growth, while significantly 
abating emissions.         
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          It should be noted that CGE models examining the relationship between 
environment and trade have mainly concentrated on energy and carbon dioxide 
emissions, largely because these allow significant economy-wide effects to be found, as 
the required policy interventions are quite severe. A disadvantage of CGE market models 
is their complexity in computation and difficulty of validation.  
 
3.2.2 Non-Market CGE Models 
          In general, past efforts to incorporate non-market environmental resources into 
CGE models have encountered a number of problems. The first arises from being able to 
specify only a limited role for environmental resources to be included in the behavioral 
relationships of a typical aggregate economic model. For example, some models 
introduce environmental resources as providing a separable contribution to individual 
well-being (Perroni and Wigle 1994, Ballard and Medema 1993). However, this 
separable specification assures that commodity demand, and hence relative prices, will 
not be affected by preference-related substitutions between marketed goods due to 
changes in environmental resources. The second problem is that most of those models 
have no spatial dimension that would distinguish the differential environmental impacts 
of production activities occurring at different locations. These studies would suggest that 
none of the available CGE trade models are capable of consistently linking the value of 
environmental resources to consumer preferences.         
          Responding to this challenge, Espinosa and Smith (1995) developed a composite 
non-market and CGE model (NM/CGE) for the European Union, the United States, 
Japan, and a single region for the rest of the would. This NM/CGE model advanced the 
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Harrison, Rutherford, Wooton model (HRW1--Harrison, Rutherford, and Wooton 1991) 
by incorporating the morbidity and mortality effects of three air pollutants: sulphur 
oxides (SOx) as a transboundary externality and particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) as sources of local externalities. Other important modifications made to 
HRW1 include: (1) replacing the Cobb-Douglas with Stone-Geary utility functions for 
aggregate consumers in each region, (2) introducing nine air pollution-induced morbidity 
effects as translating effects on each households subsistence parameter for services, and 
(3) introducing an explicit set of pollution generation and dispersion models for each of 
the three air pollutants. Each of these modifications has been introduced so that the 
models initial calibration is maintained. 
 This NM/CGE model distinguishes itself from market CGE models by allowing 
existing non-market valuation estimates to include a specification for consumer 
preferences that allows changes in atmospheric emissions to diffuse in different amounts 
in each region and to exert feedback effects on market demands. Specifically, the authors 
examine the importance of both sets of impacts, market and non-market, on Hicksian 
welfare measures by comparing the results of model specifications with and without 
environmental feedback effects to evaluate scenarios that combine trade liberalization 
with environmental degradation. Two scenarios are used in their analysis: (1) a pure trade 
scenario which considers a 50 percent reduction in nontariff barriers for all trade between 
UK and the other EU regions and (2) a composite scenario which combines this reduction 
in nontariff barriers with an increase of 25 percent in the emission rates for all three 
pollutants for the durable manufacturing sector in the UK. Their simulation results 
indicate that the impact of environmental effects on the economic variables examined, 
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such as GDP and prices, are not great when the policy scenario focuses on parameters 
linked to market transactions. When the mortality effects of pollution are combined with 
those of morbidity, the impact of removing trade barriers produces greater change in 
GDP (19.8 vs 18.9 percent). In the composite scenario, the analysis clearly shows the 
same response. That is, in the absence of a model that accounts for emission changes, the 
reduced trade barriers would be counted as welfare-enhancing. However, when taking 
into account the environment, including both morbidity and mortality effects, that 
judgment changes. The authors further point out that even if we limit our attention to the 
morbidity effects of the increased pollution, the environmental feedback effects from the 
joint change of trade barriers and emission rates are important. 
          The NM/CGE model provides a novel and useful framework for analyzing trade 
and environment interactions. However, the uncertainty and complexity of non-market 
valuation hampers it from having wide-scale applications. 
 
3.3   International Trade Models 
3.3.1   The Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) trade model, based on neoclassical supply-side 
theories, leads itself to environmental applications. The equilibrium formulation of the 
model includes two commodities, two factors of production(labor and capital), and two 
countries. Factors are assumed to be perfectly mobile within a country but immobile 
between countries. In addition, identical technologies and identical demands between 
countries are also assumed. The main tenet of the model is that a country will export the 
particular commodity that most intensively uses its relatively abundantly-endowed factor. 
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Comparative advantage and trade, therefore, are determined by differences in factor 
endowments among countries. From this model, three additional theorems are derived: 
the factor-price-equalization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the 
Rybczynski theorem (Markusen et al. 1995). These theorems form the core of modern 
trade theory and have been widely used in international trade analysis. 
Many theoretical and empirical studies on trade and environment issues are based 
on modifications of the H-O model, e.g. Walter (1975), Grubel (1976), Yohe (1979), 
McGuire (1982), Merrifield (1988), Siebert (1992), and Diao and Roe (1997), among 
others. One modification is to treat environmental damage avoidance as a third good in 
the model, the output of which competes with the production of other two conventional 
goods. Walter (1975) demonstrates that that general equilibrium exists in such a three-
good H-O model and increased pollution abatement reduces the output of the 
conventional goods but raises social welfare. However, actual application of this 
approach to examine the terms of trade, the volume of trade flows and the efficiency of 
environmental policy has been limited. 
Another modification following Grubel (1976) assumes that environmental 
pollution is associated with either the production of one of the two goods or with the 
consumption of a good. Hence, environmental pollution results in either a shrinkage in a 
countrys production possibility frontier or a reduction of the consumption level of the 
polluting good due to the implementation of proper environmental protection measures. 
Based on this approach and using general equilibrium analysis, Grubel obtains many 
useful results about the impact of environmental policy on international trade and 
welfare. Diao and Roe (1997) have followed the same approach, but unlike Grubel 
 65 
(1976), they assume non-homothetic utility to explain changes in the demand for the non-
polluting good when income increases. Both studies conclude that countries have 
incentives to adopt environmental policies and, in the large-country case, a country 
adopting environmental policies may benefit from an improvement in its terms of trade. 
And still another modification introduces environmental elements as input factors 
of production, e.g., Yohe (1979), McGuire (1982), Merrifield (1988), and Siebert (1992). 
McGuire (1982), in his study of the impact of environmental regulation on factor 
rewards, for instance, assumes that one good is production-polluting and  thus 
environmental usage or depletion represents a productive factor of that good. Efficient 
environmental regulations should make the value of marginal product of the 
environmental factor equal to its shadow price. A similar treatment is also employed by 
Siebert (1992) where environmental scarcity is interpreted as a factor of production in the 
H-O model. If both trading countries environmental policies find the correct shadow 
price of their environmental factor, the environmentally rich country will have a 
comparative advantage to produce and to export the pollution-intensive good, while the 
country with limited environmental resources will export the less polluting good. 
Merrifield (1988) models the environmental factor in a more detailed way. Both 
emissions and pollution abatement equipment appear as inputs in the commodity 
production functions of both economies. This approach is thus able to capture the 
economic effects of tighter abatement standards. 
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3.3.2 Empirical Trade Models 
Among the empirical applications of the H-O model to environmental issues, the 
cross-sectional Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek alternative (H-O-V) has proven popular, e.g., see 
Bowen (1983), Leamer (1984), Brecher and Choudhri (1988), Murrell (1990), Trefler 
(1994), and Leamer and Levinsohn (1995). The H-O-V model is a multi-factor and multi-
commodity extension of the H-O model (Vanek 1968; Melvin 1968; Leamer 1980). 
According to the H-O-V theorem, in reasonably generalized cases, differences in relative 
factor endowments still determine comparative advantage. Unlike the H-O theorem, 
comparative advantage in the generalized case refers to the patterns of trade in factor 
contents rather than in commodities. The practical significance of the H-O-V theorem is 
in the establishment of the relationship between the net exports of commodities and the 
endowments of factors. Therefore, it is unsurprising that an empirical H-O-V model 
usually consists of a set of linear equations explicitiy expressing this net-export and 
endowment relationship.  
An econometric application of the H-O-V model to trade and environmental issues 
made by Tobey (1990) extends the conventional H-O-V model by introducing a 
qualitative variable into the net-export and endowment equation to represent the 
environmental endowment measured by the stringency of environment policy. Other 
resource endowments include capital, different types of labor and land uses, coal, 
minerals, and oil. Five aggregate pollution-intensive commodity groups are examined: 
paper, mining, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, and chemicals. Econometric estimation 
of the resultant equations is based on observations from 23 countries (13 developed and 
10 developing countries). In addition, the author also investigates the trade effects of 
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environmental policy by examining the signs of the estimated error terms when the 
variable of the environmental endowment of a country is excluded in the H-O-V system. 
The most important finding of this study is that the strict environmental policies adopted 
by developed countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s do not have measurable impacts 
on patterns of world trade. 
Another empirical model successfully applied to international trade is the gravity 
model, e.g., see Tinbergen (1962), Hamilton and Winters (1992), van Beers and van den 
Bergh (1997), and Wall (1999). The gravity model of trade explains trade flows between 
two countries based on income, population, and measures of economic and geographic 
proximity. In a common specification of the gravity model, bilateral trade flows are a log-
linear function of the two trading partners incomes, the geographic distance, and any 
other factors either promoting or resisting trade between them. Despite its consistent 
empirical success in explaining trade flows, the gravity model has often been criticized 
because of its lack of a rigorous theoretical foundation. However, Anderson (1979) and 
Bergstrand (1985) show that the gravity model can be derived from trade models under 
certain assumptions, and Deardorff (1998) proves the gravity model to be consistent with 
some variants of Ricardian and H-O models. 
Extending the basic gravity model to include variables describing the stringency of 
domestic environmental policies, van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) empirically 
investigate the impact of environmental measures on particular trade flows. In the study, 
two types of environmental indicators are used: a narrow one, directly relating to 
economic costs of the environmental policy imposed on producers, and a broad one, 
made up of environmental indicators, some of which do not result in an increase in 
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producers economic costs. The authors repeat the empirical test of Tobey (1990) by 
applying the gravity model with the same environmental policy stringency measure and 
the same cross-section observations. The authors conclude, similar to Tobey, that 
stringent environmental policies have an insignificant impact on trade flows of pollution- 
intensive industries. The authors also estimate the gravity model with total bilateral trade 
flows as the independent variable and find that the impact of broad policy indicators that 
do not directly reveal environmental costs reflected in producer prices on bilateral trade 
flows is not significant, while more narrow policy indictors that are more directly in line 
with the polluter pays principle do have a significant negative impact on exports. 
 
3.4 Input-output Models 
3.4.1 Basic I-O Models 
Input-Output (I-O) models have been widely applied to the analysis of economic 
growth, trade and environmental issues, e.g., see Brody and Carter (1972), Bulmer-
Thomas (1982), Leontief (1986), Pasurka (1984), Ozaki et al (1995), Gale and Lewis 
(1995), Miller er al. (1989), van Ierland (1993) and Frechtling and Horvath (1999). Input-
output models describe and explain the production and consumption of each sector of a 
given economy in terms of its relationships to the corresponding activities in all the other 
sectors. Conventional I-O models (Leontief 1966, 1970) are presented by a set of liner 
equations which express balances between the total input and the aggregate output of 
each commodity and service, produced and used during a certain period of time. In 
addition to static general equilibrium models (Davar 1994), other developments include 
dynamic models (Leontief 1986 and Duchin 1989), optimization models (Nijkamp and 
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Reggiani 1989 and Kohno 1996), stochastic models (West 1986 and Ten Raa 1995), and 
extended models (Bulmer-Thomas 1982, Batey 1985, and Batey and Weeks 1989).  
 Multiplier analysis constitutes an important aspect of I-O model application. 
Multipliers measure the impacts of exogenous economic changes or policies on 
endogenous variables such as the total output, employment, and income. One can 
incorporate only direct effects (intersectoral linkages) into the calculation of total effects, 
or one can take into account both the direct and induced effects (linkages between the 
spending of income payments and intersectoral demands). Linkage analysis, also 
considered an important application of multiplier analysis, consists of two forms. 
Backward linkages reflect the extent that other primary, intermediate and capital goods 
are consumed by a given sector and measure the potential stimulus to other activities 
from an output increase in a given sector. Forward linkages show how the output of a 
sector is used by other sectors and measure the induced incentive of an output increase in 
a sector to the output expansion of other sectors. Linkage analysis is often used to explain 
interindustry investment effects and their impact on income (Hirschman 1958, and Prasad 
and Swaminathan 1992). However, Stewart et al. (1972) and Bulmer-Thomas (1982) 
point out that this could be misleading since both forms of linkages are not reflected in 
market prices and, therefore, indicate the existence of externalities, which could cause the 
social benefits of an investment to diverge from private benefits. 
 
3.4.2  Trade and I-O Models 
There are at least two approaches to incorporate trade into an I-O model, i.e. see 
Barker (1972) for a useful overview. The first approach omits prices; early studies by 
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Leontief (1951) and Stone (1962) fall into this category. Exports are usually exogenously 
introduced into the model and imports are determined according to domestic levels of 
output and balance of payments constraints. Though prices appear in the balance of 
payments constraints, they are assumed to be constant. Such models can ascertain the 
sources of comparative advantage and the production structures for international trade. 
The second approach introduces a price mechanism along with exports and imports, e.g., 
Aukrust (1970), Cambridge (1970) and Waelbroeck et al. (1970). That is, relationships 
between imports and domestic output are determined by relative prices instead of 
constant price coefficients. Exports are also made responsive to relative prices. In 
addition, relative prices per se are allowed to change with other economic variables such 
as exchange rates. The balance of payments constraints hence can be more effectively 
described. 
Since the 1970s, the use of the international I-O model permits one to explain 
relationships between one countrys imports and anothers exports and the reciprocating 
effects of trade via both quantity flows and price levels, e.g., see Petri (1976), Torii et al. 
(1989), and van der Linden et al. (1995). Moreover, the feedback effects of various 
international trade policies such as tariff reductions and trade liberalization can be 
conveniently simulated and analyzed, e.g., see Torii et al (1989) and Almon et al. (1991). 
There are two types of international I-O trade models. Consistency models are composed 
of balance equations for each sector in each country (Petri 1976, and Almon et al 1991 
amongst others). Optimization models usually consist of  a member countries total 
income maximizing objective function and a set of I-O relationship-based constraints, 
e.g. see Panchamukhi (1976) and Torii et al. (1989). In addition to trade policy impact 
 71 
assessment, the latter can also serve as a useful tool for analyzing optimal production and 
trade. 
Bulmer-Thomas (1982) demonstrates that I-O models can also contribute to the 
investigation of comparative advantage and patterns of international trade in an economic 
development context. The examination of comparative advantage usually requires that 
domestic and foreign costs be measured in terms of shadow prices and prefers 
optimization algorithms. The rationality of patterns of trade are examined using the 
relative factor content of exports and imports (the ratio of capital to labor content of 
exports and imports). For a recent application of international I-O models to trade 
patterns, see Ozaki et al. (1995).  
Gale and Lewis (1995) also extend I-O applications to include trade liberalization 
and environmental pollution issues. The authors have developed a detailed I-O model of 
production and trade in the Mexican economy where CO2 emissions are measured by fuel 
use in production and trade consumption, while free trade-induced change in production 
and trade is expressed by a change in total emissions. Based on this model, the authors 
first determine the changes in production and trade that result from the implementation of 
NAFTA. These results are then used to estimate the change in in the quantity of CO2 
emissions for each industry. The results suggest that free trade within North America 
increases Mexicos total CO2 emissions but it also shifts resources away from more 




3.4.3 Environment and I-O Models 
Extending I-O models to include interactions between the environment and the 
economy began in the late 1960s, e.g., see Ayres and Kneese (1969), Leontief (1970, 
1973) and Leontief and Ford (1972); see Forsund (1985) and Forssell and Polenske 
(1998) for reviews. The early environmental I-O models are notable for augmenting the 
technical coefficient matrix with additional rows and columns to describe pollution 
generation and abatement activities. Typically, each pollutant appears as a row in the 
matrix and pollution produced in each sector is assumed to be a function of its output. 
Specific anti-pollution sectors are included in the matrix as columns. These abatement 
sectors obtain inputs from all economic sectors and at the same time also produce various 
pollutants. Clearly, the concept of materials balance is essential. That is, materials not 
embodied in final products must be embodied in emissions of pollutants. Therefore, these 
models are often used to trace environment-economy interactions and to investigate how 
environmental policy influences the two-way flow process. 
Since the 1970s, as a result of increasing concerns over global warming and other 
transboundary pollution problems such acid deposition, environmental I-O models have 
evolved to give special emphasis on energy production and consumption (Leontief et al. 
1977, and van Ierland 1993, among others). As a response to the challenge of Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), Leontief and his co-authors (1977) modeled energy and 
environmental policy within a detailed global I-O framework. The world economy is 
divided into fifteen regions. A fixed coefficient I-O model with 45 sectors and including 
resource requirements, in particular, energy requirements, and emission abatement 
activities is built for each region. All separate regional I-O models are linked through 
 73 
international trade. An important conclusion of the study is that the availability of energy 
as well as other resources and requirements for environmental protection are not an 
insurmountable obstacle to the economic growth of developing countries. 
Van Ierland (1993) employs a non-linear dynamic I-O model to analyze 
economic, energy, and environmental policy in an open economy. The empirical setting 
of the model is the economy of the Netherlands from 1950 to 2010 (1950-1988 for 
parameter estimation and 1990-2010 for policy scenarios). Since the impacts of 
environmental policy differ substantially among branches of industries due to the fact that 
the intensities of energy, labor, capital, and pollution and that the import and export 
coefficients are not the same for any of the branches, the economy is further 
disaggregated into separate sectors such that the environmental and energy characteristics 
of the branches show up clearly. In addition, the model not only includes the most 
important economic variables for the various branches of industries, it also computes the 
demand for energy in physical units for different fuel types and for the branches of 
industries, transportation, households and government. Furthermore, the emissions of 
carbon dioxide can be directly calculated. This model provides a useful tool for both the 
hypothetical policy makers and the actual policy makers to obtain an overview of the 
impact of different sets of policy measures such as an increase in volume of international 
trade and a reduction in the level of household taxation, and the impact of the changes in 
external circumstances such as environmental strategies adopted in foreign countries. 
Clearly, the model can  also be used as a framework for trade and environment 
interaction analysis. 
 74 
It should be noted that many applied and computable general equilibrium (AGE, 
CGE) models used to study economic, trade and environmental analysis actually can be 
considered as extensions of I-O models by explicitly incorporating a supply and demand 
system. In those CGE or AGE models, parameters of the behavioral and structural 
equations are either calibrated to data of a certain single year or estimated 
econometrically, e.g. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993, 1990), Hazilla and Kopp (1990), 
and Whalley (1991). 
 
3.5 Welfare Models 
3.5.1 Welfare Analysis and Impact Measurement 
Welfare analysis is one of the most important tools for policy assessment and, in 
particular, plays a critical role in measurement of the impact of trade and environmental 
policies. To begin with, the existence of externalities makes non-market evaluation 
crucial for policy impact measurement; welfare analysis provides a vehicle to achieve 
such measurement, e.g., for overviews, see Freeman (1993) and Cropper and Oates 
(1992). In addition, trade and environmental policies may result in a reallocation of both 
benefits and costs among nations and among different interest agents; welfare analysis 
again provides a useful framework to examine the policy-induced benefit distribution, 
e.g., see Anderson (1992a, b), Kohn (1991), and Eldor and Levin (1990). Finally, policy 
impacts can also be measured using the surplus components of welfare, e.g., see Thurman 
(1991), Just and Rausser (1992), and Haley and Dixit (1988). A policy that leads to an 
increase in the sum of producers and consumers surplus can be considered at least 
Pareto efficient. The most widely used framework for welfare analysis of policy impact 
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measurement involves both partial and general equilibrium models. See Van Beers and 
Van den Bergh (1996) for a methodological overview; see Eldor and Levin (1990) for a 
partial equilibrium example and Thurman (1991) for a general equilibrium example. 
Extensions to three-sector analysis can be found in Anderson (1992a, b), and Haley and 
Dixit (1988), among others. 
 
3.5.2 Welfare Analysis of Gains from Trade 
Gains from trade are one of the most fundamental issues of international 
economics. Since being initially examined by Ricardo in the early nineteenth century, it 
has been widely recognized that a country almost always improves its overall welfare by 
engaging in international trade. For important contributions to the issue see Samuelson 
(1939, 1962). In general, gains from trade are considered to derive from two distinct 
sources (Markusen et al. 1995). The first source is gains from exchange which relate to 
the fact that countries differ from each other in endowments of goods or in preferences 
and they can mutually benefit from trading with each other. The second source is gains 
from specialization that refer to the fact that countries can raise their total production and 
gain from this production increase by specializing in the goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage. 
While in most cases countries can gain from international trade, welfare analysis 
reveals that not all agents within countries will necessarily benefit from trade; in fact, 
some sectors may suffer a welfare loss (Dixit and Norman 1980, and Jones 1956). That 
is, the distribution effect of trade on welfare can be very uneven. For example, trade 
makes worse off the owners of resources that are specific to the production of goods that 
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compete with imports (Krugman and Obstfeld 1997). Welfare analysis of the distribution 
effect of trade has long been a subject of international trade research.  
 
3.5.3 Welfare Analysis of Environmental Policy 
Economic welfare analysis of environmental policy serves at least two purposes. 
In the first place, welfare analysis can provide useful guidance for environmental policy 
design. Usually, maximizing social welfare and influencing its distribution are considered 
appropriate objectives of environmental policies, e.g., see Baumol and Oates (1988) and 
Hennipman (1995). On the other hand, welfare analysis of environmental policy is often 
used in policy comparison and selection. Cost-benefit analysis is a widely employed tool 
for this purpose, but it has to be accompanied by measures of externalities, e.g. see 
Thomas (1983) and Torries (1998). Since environmental policy is closely related to the 
correction of market distortion induced by externalities, willingness to pay hence turns 
out to be an important concept in the measurement of welfare costs and welfare benefits 
(Freeman 1993 and Field 1994). For other applications of welfare analysis of 
environmental policy, see discussions in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.4. 
 
3.5.4 Welfare Model Applications 
In section 3.5.2, it was mentioned that in most cases countries gain from trade. A 
key assumption in this regard is that the production possibility set must be convex in 
order to guarantee that production is maximized at world trade prices (Markusen et al. 
1995). However, as long as environmental pollution is concerned, this assumption can be 
inappropriate since non-convexity may exist in the production possibility set when there 
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are cross-sectoral production externalities (Baumol and Bradford 1972). Intuitively, if a 
country exports a pollution-intensive good, the environmental quality of that country is 
likely to deteriorate. The social welfare loss induced by environmental deterioration will 
reduce, and perhaps even outweigh the conventional gains from trade.  
The welfare analysis of gains from trade when taking into account environmental 
degradation and the impact of environmental policy has been a focus of several studies. 
Adding an environmental variable to the social welfare function and using a comparative 
static approach, Siebert (1977) and Siebert et al. (1980) examine the gains from trade 
when no environmental regulations exist. They conclude that if a country exports 
relatively less pollution-intensive goods, the improvement in environmental quality will 
lead to welfare gains from trade that are higher than the traditional measure in which 
environmental quality is excluded. In contrast, if a country exports a pollution-intensive 
good, welfare gains from trade are lower than the traditional measure and may even be 
negative due to the welfare loss resulting from environmental degradation. Using partial 
equilibrium and comparative-static analysis, Anderson (1992a) investigates the same case 
in a small-country setting and arrives at the same conclusion. Further, Anderson (1992a) 
places the problem in a large-country setting: namely, a country that is now large enough 
to influence world market prices and production abroad. The author shows that if the 
large country imports a polluting good, welfare gains from trade are unambiguous but 
smaller than can be achieved in a small country because of a rise in the import price (the 
terms-of-trade effect). If the large country exports the polluting good, welfare gains from 
trade are ambiguous because two opposite effects are interwined: a negative welfare 
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effect of the export price decrease and increased domestic pollution and a positive 
welfare effect of decreased transboundary pollution from foreign production. 
Now consider the presence of environmental regulations. Siebert (1977) and 
Siebert et al. (1980) demonstrate that, in a small-country case, if a country exports a 
production polluting good, welfare gains from trade increase with the introduction of 
environmental regulations if in the initial situation the marginal social costs of the 
polluting good production are higher than the export price. This welfare improvement 
comes from two possible sources: a positive effect of prevented environmental damage 
and an improvement in the terms of trade. Anderson (1992a) also shows that there are 
unambiguous welfare gains from trade in the same case provided an optimal 
environmental policy is adopted. In addition, Anderson extends the analysis to trade in a 
good whose consumption is polluting. With the introduction of an optimal environmental 
policy, welfare gains from trade increase no matter whether the country is an exporter or 
an importer of the consumption-pollutive good. In the large-country case, so long as the 
optimal environmental policy is in place, welfare gains from trade will always be 
positive.  
In a separate paper, Anderson (1992b) investigates the impact of liberalizing 
international trade in coal and food on the environment and welfare with a partial-
equilibrium-welfare-analysis framework. In the coal-trade-liberalizing case, the world 
coal market consists of three groups of countries: (1) the protected industrial market 
economies where the coal producer price is subsidized to be above the coal consumer 
price which, due to import restrictions, is above the international price, (2) the reforming 
centrally planned economies where the coal price is set well below international levels, 
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and (3) other market economies where the average domestic coal price level is assumed 
to be equal to that in the world market. In the case of liberalizing food trade, similar to 
the previous case, the world market is assumed to be made up of three country groups: 
(1) a group of almost autarkic centrally planned economies, (2) a set of rich countries 
whose agricultural market is protected by their governments, and (3) the rest of the world 
where the price of agricultural products is relatively lower than other tradeables. By 
means of  diagrammatic partial equilibrium welfare analysis, Anderson shows that with 
appropriate environmental policies, in both cases, liberalizing international trade is 
beneficial to the environment and to overall welfare. 
  
3.6 Game-theoretic Models 
3.6.1 Cooperative Game Theoretic Models 
Game theory and game theoretic models have been applied to the study of various 
trade and environment issues; for overviews, see Ulph (1994) and Blackhurst and 
Subraminian (1992); for recent examples, see Ulph (1996), Ulph and Valentini (1997), 
Barrett (1997), Abrego et al. (1997), and Alemdar and Ozyildirim (1998). Multilateral 
negotiation and cooperation play an important role in the formation of efficient domestic 
trade and environmental policies as well as international agreements on trade and 
environmental issues. The 1997 Kyoto agreement is a good example of such negotiation 
and cooperation. Cooperative game models, which can provide useful theoretical support 
for those negotiation processes, distinguish themselves from noncooperative game 
theoretic models in assuming that binding agreements are indeed possible (Friedman 
1986). They also assume that each agent has a clear idea about the outcome that 
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cooperation will bring to them. Other features shared are the existence of leadship and 
reliance on side-payments and side-sanctions. Moreover, leaders are willing to take 
cooperative action to maximize their joint net benefit, and hence cooperative equilibrium 
solutions of the models are sometimes heralded as fair outcomes or Pareto optimal 
outcomes. It is not surprising that many studies conclude that cooperative outcomes are 
more efficient than noncooperative ones, e.g. Dockner and Long (1993), Barrett (1997), 
and Alemdar and Ozyildirim (1998), among others. 
Specifications of cooperative game theory models as applied to trade and 
environmental issues differ in many respects. For example, Dockner and Long (1993) 
analyze international pollution control strategies with a dynamic two-player game. The 
players are the governments of two neighboring countries. A dynamic framework helps 
attenuate the free-rider problem and the prisoners dilemma type of situation because the 
punishment of any observed noncooperative behavior can be reflected in this 
intertemporal dimension. The cooperative game is modeled with a joint welfare 
maximizing presentation. Quite naturally, Pontryagins maximum principle can be 
employed to obtain a solution. Barrett (1997) develops a two-stage, multi-player game to 
examine the capability of trade measures in the enforcement of international 
environmental agreements. The players include N symmetric countries (governments) 
and N symmetric firms (one firm per country). In the first stage, governments set  
abatement standards which the firms must comply with. In the second stage, firms 
simultaneously choose their segmented outputs in response. Here international 
cooperation can be incorporated in the first stage; the abatement standards in each 
country are chosen so as to maximize the N countries joint benefits. Alemdar and 
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Ozyildirim (1998) compose a dynamic two-player North-South trade game model to 
investigate the positive impact of the North-South trade on the Southern environment and 
its policy implications due to the presence of transboundary knowledge spillovers 
brought about through trade. North and South are the two players and the joint potential 
gains from cooperation are characterized with a weighted sum of the two players 
lifetime utilities. Weights are regarded as the distributive parameter of the cooperation 
benefits and their values can be bargained between the two players in the process of 
negotiation and finalized in a cooperative agreement. The study also features a general-
purpose genetic algorithm to solve an open-loop differential game of infinite duration. 
The optimal regional trade policies are obtained from the numerical solution. 
 
3.6.2 Non-cooperative Game Theoretic Models  
Putting the trade and environment issues within a game setting, players often 
behave non-cooperatively in order to maximize their individual benefits. For instance, in 
the absence of supra-national authority to enforce the cooperative solution, multilateral 
cooperation in international trade and global environmental issues is likely to be 
sabotaged by free-riding and the Prisoners Dilemma problem (Barrett 1994a,b and 
Carraro and Siniscalao 1993). Sometimes, differences in agents ultimate self-interests 
can be a source of non-cooperation. Governmental policies are aimed to enhance the 
social welfare while firms strategies usually pursue profit maximization. In addition, 
there are also cases in which players are unable to make legally binding agreements with 
one another (for example, antitrust provisions prevent firms from colluding). For these 
and other reasons, non-cooperative game theoretic models have been the more popular in 
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the application to trade and environmental issues. For overviews, see Ulph (1994) and 
Kreps (1990); and for particular studies, see Hoel (1991), Martin et al. (1993), Dockner 
and Long (1993), Ulph (1996), Ulph and Valentini (1997), Barrett (1994b, 1997), Abreg 
et al. (1997), and Alemdar and Ozyildirim (1998). 
There are various formations of non-cooperative game theoretic models (see the 
corresponding discussion in cooperative game theoretic models since each of those 
studies includes, by contrast, a same structural non-cooperative game). The prisoners 
dilemma is the most fundamental presentation (Snidal 1985), while Nash equilibrium is 
the most important criterion of strategies (Myerson 1999 and Mailath 1998). That is, in 
non-cooperative game theoretic models, each player is maximizing his own private 
benefit given the supposed actions of the others, and a solution is obtained only when a 
Pareto optimal strategy exists (i.e., no player has an incentive to deviate from the 
solution) (Kreps 1990). 
In addition to the above applications, non-cooperative game theoretic models 
have also been used in many other trade and environment issue related analyses. For 
example, Hauptmann (1982) applies a two-player nonzero-sum non-cooperative dynamic 
game to the oil embargo problem between OPEC and the oil importing countries; Martin 
and his co-authors (1993) investigate the implication of different environmental policy 
options in a transboundary pollution setting with an N-asymmetric-player, nonzero-sum 
dynamic game model; Ulph (1996) uses a three-stage game model to analyze the 
relationship between environmental policy and international trade when governments and 
the producers act non-cooperatively; and Ulph and Valentini (1997) examine the effect of 
environmental policy on plant location based on a three-stage non-cooperative model 
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with two countries, two industries (one upstream and one downstream), and two firms in 
each industry. Since various kinds of players such as international organizations, 
countries, governments and firms are involved, the best strategies for different players 
derived from those studies can provide useful insights for policy design at different 
levels. 
 
3.7 Optimization Models 
3.7.1 The Search for Optimal Trade and Environmental Policies 
Although the relationship between trade and the environment is not uniquely 
defined, e.g., see Daly (1993a, 1993b), and Bhagwati (1993a, 1993b), there is a wide 
consensus that on the most fundamental level, trade and environmental policy must meet 
in the concept of sustainable development. Both trade policy and environmental policy 
must serve that concept as their ultimate goal (EPA Trade and Environment Committee 
1991). Trade policy helps enhance world economic welfare on the one hand while 
environmental policy aims to manage and maintain natural resources efficiently on the 
other; together they constitute the most important aspects of sustainable development. 
How should trade and environmental policies be combined to achieve the goal of 
sustainable development? In other words, within a sustainable development setting, what 
are optimal trade and environmental policies? Quite naturally, optimization models can 
provide a solution to resolving such issues. Potential models must share at least two key 
features. First, the concept of sustainable development must be concretely or 
mathematically expressed rather than vaguely stated. Second, the spatio-temporal nature 
of the trade and environment issue must be captured. 
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3.7.2 Lack of Applications 
Since the fundamental problem in economics is how to make the best use of 
limited resources, optimization methods are among the most important tools in economic 
analysis. Indeed, various different kind of optimization models have been used in a wide 
range of economic research fields, e.g., for overviews, see Wilson et al. (1981), 
Feichtinger (1982), Mills (1984), and Schellnhuber and Wenzel (1988). Optimization 
models can be generally divided into calculus optimization models, programming 
models, optimal control theory models, and differential game theoretic models. Luptacik 
and Schubert (1982) build an optimization model for optimal environmental investment 
decisions. The focus of their study is on how to allocate output between consumption and 
investment in productive capacity and pollution abatement so as to maximize social 
welfare. The concept of sustainable development and the implication of trade in a 
growing economy are untouched. In Schellnhuber and Wenzel (1998), optimization 
models are created to analyze the co-evolution of human civilization (the anthroposphere) 
and its ecological support system (the ecosphere), in particular the analysis of global 
change, sustainable development (defined as co-evolution of the anthroposphere and the 
ecosphere in the long run), and international equity and governance. However, the role of 
trade and environmental policies is not discussed. Due to the complexity of the problem, 
no optimization models aiming to search for optimal trade and environmental policies 
have been built thus far. 
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3.8 Spatial Analysis and GIS Models 
3.8.1 Spatial Analysis 
The spatial nature of economic activities and variables was first examined in the 
early 1950s and spatial equilibrium analysis gained attention of the ecomonic literature of 
that time (Enke 1951 and Samuelson 1952). Since the 1960s, spatial analysis in 
economics has greatly expanded its range of study, varying from spatial equilibrium 
models for trade, transportation and labor markets, to various kinds of more general 
models for environmental, energy, and geographical and regional economic analyses, 
e.g., see Labys et al. (1989), Labys and Yang (1991), van den Bergh et al. (1996), 
Nijkamp (1986), and Bockstael (1996). 
Spatial equilibrium and price models (SPE) have evolved from the basic neo-
classical model and most of them have a programming presentation. Samuelson (1952) 
was the first to give the SPE a linear programming specification. Takayama and Judge 
(1964) and Takayama and Woodland (1970) further extended this approach to include 
simultaneous price determination in a temporal as well as spatial framework (STPE). In 
these models, markets and transportation are spatially separated from an equilibrium 
perspective and therefore spatial quantities equilibrate only when demand prices equal 
the sum of supply costs and transportation costs. Given transportation cost, and domestic 
demand and supply functions in spatial markets, a spatial equilibrium consists of the 
market-clearing prices in all spatial markets, demands and supplies of all locations, and 
all exports and imports. For SPE applications see Labys et al. (1989) and van den Bergh 
et al. (1996). 
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Spatial models also serve as a useful framework for environment-energy-
economy analysis. They are usually an integration of models of the environmental 
system, energy system and national or regional economy. These models, in general, 
consist of the following common components: a macroeconomic model; production and 
consumption functions; equations revealing the relationships between the energy sector, 
the rest of the economy and environmental quality; a reference energy supply system 
describing energy demand as well as energy production and consumption technologies; 
and a setup reflecting spatially separated regions, e.g. see Lakahmanan and Bolton 
(1986). 
 
3.8.2 GIS Model Theory  
Since the 1980s, geographic information systems (GIS) have found wide 
applications in resource management and environmental modeling, i.e., for historical 
reviews, see Goodchild et al. (1993) and Maguire et al. (1991); for more recent work, see 
Fischer et al. (1996), Hallam et al. (1996), and Goodchild et al. (1996). 
Model applications in this area comprise two categories. The first or major 
category can be considered coupling models that link conventional environmental models 
to a GIS model, where GIS is used as a preprocessing and postprocessing tool, e.g., see 
Darwin et al. (1995), Neganban et al. (1996), Lee and Pielke (1996), and Chomitz et al. 
(1999). The second category, which is still developing and not yet broadly recognized, 
uses GIS as the principal tool or language for more sophisticated spatial and temporal 
environmental modeling. For an introductory review see Maidment (1996); examples are 
provided in Frysinger et al. (1996), and Keller and Strapp (1996).  
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Models of the first category seem to be not only much more realistic but also 
more successful. The advantage of these models is obvious; they utilize the power of 
environmental and spatial modeling software to model environmental processes and other 
spatial-natured problems; and they use the power of GIS to fulfill input, output, and other 
data representation and management tasks such as data sampling and data transformation. 
A shortcoming of the models is the absence of common data models, structures, and 
interfaces. Model builders thus frequently have to write programs to create workable 
linkages. Models of the second category, which attempt to incorporate environmental 
modeling and spatial analysis techniques fully within a GIS setting, rest in an early, 
experimental stage. 
 
3.8.3 GIS Model Applications  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, spatial GIS models have found some 
applications in describing the relationships between the environment and agricultural 
production, e.g., see Carter et al. (1991), Eswaran and Van den Berg (1992), Leemans 
and Solomon (1993), and Darwin et al. (1995). The focus of those studies is mainly on 
the direct effects of climate change on crop production. Carter et al. (1991) examined 
with a GIS the shifts in production of grain maize, sunflower, and soybeans in Europe. 
Eswaran and Van den Berg (1992) used a GIS derived index of agricultural production 
based on growing season lengths to investigate the impact of climate change on grain 
production and grazing in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. With similar methodology, 
Leemans and Solomon (1993) extended their study to match crop production with global 
climate conditions. Darwin et al. (1995) distinguished their research from those the above 
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by combining a GIS with a CGE economic model. The research divided the world into 
eight geographical regions and used the GIS to link climate with production possibilities 
of agricultural products in the eight regions. The CGE model was used to determine the 
effects of changes in production possibilities on production, trade, and consumption of 
thirteen major agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. 
More recently, Chomitz et al. (1999) employed a GIS-based spatial price 
equilibrium model to study the impact of trade and tax policies on deforestation in the 
Sahel. Specifically, based on GIS data, spatially disaggregate woodfuel supply was 
modeled at each one-square-kilometer-gridded landscape cell, which had an associated 
transport cost for supplying the market. GIS methods were used to compute the 
economically shortest path to the market, allowing for relative differences in travel cost 
on and off roads. Market equilibrium was determined annually through aggregate demand 
and supply equations. A simultaneous equation solution was written in GAUSS to 
integrate supply, demand, regrowth, and accounting procedures and use a grid search to 
solve for the market-clearing woodfuel prices. 
There are also applications of non-GIS-based spatial analysis to trade issues and 
to environmental policy issues, e.g., see Van den Bergh et al. (1996). Applications of GIS 
to environmental modeling, resource management, and sustainable development planning 
include Goodchild et al. (1993, 1996), Hallam et al. (1996), Despotakis (1991), and 
Despotakis et al. (1993).  
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3.9 Econometric Time Series Models 
3.9.1 Trade and Environment Linkages over Time 
The interaction between trade and the environment is not an instant process, 
particularly since the quality of resources deteriorates overtime. This deterioration is 
recoverable for non-depletable resources but otherwise exhaustion takes place. 
International trade also is intertwined with the intertemporal processes of economic 
growth and development. Both development and trade have led to unprecedented natural 
resource extraction and environmental pollution. For instance, in the past 200 years, the 
use of land, water, minerals and other natural resources has increased more than ten times 
(Rotmans 1998). However, the detrimental effects of economic growth, especially of 
international trade, are usually not immediately appreciated because of environmental 
assimilative capacity, i.e. see Park and Labys (1999). It is often the case that only after 
these effects become apparent that public concern leads to the enactment of 
environmental regulations. Econometric time-series models have been successfully used 
to investigate the relationship between CO2 emissions and the use of fossil fuels and to 
analyze the temporal decomposition and cyclicality of global CO2 concentrations and 
emissions, e.g., see Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), and Cohen et al. (2001), repectively. No 
doubt, econometric methods based on data recorded periodically or over time can also 
provide a useful tool to analyze temporal relationships between trade and the 
environment. 
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3.9.2 Potential Model Applications 
Econometric time series models have a long tradition in analyzing temporal 
interactions, e.g., for modeling possibilities, see Mills (1990), Granger and Terasvirta 
(1994), and Harvey (1994), among others. The basic or univariate models attempt to 
explain the behavior of an economic variable based only on its temporal history. 
Typically, models of this kind include autoregressive-moving average (ARMA), 
autoregressive-integrated-moving average (ARIMA) processes, and autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) models. In multivariate models the joint behavior of 
two or more variables is explained. These models can capture the interactions, which are 
considered a distinguishing feature, among economic time series. Commonly used 
multivariate models are causal models, cointegration models, vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models, bivariate ARCH, and dynamic simultaneous equation models. Nonlinear 
time series models refer to models which have a nonlinear presentation (for example, 
exponential autoregressive models), or in which the conditional variance of the process 
under analysis is allowed to vary over time (for instance, autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic or ARCH models). These models can be used to describe the non-linear 
feature of economic time series. Curiously, although time series data provide bases for 
empirical trade and environmental studies, there are no specific time series applications, 
e.g., see Robison (1988). However, such applications are not difficult to conceive. For 
example, with time series data, one can test whether trade causes environmental 





The objective of this chapter has been  to provide ovderview of various 
methodological approaches to modeling the multi-dimensional interactions between trade 
and the environment. The implications this overview has for research and model building 
are quite clear. Each approach has proven useful but it can generate only a limited and 
partial insight into those issues due to restrictive assumptions or analytical complexities. 
One implication is a need for both more general theoretical models and their quantitative 
implementation. For example, major approaches to the problem such as CGE models, 
GIS methods and econometric methods have been applied less often than one would 
expect and hence need further attention. Moreover, the spatial nature of environmental 
and trade problems should be addressed more adequately and greater attention should be 






MODELING TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Empirical attempts to model trade and environment relationships have pursued 
impact measurement rather obliquely, as reflected in Chapters 2 and 3. One view 
examines the impact of environmental regulation and pollution abatement costs on 
international trade flows. Examples include Tobey (1990), Grossman and Krueger 
(1993), Jaffe et al. (1995) and Antweiler (1996). The other view highlights how 
international trade, including a countrys openness, may affect economic growth and the 
environment. Examples are Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995), Shafik (1994), Seldon 
and Song (1994), Gale and Mendez (1996), Antweiler, et al. (1998), and Dean (1999). 
Overall, the results from these studies show little evidence that freer trade would bring 
about significant changes in environmental quality. Also, there is little evidence that 
differences in the strictness of environmental policy represent a significant determinant of 
trade patterns and flows. In addition, the inverted-U shaped environment-income 
relationship (the environmental Kuznets curve) is still in dispute and the role that trade 
plays in this relationship is far from clear (Asafu-Adjaye 1999 and Suri and Chapman 
1998).  
The ambiguousness among these empirical results can be ascribed to at least two 
major methodological pitfalls. First, most studies have tended to analyze cross-country or 
panel data typically for a sample of both developing and developed countries. Since 
different countries may have comparative advantage in the production of different goods, 
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the environmental effect of trade may differ from one country to another, not only in 
magnitude but also in sign. In a cross-country setting, positive and negative effects would 
probably cancel each other. Therefore, it is not surprising that cross-country studies often 
conclude that trade has no significant impact on the environment.  
The same criticism is also true in analyzing trade effects of environmental policy 
since the mixed effects that environmental policies have on trade may tend to weaken the 
statistical investigation of this effect. Whats more, the environmental Kuznets curve that 
emerges in cross-section analysis can be a spurious one, because it may simply reflect the 
juxtaposition of a positive relationship between pollution and income in developing 
countries, compared to a fundamentally different one in developed countries (Vincent 
1997). A single-country approach, therefore, has been suggested in several recent studies 
(Vincent 1997, Carson et al. 1997, and Dean 1999).  
Secondly, most studies, both cross- and single-country, are based on single 
equation models. These models enable economists to estimate the impact of trade and 
income on quality of the environment or vice versa. However, they reveal only a one-
directional relationship among trade, income and the environment, i.e., either how trade 
or income affects environmental quality or how environmental policies influence trade 
flows and income. In reality, trade, income and the environment are interrelated and 
interact with each other. For instance, the environment is a major factor of production in 
many developing countries that heavily rely on natural resources as a source of output. 
Environmental degradation in these countries could well reduce their capacity to produce 
and hence to export and to grow.  
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According to Grossman and Kruger (1993), Antweiler, et al. (1998), and Dean 
(1999), an empirical investigation of these various interactions should be able to 
decompose the change in emissions in three ways: a scale effect, a composition effect, 
and a technique effect. A scale effect occurs when the scale of economic activity 
expands. If the nature of that activity is unchanged but the scale is growing, then more 
pollution will be generated alone with output. A composition effect occurs when national 
output composition is altered. If the share of pollution-intensive goods in output 
increases, then this change in output composition will exacerbate existing environmental 
problems. A technique effect arises from increases in income that call for cleaner 
production methods. In addition, a technique effect may also exist as a result of increases 
in income if newly affluent individuals would demand a leaner environment.  
Empirical investigation should be able to isolate the effects of trade on the 
environment among these three effects. It should also be able to identify how emissions 
and environmental policies have affected trade flows through their impacts on economic 
scale and composition. As far as these interactions appear to be endogenously 
interrelated, a simultaneous equations model can better capture the interrelationships 
between trade, growth, and the environment. So far only Dean (1999) has attempted to 
model the relationship between trade and the environment with a simultaneous system. 
The system consists of four equations: 
Y = A(t)h(L, K, E)    
E = f (r, Y, S)           
r = g (E, Y)  
S = z (t, Y)   
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The first equation shows total output (real income, Y) as a function of the level of trade 
restrictions (t), the stock of conventional factors of production (L, K) and the level of 
emissions (E). Increased openness is assumed to lead to higher total factor productivity 
(A< 0). Since emissions are treated as an input, the total output Y is positively related to 
the equilibrium level of emissions E at any point of time. The second equation shows that 
demand for E is a function of the emissions charge (r), Y, and the share of pollution-
intensive goods in total output (S). The third equation is the inverse supple curve for E 
which is derived from the individuals utility function. The second and third equations 
simultaneously determine the equilibrium level of emissions and the equilibrium 
emissions charge. The fourth equation describes that the composition of output, S, is a 
function of real income and the restrictiveness of the trade regime (t).   
For a country with a comparative advantage in pollution intensive goods, an 
increase in trade restrictiveness moves resources toward production of relatively cleaner 
goods and hence leads to a lowered share of pollution-intensive goods in total output. 
Clearly, this system provides a useful framework for the investigation how trade 
liberalization can affect the environment in different ways. Since the trade variable is 
exogenous, the relationship between trade and the environment modeled in the system is 
one-directional, and the impact of environmental policies on trade is neglected. 
 Given the potential of the simultaneous interaction approach, this chapter applies 
this model to the particular case of Chinas development. This development perspective 
is interesting for a number of reasons. Since the inception of economic reform in 1978, 
China has achieved remarkable economic progress at a highly sustained growth rate. 
Promotion of trade and attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been central to 
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the countrys efforts to modernize its economy. The contribution of foreign trade to 
Chinas economy has also grown at an extraordinary pace. Since 1997, China has become 
one of the top ten exporters in the world, and since 1993, the largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment after the United States. While export-led economic growth has brought 
many benefits to China, the environment has suffered. Moreover, the large scale and 
rapid growth of Chinas economy have exposed a growing population to serious air and 
water pollution (World Bank 1997).  
Unfortunately, though some interesting attempts have been made to analyze this 
problem (Dean 1999, and Wu 2000), the environmental implications of the surge in 
foreign trade and investment are complex, very largely contested, and not fully 
illuminated by existing empirical data and analysis. At the same time, Chinas 
environmental protection agencies, aware of its pollution problems, have responded by 
enforcing regulatory standards for waste water and air pollutant discharges. It is worth 
noting that an extensive water and air pollution levy system has been in place in China 
since 1983 (Wang and Wheeler 1996). How the enforcement of environmental policy in 
China affects its trade and foreign direct investment is also an interesting topic of 
research and, to the best of my knowledge, has received no empirical investigation. 
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
theoretical framework suitable for analyzing the relationship between these variables. 
Section 3 examines the model-implied causal effects between the trade and 
environmental variables. Section 4 details Chinas trade, foreign direct investment, and 
environmental status. Section 5 discusses model specification and Section 6 provides a 
summarization. 
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4.2 Model Theory and Equations 
 The following model structure resembles Dean (1999), with the following 
enhancement: trade and foreign direct investment are included as endogenous variables. 
The endogenous treatment of trade highlights the trade effects of domestic environmental 
policy. Another significant improvement over the previous model is the introduction of  
foreign direct investment (FDI), an important determinant of trade in the Chinas case. 
Whats more, the inclusion of FDI allows one to test whether differences in 
environmental regulations affect location. Instead of testing the pollution haven and 
industrial flight hypotheses due to data limitations, the present test evaluates whether 
more stringent environmental regulations have an economic impact on a regions 
absorption of FDI. 
 
4.2.1 The Production Function Including Emissions and Trade 
Physically, pollution is an unwanted by-product or output of production. From 
another perspective, however, the environment can be regarded as a factor of production 
because it is used up in the productive process. Also, pollution abatement requires the 
input of valuable production factors such as labor and capital, and higher permissible 
emissions hence can save the use of conventional production factors. It has been 
suggested that emissions, labor and capital can be substitutes in a sense. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that treating emissions as a production factor in addition to labor and 
capital has become the standard approach in the trade and environment literature 
(McGuire 1982, Merrifield 1988, Siebert 1992, and Dean 1999). 
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 Including trade in a production function seems to be difficult because it may be 
inappropriate to simply treat exports, imports or the total trade values as an output or as a 
productive factor. For example, in a trade balance situation, while part of production 
output is exported, the same amount of goods is usually imported, leaving total output 
level unchanged. According to Heckscher and Ohlin (1991), however, difference in the 
relative scarcity of production factors between regions implies an uneconomic pattern of 
production, and the tendency of trade to equalize factor prices reflects production 
efficiency. In one region, a scarce factor might be used in a very economical way, and 
every measure is taken to substitute other less scarce resources for it; while in another 
region it may be the opposite case that these substitute resources are more scarce and 
must be used sparingly. That is, what is available in abundance in one region and used 
accordingly is scarce in another region, and conversely. Trade tends to lessen, if not 
completely eliminate, factor scarcity among trading regions by encouraging regions to 
specialize in the production of goods that intensively use resources with relative 
abundance. A relatively equalized supply of production factors would obviously increase 
the efficiency of production, and according to Ohlin (Heckscher and Ohlin 1991, pp 104), 
it is this that benefits the trading partners. Therefore, it is reasonable to model trade as a 
component leading to a shift in the production function, as trade flows increase with the 
input bundle held constant. 
 This suggests the following relationship between output, inputs, emissions, and 
trade: 
Y=A (T) h (L, K, E)                                      (4-1) 
where, Y= output; 
  L= labor input; 
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  K= capital input; 
  E= emissions released to the environment in the course of production; 
  T= trade, i.e. exports plus imports ; 
Here  hL>o, hK>0, and hE>0 ( where the subscript refers to the derivative of the function 
with respect to L, K, and E, respectively). In addition, assume A> 0, that is, the more an 
economy is engaged in trade, the higher the total factor productivity. 
 
4.2.2 Emissions Demand and Supply 
 Factor theory suggests that emissions are released until their marginal product 
equals their price, which in the presence of a pollution levy system is the effective levy 
rate. However, it is difficult to directly measure this marginal product since emissions are 
a joint output rather than a direct input of production. Emissions are typically reduced 
through abatement activities. The opportunity costs of a reduced level of emissions thus 
consist of the resources forgone in production. This implies that pollution abatement 
could result in a loss of output. Hence, from the polluters perspective, the optimal level 
of emissions discharged will be the point at which the marginal cost of abatement and the 
levy rate are equal.  
According to Dean (1999), the derived demand for emissions can be expressed as 
a function of the levy rate, r; output, Y; and the share of pollution-intensive goods in 
output, S: 
  E= f (r, Y, S)                                                                                   (4-2) 
where, fr < 0 and fS > 0 (fr , fY and fS  are derivatives of function f with respect to r, Y, and 
S respectively). Assuming an inverted-U relationship exists between per capita emissions 
and per capita outputs as reported in studies by Seldon and Song (1994) and Shafik and 
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Bandyopadhyay (1992), the relationship between emissions and output would also have 
an inverted-U shape (see Figure 4.1). We may then expect that fY > 0, given a position on 
the left side of the inverted U, and fY < 0 on the right side of the inverted U.  
While emissions demand reflects the economics of cost-minimizing abatement by 
industry, emissions supply, which specifies the pollution price imposed by the 
community as damage increases, reflects marginal social damage (MSD). In practice, 
emissions supply can be an interplay of limited information, perceived self-interest and a 
different ability or willingness to enforce community standards (Wang and Wheeler 
1996). In Dean (1999) the supply of emissions is interpreted as the communitys 
willingness to tolerate environmental damage. Let utility be a positive function of goods 
and clean environment, Eo, then E = Ē  Eo, where Ē is the total stock of environment as a 
good. Analogous to modeling the labor/leisure tradeoff, Dean notes that utility 
maximization yields the communitys demand for Eo, and their willingness, therefore, to 
supply (tolerate) E. The inverse supply curve for E can be represented as 
  r = g (E, Y)                                                                                        (4-3) 
The community will allow higher levels of emissions only if polluters pay a higher 
charge (gE > 0). Assuming clean environment is a normal good and higher output, Y, 
means higher income, an increase in output raises income and hence the demand for 
clean environment, and thus reduces the supply of emissions (gY > 0). 
   It should be pointed out that the effective levy rate and the level of emissions are 
simultaneously determined by the emissions demand and supply functions in each 
economy and at each time period. But the equilibrium emissions level (at the intersection 
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of emissions demand and supply curves) may not be optimal because the emissions 
supply function may not fully reflect the marginal social damage of pollution discharges. 
Following Dean (1999), the share of pollution intensive goods in total output can 
be simply written as: 
      S=Z (T, Y)                   (4-4) 
Again, assume that an increase in output raises income and clean goods are relatively 
income elastic, then S will decrease as Y increases and ZY < 0. For economies that 
possess a comparative advantage in pollution intensive goods, an increase in trade will 
lead to a rise in S and hence ZT > 0; while for economies with a comparative advantage in 
relative clean goods, one expects ZT < 0. 
 
4.2.3 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 Trade may arise from a variety of causes. For example, trade can be caused by 
differences in technology and/or by differences in endowment between trading partners. 
Though they may not be ranked with factor endowments as a cause of trade, government 
policies such as trade policies and environment policies and regulations can also have a 
profound impact on trade (Markusen et al. 1995). In addition, FDI can be trade promoting 
rather than trade destroying (Kojima 1976 and Reuber 1973). Both Kojima and Reuber 
argue that FDI is likely to occur when a countrys comparative advantage in some 
product in eroded or when comparative disadvantage exists. FDI moves factors 
(technology, management skills, and movable capital) to foreign locations, where total 
production costs are lowest for any given product. Hence, FDI can generate exports and 
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Figure 4.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
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   In general, the size of an economy, the economys proximity to its trading 
partners and the economys trade regime are important determinants of its production and 
trade patterns (Leamer and Stern 1970, Markusen et al. 1995, and Frankel and Romer 
1999). Trade flows (exports plus imports), T, thus reflect output, Y (the size of the 
economy), FDI, geographic remoteness, R, and a trade policy indicator, t: 
T= W (Y, FDI, R, t)                                                                             (4-5) 
where WY > 0, WFDI >0, WR < 0, and Wt > 0 if a trade policy is designed to promote trade. 
Otherwise, Wt < 0. 
 There are many explanations of FDI motives and patterns (see Leamer and Stern 
1970 and Ni 1998 for an overview of the theory of international capital movements). 
From the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory, decisions on the location of FDIs are 
predominantly made on the basis of traditional sources of comparative advantage such as 
relative wages, market sizes, and transportation costs (Vernon 1966, Aliber 1970, and 
Hirsch 1976). In addition, impediments to international trade such as tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers may also influence location (Clegg 1992). From a geographic perspective, 
agglomeration economies, that is, the advantages of co-locating different economic units, 
also play an important role in location (Wheeler and Mody 1992). The attractiveness of 
an area can be enhanced by factors such as the quality of infrastructure, the availability of 
specialized service supplies and of skilled labor, location related reputation effects, and 
the development of so-called industrial clusters (Porter 1990).  
Once location advantages have been achieved, they tend to be self-reinforcing 
(Head and Ries 1996 and Ni 1998). An existing economic base of a region will increase 
its attractiveness to subsequent FDI. The empirical evidence available suggests that both 
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conventional comparative advantage factors, market size and market growth (Kravis and 
Lipsey 1982, Culem 1988, Veugelers 1991,), and agglomeration factors such as 
infrastructure quality and the level of previous FDI (Wheeler and Mody 1992, Head and 
Ries 1996, and ZI 1998), are important determinants of a countrys FDI inflows. 
Moreover, though a higher wage rate means higher production costs, some empirical 
studies also reveal a positive relationship between FDI and wage rates because higher 
wage rates are usually related to higher productivity (Kravis and Lipsey 1982, Erickson 
and Kuruvilla 1994, and Chen 1997). These various interactions can be represented as 
follows: 
FDI =V (Y, CFDI-1, w, I, P, r)                                                               (4-6) 
where, FDI and CFDI-1 = FDI inflows and cumulative FDI inflows in the previous year; 
Y = output, a measure of market size; 
w = wage rates; 
I = infrastructure quality indicator; 
P = policy indicators; 
r = levy rate, which is separated from other policy indicators in order to test 
whether stricter environmental policies affect FDI inflows . 
Typically, VY > 0, VFDI-1 > 0, VI > 0, VP > 0, Vr < 0, and Vw < > 0.  
 
4.3   Interactions between Trade and the Environment 
Equation (4-1) to (4-6) reveal how trade and environmental variables are 
interrelated. Their interpretation depends on totally differentiating equations (4-1) to (4-
6): 
dY = hAdT + Ahl dL + AhK dK + AhE dE                                          (4-7) 
dE = fr dr + fY dY + fS dS                                                                   (4-8) 
dr = gE dE + gY dY                                                                            (4-9) 
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dS = ZTdT + ZYdY                                                                             (4-10) 
dT = WY dY + WF dF +WR dR + WT dT                                           (4-11) 
dFDI = VY dY + Vr dr + V F-1 dCF-1 + VI dI + VP dP  +  Vw dw                     (4-12) 
Diagrammatically, the implied mechanism of the system in (4-7)  (4-12) is shown in 
Figure 4.2.  
Rearranging equations (4-7)  (4-12), the proposed trade and environment model 
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The static causal effects among the variables relating trade and the environment that are 
relevant for policy purposes can be interpreted as follows: (1) how a change in trade 
policy or in trade values would affect the level of emissions and the emissions charge 
(effects of a trade policy on emissions and effects of a trade policy on emissions charges); 
and (2) how a change in an emissions charge or in emissions level would influence FDI 
inflows and trade flows (effects of an emissions charge on FDI and effects of an 
emissions charge on trade). These relationships involve not only effects between 
exogenous and endogenous variables, but also effects between endogenous variables that 
are simultaneously related. The latter are usually not dealt with in the existing literature. 
Appendix A shows that these effects can be solved either by flowgraph analysis or by 
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The effects of a trade policy on emissions 





 = [ ])('1 YSYYrTSt ZffgfhAZfW +++∆ −                                                     (4-14)  
 
where  | ∆| is the determinant of the system: 
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Assuming at present that a theoretically correct system should not change the sign of the 
direct impact of an exogenous variable on an endogenous variable, then | ∆| > 0. 
 The first term fsZT in the square brackets of (4-14) demonstrates the effect of a 
trade policy on the demand for emissions as an input due to a change in the composition 
of output. If an economy has a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods and 
its trade policy is designed to promote trade, then ZT >0 and fSZT >0. That is, increased 
trade could induce increased emissions. The second term in the square brackets captures 
the income effect of trade. The terms in parentheses reflect, respectively, the technique 
(frgY), scale (fY) and composition effects (fsZY) of an increase in income caused by the 
trade promoting policy. If an economy is in a state of development where increased 
income growth reduces emissions, i.e., on the right side of an inverted U, the sum of the 
term in parentheses would be negative. In addition, even if an economy is on the left side 
of an inverted U, the sum in parentheses could still be negative, once the technique and 
composition effects outweigh the scale effect. Though an economy may have a 
 108
comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods, a trade-promoting policy can lead to 
lower emissions, if the income effect of trade prevails. 
 Similarly, the effects of trade flows on emissions would be given by  
dT
dE
 = [ ])('1 YSYYrTS ZffgfhAZf +++∆ −                                                      (4-14a) 
 
The effects of a trade policy on FDI  
 Changes in foreign direct investment derive from 
 
tWdt
dF 1−∆= [hA(fS gE Vr ZY+ fS gE Vr+VY+gY Vr-fr gE VY)  
+ZT(AhE (fS VY + AhE fS gY Vr+fS gE Vr)]                     (4-16) 
The first term in the square brackets summarizes the effects of an increase in income on 
FDI due to the imposition of a given trade policy. The second term in brackets captures 
the trade-induced composition effects on FDI. Both the income and the composition 
effects are mixed in signs. If the impact of environmental policy on FDI is very small 
(Vr→ 0), i.e., the strictness of environmental policies is not significant factor for foreign 
firms to choose places to invest, then the first term would be positive but the second term 
would only be positive as long as the economy has a comparative advantage in pollution-
intensive goods. In this case, trade liberalization stimulates foreign investment. For an 
economy with a comparative advantage in environmentally safe goods (ESG), the second 
term could be negative due to the negative impact of a relatively reduced share of 
pollution-intensive goods on emissions and hence on economic scales. In the case that the 
trade-induced income effects dominate, trade promotion would lead to more FDI inflows. 
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The effects of a trade policy on emissions charges 
 The emissions charge impact is defined by 
 
 tWdt
dr 1−∆= [ZT (fS gE + AhE fS gY) + hA(fS gE ZY + fY gE + gY)]               (4-17) 
The first term in square brackets shows the effect of trade on the price of the environment 
due to the trade-induced change in output composition. With a comparative advantage in 
pollution-intensive goods, the emissions charge can be raised in two ways. On the 
demand side, increased trade implies an increased demand for environment and hence 
higher environmental prices (captured by fSgE). On the supply side, this increased 
demand for environment as an input would also imply a higher lever of output and 
income, which would lead to reduced supply of the environmental factor and hence to a 
higher emissions charge (captured by AhEfSgY). On the other hand, with a comparative 
advantage in clean goods, increased trade would result in a decrease in demand for and an 
increase in supply of emissions; the first term would thus be negative and trade would 
lower emissions charges. 
 The second term in square brackets reveals the income effect of a trade policy on 
the emissions charge. Similar to the decomposition of effects that trade has on emissions, 
the components of the term can be interpreted as respectively the composition, scale, and 
technique effects of income, on emissions demand and supply. The composition effect of 
income, fSgEZY, states that higher income reduces the demand for emissions provided that 
clean goods are relatively income elastic, leading to a lower emissions charge. The scale 
effect of income, fYgE, would increase (decrease) the demand for emissions if an 
economy is on the left (right) side of the inverted U and hence would cause the emissions 
charge to rise (decline). The technique effect of income, gY, implying that a rise in 
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income would enhance an economys ability and willingness to pay a higher price for a 
cleaner environment and would thus reduce the supply of emissions and raise the 
emissions charge. 
 Generally, if an economy specializes in pollution-intensive goods and the 
technique affect of income dominates the overall effect of trade on the emissions charge 
would be positive, that is, trade could lead to stricter environmental policies and 
enforcement. 





dr [ZT (fS gE + AhE fS gY) + hA’(fS gE ZY + fY gE + gY)]              (4-17a) 
 
The effects of the emissions charge on FDI 




dF {Vr [1- hA WY- AhE (fS WY ZT +fY + fS ZY)] + AhE fr VY}         (4-18) 
The first term in braces consists of both the positive and the negative effects of a change 
in the emissions charge on FDI. The negative effects include the direct impact (Vr) of the 
emissions charge, and the indirect impact (AhEfSZY) of decreased economic scale caused 
by income-induced change in output composition. The positive effect comes from the 
increased output scale due to positive interactions between trade and output (hAWY). 
The other two components of this term could be either positive or negative. If an 
economy has a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods, the trade-induced 
increasing demand for environment as an input would raise the output and hence make 
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the economy more attractive to FDIs (captured by AhEfSWYZT). Otherwise this effect 
would be negative. When an economy is on the left (right) side of the inverted U, 
increased (decreased) output due to positive (negative) inter-influence between output 
and emissions (captured by AhEfY) could lead to more (less) FDIs. Finally, the last term 
in braces (AhEfrVY) suggests that the negative impact of a strict environmental policy 
such as a higher emissions charge on output would lead to lower FDIs, and this effect 
would dominate as long as the direct effect Vr approaches to zero.  
 
The effects of the emissions charge on trade 






 [Vr wF (1-AhEfY  AhEfSZY) + AhE (frWY + frVYWF)]                  (4-19) 
Though the proposed model does not explicitly measure the impact of environmental 
policies on trade, equation (4-19) can evaluate all the indirect effects from an increase in 
the emissions charge to trade, most likely negative.  The only likely source of a positive 
effect, AhEfY, is derived from the positive interaction between output and emissions when 
the economy is on the left side of the inverted U. In this case, the negative effect of an 
emissions charge on trade via FDI, VrWF, would be mitigated. Otherwise, just like the 
term AhEfSZY relating the composition effect of an increase in output, AhEfY would 
aggravate the negative effect of the emissions charge on trade. A plausible explanation 
could be that, given emissions as an important input, any reductions in emissions would 
first lower the output scale and then the trade volume, given the direct impact of output 
on trade. For similar reasons, the second term in square brackets is negative because an 
increase in an emissions charge would reduce the demand for environment as an input, 
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leading to a lower level of output and hence reduced trade (captured by AhEfrWY). In 
addition, lowered output would make the economy less appealing to FDIs, and reduced 
FDIs would result in reduced exports and imports (captured by AhEfrVYWF). 
 Conventional trade and environment theory suggests that environment policies 
would raise production costs, lower the competitiveness of the economy, and hence lead 
to reduced trade (Siebert et al. 1980, McGuire 1982, and Baumol and Oates 1988). 
Though production costs and price are excluded, the analytical results of the theoretical 
framework on the trade effects of environmental policies are consistent with the 
conventional view, but stem from a different perspective. 
 
4.4 Model Application 
4.4.1 China as an Appropriate Case Study  
 Since the post-1978 reform, China has experienced the longest and most rapid 
period of economic growth in its modern history. Over the past two decades, the average 
rate of GDP growth has been around 9 percent per annum and the economy has 
quadrupled in size. Equally impressive is the extent to which China has integrated into 
the world economy. Indeed, enhanced trade performance and increased trade flows and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have been key to the high growth rate of the Chinese 
economy. Table 4.1 provides basic statistics and information of Chinas economic 
growth, trade volumes and FDI inflows over the past twenty years. 
 Over the same time period, there also has been a significant change in the 
composition of Chinas exports and imports. Before the reform process began, about 54 
percent of Chinas exports were typically primary products such as crude petroleum and 
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non-staple foods, while imports were strongly biased toward manufactured goods (Lardy 
1992). By 1998, while imports were still dominated by manufactured goods (83.6 
percent), the exports of manufactured goods increased significantly and accounted for 
88.8 percent of total exports. Table 4.2 and 4.3 show the totals of Chinas exports and 
imports, respectively, by main commodity groups from 1980-1998. It is believed that 
Chinas accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 may significantly 
impact the countrys economic and trade growth. 
 An important feature of Chinas trade has been the role of foreign direct 
investment. Evidence shows that by 1994, nearly 30 percent of Chinas exports were 
from foreign funded enterprises (Lardy 1995). Moreover, most of these exports consisted 
of products assembled from imported goods and accounted for nearly one-half of the 
values of manufactured exports.  
 
4.4.2 The Present Environmental Status and Regulations 
 Chinas environmental problems have been aggravated by its rapidly developing 
economy (Wu 2000, and World Bank 1997). Rapid economic growth has instigated 
enormous volumes of air emissions, wastewater, and toxic hazards and resulted in 
widespread depletion of natural resources. These factors, in turn, have adversely affected 
human health, increased natural disasters, dampened gains from trade, and resulted in 
social instability and conflicts. 
Water pollution is the first major environmental concern. Briefly, according to the 
1996 annual governmental report (NEPA 1997), 78 percent of Chinas river sections 
cannot be used for drinking purpose and 50 percent of urban groundwater has been 
contaminated. Lakes, reservoirs, and coastal regions are polluted by various degrees.
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Table 4.1 Major Economic Indicators in China, 1980-1998 
 
Year

































1980 7.8 987.05 - 181.2 200.2 381.4 12.6 - 44.2 
1981 5.2 1000.72 - 220.1 220.2 440.3 15.1 - 42.1 
1982 9.1 1016.54 - 223.2 192.9 416.1 14.6 - 40.8 
1983 10.9 1030.08 - 222.3 213.9 436.2 14.5 6.36 40.0 
1984 15.2 1043.57 - 261.4 274.1 535.5 16.7 12.58 38.9 
1985 13.5 1058.51 293.67 273.5 422.5 696.0 23.1 16.61 38.5 
1986 8.8 1075.07 345.28 309.4 429.1 738.5 25.3 18.74 38.9 
1987 11.6 1093.00 372.21 394.4 432.1 826.5 25.8 23.14 38.3 
1988 11.3 1110.26 372.21 475.2 552.7 1027.9 25.6 31.94 38.7 
1989 4.1 1127.04 376.59 525.4 591.4 1116.8 24.6 33.92 38.3 
1990 3.8 1143.33 478.38 620.9 533.5 1154.4 30.0 34.87 37.0 
1991 9.2 1158.23 532.27 718.4 637.9 1356.3 33.4 43.66 37.4 
1992 14.2 1171.71 551.49 849.4 805.9 1655.3 34.2 110.07 38.6 
1993 13.5 1185.17 576.19 917.4 1039.6 1957.0 32.5 275.15 40.8 
1994 12.6 1198.50 861.87 1210.1 1156.1 2366.2 43.6 337.67 41.4 
1995 10.5 1211.21 835.07 1487.8 1320.8 2808.6 40.2 375.21 42.3 
1996 9.6 1223.89 831.42 1510.5 1388.3 2898.8 35.6 417.25 42.8 
1997 8.8 1236.26 828.98 1827.9 1423.7 3251.6 36.1 452.57 42.5 
1998 7.8 1248.10 827.91 1837.6 1401.7 3239.3 33.8 454.63 42.2 
 





Table 4.2 China’s total exports by main commodity categories, 1980-1998  
(US$ 100 million) 
 
                          Primary                      Manufactured  























  and  
Equip. 
Tex-     
tiles 
1980 181.19 91.14 50.30 29.85 17.11 42.80 90.05 49.70 11.20 8.43 39.99 
1981 220.07 102.48 46.57 29.24 19.48 52.28 117.59 53.43 13.42 10.87 47.06 
1982 223.21 100.50 45.02 29.08 16.53 53.14 122.71 54.98 11.96 12.63 43.02 
1983 222.26 96.20 43.28 28.53 18.92 46.66 126.06 56.72 12.51 12.21 43.65 
1984 261.39 119.34 45.66 32.32 24.21 60.27 142.05 54.34 13.64 14.93 50.54 
1985 273.50 138.28 50.56 38.03 26.53 71.32 135.22 49.44 13.58 7.72 44.93 
1986 309.42 112.72 36.43 44.48 29.08 36.83 196.70 63.57 17.33 10.94 58.86 
1987 394.37 132.31 33.55 47.81 36.50 45.44 262.06 66.45 22.35 17.41 85.70 
1988 475.16 144.06 30.32 58.90 42.57 39.50 331.10 69.68 28.97 27.69 104.89 
1989 525.38 150.78 28.70 61.45 42.12 43.21 374.60 71.30 32.01 38.74 108.97 
1990 620.91 158.86 25.59 66.09 35.37 52.37 462.05 74.41 37.30 55.88 125.76 
1991 718.43 161.45 22.47 72.26 34.86 47.54 556.98 77.53 38.18 71.49 144.56 
1992 849.40 170.04 20.02 83.09 31.43 46.93 679.36 79.98 43.48 132.19 161.35 
1993 917.44 166.66 18.17 83.99 30.52 41.09 750.78 81.83 46.23 152.82 163.92 
1994 1210.06 197.08 16.29 100.1 41.27 40.69 1012.98 83.71 62.36 218.95 232.18 
1995 1487.80 214.85 14.44 99.54 43.75 53.32 1272.95 85.56 90.94 314.07 322.40 
1996 1510.48 219.25 14.52 102.3 40.45 59.31 1291.23 85.48 88.77 353.12 284.98 
1997 1827.68 239.30 13.09 110.5 41.93 69.87 1588.38 86.91 102.27 437.08 344.32 
1998 1837.57 206.00 11.21 106.1 35.17 51.81 1631.57 88.79 103.16 502.33 323.83 
 
Source: Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics (1999),  
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China,  Beijing: China 













Table 4.3 China’s total imports by main commodity categories, 1980-1998  
(US$ 100 million) 
 
                          Primary                      Manufactured  



























1980 200.17 69.59 34.77 29.27 35.54 2.03 130.58 65.23 29.09 51.19 41.54 
1981 220.15 80.44 36.54 36.22 40.27 0.83 139.71 63.46 26.06 58.66 40.35 
1982 192.85 76.34 39.59 42.01 30.12 1.83 116.51 60.41 29.36 32.04 39.06 
1983 213.90 58.08 27.15 31.22 24.59 1.11 155.82 72.85 31.83 39.88 62.89 
1984 274.10 52.08 19.00 23.31 25.42 1.39 222.02 81.00 42.37 72.45 73.18 
1985 422.52 52.89 12.52 15.53 32.36 1.72 369.63 87.48 44.69 162.39 118.98 
1986 429.04 56.49 13.17 16.25 31.43 5.04 372.55 86.83 37.71 167.81 111.92 
1987 432.16 69.15 16.00 24.43 33.21 5.39 363.01 84.00 50.08 146.07 97.30 
1988 552.75 100.6 18.21 34.76 50.90 7.87 452.07 81.79 91.39 166.97 104.10 
1989 591.40 117.5 19.87 41.92 48.35 16.50 473.86 80.13 75.56 182.07 123.35 
1990 533.45 98.53 18.47 33.35 41.07 12.72 434.92 81.53 66.48 168.45 89.06 
1991 637.90 108.3 16.98 27.99 50.03 21.13 529.57 83.02 92.77 196.01 104.93 
1992 805.85 132.5 16.45 31.46 57.75 35.70 673.30 83.55 111.57 131.12 192.73 
1993 1039.59 142.1 13.67 22.06 54.38 58.19 897.49 86.33 97.04 450.23 285.27 
1994 1156.14 164.8 14.26 31.37 74.37 40.35 991.28 85.74 121.30 514.67 280.84 
1995 1320.84 244.1 18.49 61.32 101.59 51.27 1076.67 81.51 172.99 526.42 287.72 
1996 1388.33 254.4 18.32 56.72 106.98 68.77 1133.92 81.68 181.06 547.63 313.91 
1997 1423.70 286.2 20.10 43.04 120.06 103.06 1137.50 79.90 192.97 527.74 322.20 
1998 1401.66 229.5 16.37 37.93 107.16 67.73 1171.24 83.56 201.66 567.68 310.71 
 
Source: Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics (1999),  
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China,  Beijing: China 













While there has been progress in water pollution control, it has been largely offset by 
increased pollution. Besides water pollution, water scarcity has become an increasingly 
serious problem in Northern China, which, in turn, has led to ambitious schemes to divert 
water from the Yangtze River in the South to ease water shortages in the North.  
 Similarly, despite considerable efforts to control air pollution, Chinas industrial 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions doubled between 1982 and 1997 and most major city 
centres have SO2 concentrations substantially above legal limits. A study by the World 
Resources Institute concludes that nine of the ten worst air polluted cities in the world 
appear in China (Fox 1999). This problem is closely related to the fact that coal accounts 
for more than 70 percent of Chinas total energy consumption (with little adoption of 
clean coal technologies) (see Table 4.4). Rapid growth in coal-based energy consumption 
and in motorized urban transportation is also responsible for the large increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2) in China.  
Another major environmental concern in China has been the growth in industrial 
solid wastes. In 1996, 660 million tons of solid wastes were produced, 20 million tons 
more than the amount produced in the previous year and 75 percent higher than in 1991. 
Of the total solid wastes generated, 10 million tons are considered hazardous. In addition, 
nearly 70 million tons of household garbage are produced nationwide each year. Due to 
lack of sufficient handling facilities, solid wastes are stockpiled in suburbs and rural areas 
and waste accumulations surround many cities. What makes the situation even worse is 
that China imports wastes from other countries to supplement its need for materials to 
sustain industrial production. Due to the lack of adequate regulations and strict 
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Table 4.4 Energy Consumption in China, 1980-1995 
 1980 1990 1995 
Total consumption (million tonnes) 602.7 987.0  1290.0 
(Shares in percentages)    
       Coal 72.2 76.2 75.0 
       Oil 20.7 16.6 17.3 
       Natural gas 3.1 2.1 1.8 
       Hydropower 4.0 5.1 5.9 
       Nuclear power 0 N/A <0.1 
       Non-biomass renewable energy N/A N/A <0.1 
 
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1996 (China Statistical Yearbook 1996). Beijing: 
China Statistical Press, 1997, p p: 203 
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environmental enforcement, China receives millions of tons of toxic wastes that pollute 
its domestic environment and constitute a serious health hazard. 
As a result, the Chinese government has begun to treat environmental protection 
as an important national policy. It has been widely accepted in China that the pace of 
environmental protection must be commensurate with economic growth in order for 
China to achieve sustainable development. China has promulgated and enforced its 
Environmental Protection Law, first implemented in 1979 and later amended in 1989. 
Efforts have been made to gradually promote an integrated environmental system of 
unified management, with an increased emphasis for coordination between different 
sectors and the agencies of environmental protection at varying levels. Many other laws 
also exist for marine protection and for air, water and noise pollution prevention. In 
addition, stringent measures have been established with the aim of adhering to three basic 
principles: intensive management, prevention first, and the polluter-pays principle. It is 
worth noting that China has the most extensive pollution charge system in the developing 
countries. From its inception in the early 1980s to 1996, about 30 billion RMB yuan (3.66 
billion US dollars) have been collected from more than 500,000 major polluters. In 1996 
alone, the system collected about 4 billion RMB yuan (0.49 billion US dollars). Charges 
are levied for effluents of wastewater, air pollutants, and solid waste discharge; the 
majority comes from levies on wastewater. According to the China Environmental 
Yearbook 1997 (NEPA 1998), about 63 percent of total environmental levies in 1996 




4.4.3 Interface between Trade and the Environment 
 Historically, Chinas trade policy regime has aimed to stimulate export growth to 
generate foreign exchange without regarding its costs, while its import policy has been 
hampered with controls to reduce import growth. Such an approach has neglected any 
relationships between trade and the environment. According to Jha et al. (1999), 
unchecked production from export-oriented rural small and medium-sized enterprises has 
led to the deterioration of Chinas environment. Since the 1980s, market growth has 
gradually become the dominant force in decisions concerning exports. Environmental 
policies have not generally affected investment and trade decisions significantly. Other 
factors such as production costs, market access and resource availability dominate. 
Though not the intention of the central government, exporters have so far encountered 
few domestic environmental regulations due to provincial regional protectionism (Wu 
2000 and Jha et al. 1999). 
 The impact of FDI on the environment has been mixed and controversial. In 
Chinas case, Jha et al. (1999) note that FDI enterprises have a higher investment share in 
pollution abatement (2.27 percent) than that of their local counterparts (0.94 percent). 
Moreover, the former tend to use more efficient technology and equipment that also 
reduce pollution. In the case of wastewater recycling, it was found that the rate of 
recycling was about 29 percent for domestic firms, while it was over 68 percent for FDI 
enterprises. However, under pressures of the rising costs of pollution abatement in their 
parent country or in other developed countries, some foreign firms have diverted their 
pollution intensive industries to China. In 1991, for example, over 36 percent of all FDI 
was invested in highly polluting industries, including printing, dyeing and electroplating 
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industries (Xia 1995). It has been found that technologies used in some foreign-funded 
enterprises are often out of date and result in heavy pollution. A survey of foreign firms 
in the special economic zone of Guangdong reveals that only 28.4 percent of these 
enterprises have equipment that can control dust and toxic substances (Xia 1995). Hence,  
some parts of China may indeed be pollution havens for some foreign investors. 
 
4.5   Model Specification  
The empirical framework employed for model specifications reflects the lack of 
long environmental and economic time series for China as a whole. As a consequence,  
more attention is given to model disaggregation with concentration on the Chinese 
provinces. A provincial-level panel data set not only expands the sample size for 
econometric estimation and improves the efficiency of estimates, but it also permits one 
to better deal with the effects of missing or unobserved variables (Hsiao 1986). Below, 
equations (4-1) to (4-6) that form the core of the model have been modified to permit 
estimation according to the 1987-1995 provincial-level panel data set. 
 
The Production Function  
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function form matched by the trade-induced 
productivity term A(T) = a0 Ta1, Equation (4-1) can be rewritten as: 
Yit = a0’ Tit a1 Lit a2 Kita3 Eita4 eu1it                                                                     (4-20) 
Taking logs of (20) and setting a0=log a0, one obtains an equation suitable for employing 
with the provincial panel data set  
log Yit = a0 + a1 log Tit + a2 log Lit + a3 log Kit +a4 log Eit + u1it                   (4-21) 
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where Yit = output, measured as GDP; 
           Tit = trade, measured as exports plus imports; 
           Lit = labor input, measured as the number of total employed persons; 
           Kit = capital input, measured as cumulative total investments in fixed assets; 
           Eit = emissions generated in production; 
           u1it= disturbance term; 
           i, t = subscripts denoting provinces and time periods respectively. 
Here, a0, a1, a2 , a3 and a4 are parameters to be estimated. One expects a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 
0 and a4 > 0. For information regarding the definitions, units, and coefficient assumptions 
of the variables, see Table 4.5. 
 
Emissions Demand 
As noted earlier, there may exist an inverted-U relationship between demand for 
emissions and output. Therefore, the inclusion of a quadratic output term would be 
appropriate in specifying the emissions demand function. In addition to the three 
determinants of emissions demand included in Equation (4-2), it is hypothesized that 
state ownership may also be important. According to Wang and Wheeler (1996), state-
owned firms may be more pollution intensive than those of other ownership types for 
several reasons. First, state-owned firms may generate more emissions per unit of output 
because they are less efficient. Second, state-owned firms may be less sensitive to 
emissions charges due to soft budget constraints. Third, evidence from other Asian 
countries suggests that state-owned firms resist environment regulations more 
successfully than privately owned ones (Pargal and Wheeler 1996 and Hartman et al. 
1996). Therefore, the industrial output share of state-owned firms is added to control for 
this ownership factor. The specification of Equation (4-2) thus becomes: 
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Table 4.5 Variable Definition and Coefficient Assumption 
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Assumption 
Endogenous Variable    
    Yit Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in 100 
million RMB yuan at 1990 constant prices. 
b2>0, c2>0, d2<0, e1>0, f1>0. 
    Eit Industrial wastewater discharges, in million 
tons ; industrial waste gas emissions, in 
billion m3 ; industrial SO2 emissions, in 
tons ; CO2 emissions, in million tons; 
industrial particle emissions, in tons ; and 
industrial dust discharges, in tons. 
a4>0, c1>0. 
    rit The levy rate, at 1990 constant prices, 
computed as total levy collected on 
industrial wastewater (gas) discharge 
divided by total amount of wastewater (gas) 
discharge, in cents per ton (cents per 
thousand m3). 
b1<0, f2<0. 
    Sit Share of industrial GDP in total GDP, %. b4>0. 
    Tit Total trade flows (exports plus imports), in 
10,000 US$ at 1990 constant prices. 
a1>0, d1<>0. 
    FDIit Foreign direct investment inflows, in 10,000 
US$ at 1990 constant prices. 
e2>0. 
Exogenous Variables    
    Lit Number of total employed persons, in 
10,000. 
a2>0. 
    Kit Cumulative total investment in fixed assets, 
in 100 million RMB yuan at 1990 constant 
prices. 
a3>0. 
    SOEit Share of state-owned firms in industrial 
GDP, %. 
b5>0. 
    Nit Population, in 10,000. c2>0. 
    Cit Number of pollution complaints per million 
population. 
c3<>0. 
    edit Illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rate, %. c4<0. 





(Table 4.5 continued) 
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Assumptions 
Exogenous Variable   
    Vit Investment in fixed assets, in 100 million 
RMB yuan at 1990 constant prices. 
d4<>0. 
    Rit Remoteness, computed as the nearest 
distance between a provinces capital and 
the capitals of Chinas 15 biggest trading 
partners, in kilometers. 
e3<0. 
    ERt Exchange rate,  in RMB yuan  per 100 US$. e4<>0. 
    TNt National total tariff revenues divided by 
national total imports, %.  
e5<0. 
    TPi 1996 provincial  ad valorem tariff rates, %. e5<0. 
    CFDII(t-1) Lagged cumulative FDI inflows, in 10,000 
US$ at 1990 constant prices. 
f3>0. 
    TIit Highway intensity, kilometers per 100 
square kilometers. 
f4>0. 
    TAXit Overall tax rate, tax revenue divided by 
GDP, %. 
f5<0. 
    PGDPi(t-1) Lagged per capita GDP, in RMB yuan per 
capita. 
f6>0. 
    Di Regional geographic and policy dummy 
variable, 1 for coastal provinces and Beijing, 
and 0 for other provinces. 
d5<>0, e6>0, f7>0. 
    DTt Time dummy variable, 1 for 1989, 1990 and 
1991, and 0 for other years. 
e7<0, f8<0. 
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log Eit = b0 + b1 log rit + b2 log Yit + b3 (log Yit)2 + b4 log Sit + b5 log SOEit + u2it   (4-22) 
where Eit = emissions, measured as industrial wastewater, waste gas, CO2, SO2, particle,  
         and dust discharges, respectively; 
 rit  = the emissions charge, measured as pollution levy rates; 
            Yit  = output, measured as GDP; 
Sit  = pollution-intensive goods in output, measured as the industrial output share  
         in GDP; 
SOEit = the industrial output share of state-owned enterprises in total industrial  
             GDP;  
             u2it = disturbance term.  
Here, b0, b1, , b5 are parameters to be estimated. one expects b1 < 0, b2 > 0, b3 < 0, b4 > 0, 
and b5 > 0. See Table 4.5 for variable definitions and coefficient assumptions. 
 
Emissions Supply 
 As income increases, ceteris paribus, emissions supply will decrease because the 
demand for clean environment, which is a normal good, will increase. Income is not only 
directly related to a communitys willingness to tolerate emissions but also the key 
variable that the Chinese provincial regulators use to establish emissions charge standards 
(Wang and Wheeler 1996). Therefore, given the importance of income in emissions 
supply, instead of approximating it with output as is in Equation (4-3), income per capita 
is explicitly introduced. 
 Other factors that may affect emissions supply or a provinces decision on 
emissions charges are environmental complaints from citizens, average education levels, 
and population density. Citizen environmental complaints can be considered both an 
indication of weak enforcement of environmental standards and regulations and an 
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indication of pressure that communities place on regulators for lower emissions supply. If 
the primary role of complaints is an indication of weak enforcement dominates, the 
relation between complaints and emissions charges will be negative, i.e., lower emissions 
charges incur more complaints. This relation will be positive if the effect of pressure on 
emissions supply is to increase the price or levy. Education levels may have an impact on 
emissions supply because they would affect local perceptions of environmental problems 
and a communitys ability to organize and bring pressure on regulators to enforce desired 
levels of compliance (Wang and Wheeler 1996).  
Population density may be a factor in emissions supply as well for two reasons. 
On one hand, the increasing pressure of population growth often forces developing 
countries such as China to assign a high priority to economic development. In this case, 
environmental quality is sacrificed for higher growth rates. Hence higher population 
density could mean more lenient environmental enforcement, higher emissions supply, 
and lower pollution charges. On the other hand, according to the Samuelson condition for 
the provision of public goods, the optimized emissions charge should be the sum of 
marginal damages across all individuals (Antweiler et al. 1998). Therefore, high 
population density would call for high emissions charges and low emissions supply. 
Given the above considerations, the inverse emissions supply equation becomes: 
log rit = c0 + c1 log Eit + c2 log INit + c3 log Cit + c4 log edit + c5 log PDit +u3it        (4-23) 
where  rit = the emissions charge, measured as pollution levy rates; 
            Eit = emissions, measured as different types of industrial pollution discharges; 
            INit = per capita income, approximated as per capita GDP; 
            Cit = citizen environmental complaints, measured as complaint letters and visits  
        that authorities receive per 10,000 population; 
           edit = education levels, measured as illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rate; 
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           PDit = population density, in number of inhabitants per km2; 
 u3it = disturbance term. 
Here, c0, c1,   , c5 are estimating parameters, and c1 > 0, c2 > 0, c3 < > 0, c4 < 0,  and c5 < 
> 0.  
Since INit = Yit/Nit, where Nit = population, Equation (4-23) can be rewritten as: 
log rit = c0+c1log Eit+c2 log Yit –c2’log Nit +c3 log Cit +c4 log edit +c5 log PDit      (4-23a) 
where c2 = c2’, a restriction imposed on these two parameters. Detailed variable 
definitions and coefficient assumptions are shown in Table 4.5. 
 
The Share of Pollution- Intensive Goods in Output 
 In this study, the industrial output share in GDP is used to approximate the share 
of pollution-intensive goods in output. In China, industrial sector includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, and the production and supply of tap water, power, steam, 
hot water, and gas (CSP 1999). According to Park and Labys (1999), industry is a very 
important source of environmental pollution in an economy since it generates huge 
emissions on both input and output sides from its productive activities. Industry is a 
major consumer of energy, and power generation is the major source of airborne 
pollutants such as CO2, SO2 and particles. Also, many industrial processes rely heavily on 
the use of water and this directly leads to millions of tons of wastewater discharge each 
year. In addition, there are many types of solid waste due to industrial production, 
particularly in China. Chinas National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) 
estimates that industrial pollution accounts for over 70 percent of the national total, 
including 70 percent of wastewater pollution, 72 percent of SO2 emissions, 75 percent of 
flue dust, and 87 percent of solid wastes (Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler 1997). 
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 The determination of industrial output share in GDP has to be an empirical one 
due to the absence of a readily applicable economic theory. Inclusion of trade in the 
specification can be justified by the fact that the share of manufactured goods in Chinas 
total exports and imports has averaged around 80 percent since the 1980s. Evidence that 
an unusually large fraction of the population have been absorbed in the tertiary of the 
services sector suggests that the industrial share in GDP may shrink as the economy 
grows. In Chinas case, the tertiary sector has developed faster in the coastal provinces 
than in the inland areas due to demographical and policy differences. Historically, the 
Chinese central government intentionally placed industrial bases in the inland provinces 
as part of national security policy. Hence, a dummy variable is needed to control for the 
effect of these demographical and policy differences.  
Investment in fixed assets is also specified because industry is more capital 
intensive than the agricultural and services sectors, and the direction of this investment 
may have an important impact on the industrial output share of GDP. Whats more, since 
industrial production relies heavily on capital input, its capacity determined output is 
relatively fixed in the short term and time lags are needed to adjust capacity and output 
(Labys 2000). In order to capture this time lag effect, the industrial share in the previous 
time period is therefore added in the equation. 
 The equation describing the share of pollution-intensive goods in output can be 
written as follows: 
log Sit = d0 + d1 log Tit + d2 log Yit + d3 log Si(t-1) + d4 log Vit + d5 Di + u4it               (4-24) 
where  Sit = pollution-intensive goods in output, measured as the industrial output share  
       in GDP; 
            Tit  =trade, measured as exports plus imports; 
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            Yit = output, measured as GDP; 
            Si(t-1) = industrial output share in the previous time period; 
            Vit = investment in fixed assets; 
            Di = regional dummy variable, one for the coastal provinces and Beijing, and zero  
       for other provinces; 
           u4it = disturbance term. 
Here, d0, d1,   , d5 are parameters,  and one expects d1< > 0, d2 < 0, d3 > 0, d4 < > 0, and 
d5 < > 0. A summary of variable definitions and coefficient assumptions is provided in 
Table 4.5. 
 
The Trade Equation 
From the standard gravity model of international trade, a log-linear functional 
relation can be derived to describe Chinas provincial aggregate trade flows with the rest 
of the world (Chen 1997). A provinces proximity to the rest of the world is measured as 
the geographic distance between the provinces capital and the nearest capital city of 
Chinas fifteen largest trading partners. Hence, it is conceivable that a provinces 
proximity index can be time varying, because Chinas top fifteen trading partners may 
change from time to time. The impact of this variable on trade would be negative taking 
into account trading costs such as transportation and information costs associated with the 
distance. Other trade-related policy variables considered include foreign exchange rates 
and tariffs. Since the 1980s, China has adjusted its exchange rates in order to stimulate its 
exports (see Table 1). At the same time, however, these devaluations may have lessened 
Chinas ability to import from other countries. The exchange rate variable could thus 
provide an interesting test for the overall effect of the exchange rate policy on trade.  
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In the past twenty years, as one of its many efforts for accession to the WTO, 
China has gradually but significantly reduced its tariffs on imports. Though tariffs are 
uniformly set in China, provincial weighted-average of ad valorem tariffs vary 
considerably across provinces due to different import preferences (World Bank 1997, 
Annex Table A.1). Unfortunately, only the 1996 provincial tariff data are available. We 
thus assume that a provinces import preferences were relatively stable during the period 
of study. However, in order to capture the change in tariffs across provinces and over 
time, a product term of the national average and the provincial average tariffs is 
introduced in the specification. Again, a regional geographical and policy dummy 
variable is used to control for the effect of the resulting differences between the coastal 
and the inland areas.  
In addition, a time dummy is introduced to control for the impact of the well-
known 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident (or the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre). The 
Chinese communist governments use of military force to suppress student demonstrators 
led to economic sanctions by Western countries. The trade equation becomes: 
       log Tit = e0 + e1 log Yit + e2 log FDIit + e3 log Rit + e4 log ER1t  
               + e5 (log TNt)*(log TPi) + e6 Di + e7 DTt  + u5it                                    (4-25) 
where Tit = trade flows, measured as exports plus imports; 
           Yit = output, measured as GDP; 
           FDIit = foreign direct investments; 
           Rit = proximity index, measured as the geographic distance between a provinces  
        capital and the nearest capital of Chinas top 15 trading partners; 
           ERt = the exchange rate, measured as the amount of RMB yuan (Renmibi yuan,  
        name of the official Chinese currency) that can be bought with one US  
        dollar; 
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           TNt = average tariffs at national level; 
           TPi = the 1996 provincial average tariffs;  
           Di = regional dummy variable, one for the coastal provinces and Beijing, and zero  
       for other provinces; 
           DTt = time dummy variable, one for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, and zero for  
         other years; 
           u5it = disturbance term. 
Here, e0, e1, , e7 are parameters, and one expects e1 > 0, e2  > 0, e3 < 0, e4 < > 0, e5 < 0, e6 
> 0, and e7 < 0. See Table 4.5 for a list of variable definitions nd coefficient assumptions. 
 
The FDI Equation 
The specification of the FDI equation is relatively straightforward, following the 
structure of equation (4-6). In addition to the geographical and policy-related regional 
dummy variable discussed earlier, a provincial average tax rate variable is also 
introduced to represent a provinces general policy environment for FDIs. The 
infrastructure proxy used in this study is the length of highways per unit area, because of 
the unique importance of transportation in infrastructure and to the economy as well. Rail 
way also plays an important role in Chinas tranportation but not included in this study 
because it is relatively more evenly distributed for national security considerations. The 
proxy for wage rates is lagged per capita GDP. In fact, per capita GDP is not only a good 
proxy for real wages but also a good indicator of economic development, which reflects a 
provinces overall investment environment (Chen 1997). For the reason discussed in the 
specification of the trade equation, the same time dummy variable is included to capture 
the impact of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Thus, Equation (4-6) is specified as: 
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log FDIit = f0 + f1 log Yit + f2 log rit + f3 log CFDIi(t-1) + f4 log TIit     
             + f5 log TAXit + f6 log PGDPi(t-1) + f7 Di + f8 DTt + u6it                (4-26) 
where FDIit =Foreign direct investment inflows; 
            Yit = output, measured as GDP; 
             rit  = the emissions change, measured as pollution levy rates; 
            CFDI i(t-1) = lagged cumulative FDI inflows; 
            TIit = infrastructure indicator, measured as the length of highways per unit area; 
TAXit = average tax rates, a proxy for the policy environment of investment and  
  measured as a provinces total tax revenue divided by its GDP; 
PGDPi(t-1) = lagged per capita GDP, a proxy for real wage and economic  
        development; 
Di and DTt = dummy variables as defined in the specification of the trade  
         Equation; 
u6it = disturbance term. 
Here, f0, f1, , f8 are parameters, and one expects f1 > 0, f2 < 0, f3 > 0, f4 > 0, f5 < 0, f6 > 0, 




China is a country that is experiencing both rapid economic growth, trade 
expansion and severe environmental degradation. In addtion, it appears that a tradeoff 
between high growth rates in the economy and environmental protection has taken place. 
A case study of China could provide important information as to how trade and the 
environment affect each other in a developing world and hence help to deepen our 
understanding of the nexus between trade and the environment in any country. 
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Existing empirical investigations of the interactions between trade and the 
environment are usually based on single equation models which focus on a one-
directional static impact between trade and environemntal variables. This chapter 
presents a simultaneous model of trade and environment by adding to Deans framework 
an international trade and an FDI inflow equation. This model can be used not only to 
examine the interactions between trade and environmental variables but also to 
disaggregate such impacts into three different effects: a scale effect, a composition effect, 
and a technique effect. This model makes an inverted-U relationship between emissions 
and economic scales explicit and thus allows for testing the existence of an 
environmental Kuznets curve in the Chinese case.  
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Chapter 5 
MODEL ESTIMATION AND APPLICATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has presented a simultaneous trade and environment model (TEM) and 
derived some useful analytical results regarding the interactions between trade and the 
environment. These results, however, reveal only qualitative theoretical relationships 
between trade and environmental variables. Questions as to how these variables impact 
on each other and how they relate to Chinas development remain unansweared. 
Econometric estimation and application of the TEM model is required to analyze these 
questions. This chapter is dedicated to this purpose. The organization of this chapter is as 
follows. Section 2 provides information about data sources. Section 3 focuses on model 
indentification. Section 4 discusses model estimation and presents the estimated results in 
detail. Section 5 reports on model validation. Section 6 examines the model results 
concerning the relationship between trade and the environment. Section 7 presents results 
of model simulation, while Section 8 concludes the chapter. 
  
5.2  Data Sources 
Most provincial emissions data were obtained from a province-level panel 
database constructed by the World Bank. This data set is limited to the industrial sector 
for the 1987-1995 period. The only exception is the CO2 emissions data, which are based 
on the national total CO2 emissions provided by Zhang (1999); these data have been 
disaggregated to the provincial level according to the industrial coal consumption share 
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of a province in the national total, reflecting the dominant role of coal in Chinas energy 
use. Other provincial social and economic data are from various China Statistical 
Yearbooks (1987-1999) and the provincial Statistical Yearbooks (1987-1999). Detailed 
data sources and variable definitions are reported in Table 5.1. 
All nominal variables such as GDP, investments, trade flows, and FDIs are 
measured either in 1990 constant RMB yuan or in 1990 constant US dollars. Nominal 
variables measured in RMB yuan were converted either by Chinese GDP price indexes, 
by price indexes for investment in fixed assets, or by general consumer price indexes 
(obtained from various China Statistical Yearbooks) while variables in US dollars were 
by implicit price deflators for US GDP published in Survey of Current Business (BEA 
2000).  
As shown in Figure 5.1, China now consists of 34 provinces, autonomous regions, 
municipalities directly under the central government, and special administration regions 
(all referred to as provinces in this study). The number of provinces that are included in 
this analysis is 28. Tibet and Hainan are excluded due to data insufficiency. Chongqing 
was part of Sichuan before 1997. Taiwan is also excluded for evident reasons, and Hong 
Kong and Macao were not yet returned to China in the study period. Instead, these three 
regions were Chinas major trading partners and FDI sources. Summary statistics of the 
variables are reported in Table 5.2. 
Explanation with regard to the measurement of some variables is required. China 
initiated its nationwide pollution discharge levy system in 1982. Levies were initially 
applied when pollutant discharges exceeded the required standards. In order to provide 
incentive for enterprises to further abate water pollution, a volume-based industrial 
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wastewater discharge fee was introduced in 1993. Since the data available are total levies 
separately collected on excess industrial wastewater discharges and on excess industrial 
waste gas emissions, the levy rate is approximated as the total levy on wastewater (gas) 
divided by the total discharge of the pollutant. Though this is a rough measure as a price 
indicator for environmental demand and supply, it does reflect the differentials in 
strictness of environmental enforcement across provinces. Another variable whose 
measurement requires explanations is the national level tariffs. These tariffs are simply 
calculated as the national total tariff revenues divided by national total imports. It is 
noticeable that our calculated tariffs are much lower than those reported by other sources 
such as the World Bank (1999). Nevertheless, they are used in this analysis because they 
capture the decreasing trend of the variable during the study period and there is no 
available single source that releases Chinas tariff series. 
 
5.3  Model Identification 
The final model specification that has been selected for estimation is summarized 
in Table 4.7. Before proceeding to model estimation, it is important to check the models 
identification. If a model is unidentified, structural estimation may not be computed or it 
may be computed but it is not consistent. Rearranging equations (4-21)- (4-26) reported 




Table 5.1  List of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Endogenous Variable    
    Yit Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in 100 
million RMB yuan at 1990 constant prices. 
Various issues of China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
    Eit Industrial wastewater discharges, industrial 
waste gas emissions, industrial SO2 
emissions, CO2 emissions, industrial particle 
emissions, and industrial dust discharges. 
Chinas provincial environmental 
data set compiled by the World 
Bank, various issues of China 
Environmental Year Book, and 
Zhang (1999). 
    rit The levy rate, at 1990 constant prices, 
computed as total levy collected on 
industrial wastewater (gas) discharge 
divided by total amount of wastewater (gas) 
discharge. 
Chinas provincial environmental 
data set compiled by the World 
Bank, various issues of China 
Environmental Yearbook. 
    Sit Share of industrial GDP in total GDP. China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Tit Total trade flows (exports plus imports), in 
10,000 US$ at 1990 constant prices. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    FDIit Foreign direct investment inflows, in 10,000 
US$ at 1990 constant prices. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
Exogenous Variables    
    Lit Number of total employed persons, in 
10,000. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Kit Cumulative total investment in fixed assets, 
in 100 million RMB yuan at 1990 constant 
prices. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    SOEit Share of state-owned firms in industrial 
GDP 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Nit Population, in 10,000. China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Cit Number of pollution complaints per million 
population. 
Chinas provincial environmental 
data set compiled by the World 
Bank, various issues of China 
Environmental Yearbook. 
    edit Illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rate. China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    PDit Population density, in number of inhabitants 
per km2. 




( Table 5.1 continued ) 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Exogenous Variable   
    Vit Investment in fixed assets, in 100 million 
RMB yuan at 1990 constant prices. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Rit Remoteness, computed as the nearest 
distance between a provinces capital and 
the capitals of Chinas 15 biggest trading 
partners, in kilometers. 
Authors calculation. 
    ERt Exchange rate,  ratio of RMB yuan  to US$. China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    TNt National total tariff revenues divided by 
national total imports.  
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    TPi 1996 provincial  ad valorem tariffs. World Bank (1997). 
    CFDII(t-1) Lagged cumulative FDI inflows. China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    TIit Highway intensity, kilometers per 100 
square kilometers. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    TAXit Overall tax rate, tax revenue divided by 
GDP. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    PGDPi(t-1) Lagged per capita GDP, in RMB yuan per 
capita. 
China Statistical Yearbooks. 
    Di Regional geographic and policy dummy 
variable, 1 for coastal provinces and Beijing, 
and 0 for other provinces. 
 
    DTt Time dummy variable, 1 for 1989, 1990 and 














































SC: Sichuan & Chongqing 
SD: Shandong 





















Endogenous Variable      
  Yit: GDP 252 809.23 624.44 51.79 3749.77 
  Eit: Wastewater   252 853.99 596.28 50.29 2471.64 
         Waste gases 252 332.87 323.92 31.00 4479.00 
         SO2 252 588529.4 460628.7 20000.0 2319157.0 
         CO2 252 22.55 13.73 2.00 59.40 
         Particles 252 501177.5 354842.1 55515.0 1788377.0 
         Dust 252 266926.8 207402.8 10000.0 2070000.0 
  rit: Levy rate on wastewater 252 4.12 1.73 1.06 10.35 
       Levy rate on waste gases 252 5.17 1.86 0.54 10.63 
  Sit: Industrial GDP share 252 43.35 8.81 26.38 68.73 
  Tit: Trade 252 436587.4 1119777 5732.8 9177245 
  FDIit   252 61879.1 297739.7 0.0 4432341 
Exogenous Variables       
  Lit 252 2057.15 1371.05 190.90 6335.30 
  Kit 252 1091.69 1026.38 46.39 6714.08 
  SOEit 252 58.04 17.56 13.86 84.48 
  Nit 252 4020.27 2573.60 417.50 11162.90 
  Cit 252 135.31 93.55 2.40 550.70 
  edit 252 21.88 8.76 8.84 47.09 
  PDit 252 329.58 365.72 5.84 1947.91 
  Vit 252 218.86 188.35 18.92 1146.77 
  Rit 252 1025.60 580.22 124.50 2143.00 
  ERt 9 550.70 176.08 372.21 861.87 
  TNt 9 5.64 2.13 2.65 8.85 
  TPi 28 22.70 6.63 9.20 41.30 
  CFDIi(t-1) 252 192201.4 713954.5 5.7 4514707.0 
  TIit 252 22.57 13.17 1.53 71.02 
  TAXit 252 9.70 3.70 2.84 20.90 






Table 5.3  TEM Specification 
Equations 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
           log Yit = a0 + a1 log Tit + a2 log Lit + a3 log Kit +a4 log Eit + u1it 
Emissions Demand 
           log Eit = b0 + b1 log rit + b2 log Yit + b3 (log Yit)2 + b4 log Sit + b5 log SOEit + u2it 
Emissions Supply (Inverted) 
           log rit = c0 + c1 log Eit + c2 log INit + c3 log Cit + c4 log edit + c5 log Pit +u3it 
Industrial Output Share in GDP 
           log Sit = d0 + d1 log Tit + d2 log Yit + d3 log Si(t-1) + d4 log Vit + d5 Di + u4it 
Trade Values (Exports plus Imports) 
            log Tit = e0 + e1 log Yit + e2 log FDIit + e3 log Rit + e4 log ER1t  
                                     + e5 (log TNt)*(log TPi) + e6 Di + e7 DTt  + u5it 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
           log FDIit = f0 + f1 log Yit + f2 log rit + f3 log CFDIi(t-1) + f4 log TIit     
                       + f5 log TAXit + f6 log PGDPi(t-1) + f7 Di + f8 DTt + u6it 
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logYit – a4logEit – a1logTit – a2logLit – a3logKit – a0  = u1it 
- b2logYit + logEit – b1log rit – b3(logYit)2- b4logSit – b5logSOEit – b0 = u2it 
- c2logYit – c1logEit + log rit + c2’logPit – c3logCit – c4 log edit – c5logPDit – c0 = u3it 
- d2logYit + logSit – d1logTit – d3logS i(t-1) – d4logVit – d5Di – d0 = u4it    (5-1) 
-e1logYit + logTit – e2logFDIit – e3logRit – e4logERt – e5logTNt*logTPi  
– e6Di – e7DTt – e0=u5it 
-f1 logYit – f2 log rit + logFDIit – f3 logCFDI i(t-1) – f4 logTIit – f5 logTAXit  
     –  f6logPGDP i(t-1) – f7Di – f8DTt – f0 = u6it 
where c2 = c2’. 
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Again, c2 = c2’. 
It can be noticed that this system is linear in parameters but nonlinear in variables. 
In particular with the term (log Yit)2, nonlinearity in the endogenous variables arises, and 
this makes the identification problem even more complicated (Fisher 1976, Brown 1983, 
and McConnell and Phipps 1987). Fortunately, there exists a useful result for the 
common case, such as Equation (5-2), in which the endogenous variables and nonlinear 
functions of them each involve a single variable (Fisher 1976, Goldfeld and Quandt 1972, 
and Greene 1997). Let A be the structure coefficients matrix with one row for each 
equation and one column for each variable, Φj be the restrictions matrix on the 
























































































































row for each parameter in the equation, and M be the number of the endogenous 
variables; then the necessary and sufficient rank condition for the jth equation to be 
identifiable is: 
rank [AΦj ]=M - 1                              (5-2) 
This system can be extended simply by adding the nonlinear functions to the system as 
additional endogenous variables and maintaining the same number of equations (as 
shown in Equation (5-2)), while the necessary order condition is that  
rank [Φj ]≥ M - 1               (5-3) 
Based on the above identification criteria, it is not difficult to find that all of the six 
equations in the model are over-identified; therefore, the corresponding system is thus 
also identified. 
 
5.4   Model Estimation 
To properly estimate the above model, two tasks must be resolved. First, we need 
to deal with the difficulties of computation and statistical inference that usually arise in 
the estimation of a nonlinear simultaneous equations system (Amemiya 1985, and 
Goldfeld and Quandt 1972). For instance, because of the nonlinearity, it may not be 
possible to solve for the reduced-form equations, and hence the application of two stage 
least squares (2SLS) becomes difficult (Greene 1997). In the present case, because of the 
presence of the squared output term in the second equation of (5-2), the reduced form 
equations of the system consist of functions of the square root of linear relations among 
the exogenous variables. Kelejian (1971), Parke (1982), and Amemiya (1985), however, 
demonstrate that equivalent systems linear in parameters but nonlinear in endogenous 
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variables can still be consistently estimated with 2SLS based on a Taylor expansion 
approximation for the reduced-form equations, using a polynomial function of the 
exogenous variables.  
 Second, though more precise parameter estimates may be obtained by exploiting 
the variation in data both across individuals and within individuals over time, the 
exploitation in a nonlinear simultaneous equation setting is obviously a challenge,  
particularly when error components are considered. Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995), 
nonetheless, provide a general treatment of panel data in a linear simultaneous equations 
framework. There also are a number of ways of dealing with simultaneous equations with 
unobservable error components (Baltagi 1981 and 1984, Magnus 1982, Prucha 1985, and 
Kinal and Lahiri 1990 and 1993). Despite the success of the methodological research, 
few applications of these techniques have been followed in empirical studies (Maddala 
1987, and Kinal and Lahiri 1993). 
 This study attempts to extend such applications by employing 2SLS and 
approximating the reduced-form equations with second-degree polynomials. Specifically, 
fitted values for 2SLS are obtained by regressing all of the endogenous variables, 
including log2 Y and log (Y/p) on a constant, the exogenous variables and their squares, 
and all distinct cross products. This process includes three estimation strategies. (1) 
System (5-2) can be estimated simply by pooling the data with no fixed or random effect 
specifications. (2) Provincial and time period fixed effects can be included in the 
estimation. And (3) a two-way error components 2SLS(EC2SLS) method is tried for 
overall system estimation. The coding and estimating of the model then follows 
employing Eviews (version 4.0 or 3.1). The Eviews codes written for estimating the 
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model are attached in Appendix B. Three different sets of results are presented here: the 
first with no fixed or random effects, the second with fixed effects, and the third with 
random effects. 
 
5.4.1  2SLS Estimation Results 
 The 2SLS estimates of the six structural equations shown in Table 5.4-5.9 
assumes that given exogenous variables Xit, E [ujit | Xit] = 0, E [ujit2 | Xit] = σj2, and E [ujit 
ujks] = 0, for all i≠k and t≠s, i.e., no fixed or random effects are controlled for in this 
estimator. Since both the economic and the environmental data differ significantly in 
magnitude over provinces, heteroskedasticity problems may arise. The 2SLS provide 
consistent parameter estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity, but the 2SLS 
standard errors will be incorrect and should not be used for inference. Therefore, the 
White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator is applied to derive the 
correct estimates of coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form (see Eviews Users Guide 1997).  
 
Industrial wastewater discharges as the emissions variable 
Table 5.4 summarizes the results in the case that industrial wastewater discharges 
and the levy rate on industrial wastewater discharges are included as key environmental 
variables in the system. Most of the coefficients of the variables bear the expected signs 
and are significantly different from zero. The first equation shows, as expected, that 
increases in industrial wastewater discharges, trade, labor input, and capital input will
 147
Table 5.4 2SLS Estimates When Industrial Wastewater (IWW) Included 
 Dependent   Variable   
(t-statistics  
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lead to GDP growth. The output elasticities of these factors are explicitly indicated by the 
estimated coefficients. 
 Most of the results from the second equation are also as expected. They confirm 
statistically that there exists an inverted-U relationship between industrial wastewater 
discharges and GDP. Given all other things equal, industrial wastewater discharges are 
likely to rise as GDP increases, but will reach their peak when provincial level of GDP 
reaches 11813.8 billion RMB yuan (about 1440.7 billion US$), which is about 146 times 
as much as the mean over the 1987-1995 period. In terms of per capita GDP measure, this 
result implies that industrial wastewater discharge will begin to decrease when GDP per 
capita reaches 293,854 RMB yuan (about 35,836 US$), which is well above a realistic 
level. This inverted-U relationship is further tested by an auxiliary regression of industrial 
wastewater discharges on a constant and GDP featuring only the provincial cross-
sectional data. The results of this regression show that the coefficient estimate of GDP is 
1.639 for 1987 and monotonically decreases to 0.448 for 1995. That is, though 
wastewater discharges increase as GDP grows, the rate of this pollution increase 
decreases from year to year, suggesting that industrial wastewater pollution is concave in 
GDP levels over time.  
The results of the second also clearly suggest that Chinas pollution levy system is 
an effective instrument for industrial wastewater pollution control since, as the direct 
impact suggests, a one percent increase in the levy rate could lead to about a 0.5 percent 
decrease in industrial wastewater discharges. Some studies assert that Chinas pollution 
levy rates are too low to have significant impacts on industrial emissions (Qu 1991, 
NEPA 1992 and 1994, and Shibli and Markandya 1995). Our findings agree with those of 
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Wang and Wheeler (1996) that, regarding the control for industrial wastewater pollution, 
Chinas levy system has proven reasonably effective. The value of the estimated 
coefficient of the state ownership variable confirms that the state-owned enterprises 
pollute more than firms of other types of ownership. It is surprising, however, that the 
coefficient of the industrial output share fails to carry the expected sign and is not 
statistically different from zero, suggesting that provinces with a higher industrial output 
share might be more environmentally efficient in wastewater pollution control. 
The third equation indicates a positive relationship between levy rate and per 
capita GDP. That is, as per capita GDP increases, people would pay a higher price for a 
clean environment. Since this equation explains environment supply, we expect that there 
also exists a positive relationship between the levy rate and wastewater discharges, 
because, theoretically, individuals would tolerate more pollution if the polluter pays a 
higher price. But, in the third equation, the coefficient of wastewater discharges is 
negative and not significant. This might suggest a zero or a negative price elasticity for 
environmental supply. That is, even if a higher levy rate is in place, individuals still do 
not have the willingness to tolerate more pollution.  
As noted earlier, Chinas pollution levy rates have been argued to be too low to 
have significant effects on pollution control. Our point is that, from the perspective of the 
environmental supply side, these levy rates are indeed too low for individuals to tolerate 
pollution discharges at the existing level. This point is supported by the significant 
negative coefficient of citizen environmental complaints, because a negative sign 
indicates citizens unsatisfaction with the environmental situation and environmental 
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enforcement. Moreover, as expected, population density has a significant positive effect, 
and the illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rate has a significant negative effect on the levy rate. 
In the fourth equation, trade might have a positive effect on industrial output share 
but the effect is not significantly different from zero. Different results have been obtained 
in studies on whether China has a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods 
(Dasgupta et al. 1997 and Dean 1999). Our results suggest that trade does not have a 
significant impact on industrial output share, and, therefore, China may not have a 
comparative advantage in relatively pollution-intensive industrial goods. The result is 
consistent with the fact that the shares of manufactured goods in Chinas total exports and 
imports are very close for most of the 1987-1995 period (See Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). 
The coefficients of GDP and the regional policy dummy variable both have the expected 
negative signs but are not significant. As is the case of many developing countries, 
industrialization still provides a key to Chinas economic development (Syrquin (1989) 
offers a discussion on structural change in development). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that GDP does not have a significant negative effect on the industrial output share. In 
addition, the coefficient of the investment variable shows that Chinas investments in 
fixed assets tend to slightly increase the industrial output share, indicating a strengthened 
trend of industrialization. The results also confirm that the share of industrial output 
heavily depends on its previous level.  
 In the fifth equation, variables derived from the gravity model, i.e. GDP and 
remoteness, both bear the expected signs and are statistically significant. Also as 
expected, both FDI and regional geographical and policy dummy variable have 
significant positive effects on trade. The coefficient of the exchange rate suggests that a 
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one percent increase in the exchange rate might lead to more trade, though the coefficient 
is negative (since trade is measured in US dollars, any change in the exchange rate should 
change trade by the same magnitude but in opposite direction given the real trade flow 
constant). Unfortunately, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Similarly, the 
coefficient of tariffs might suggest that lower tariffs would stimulate trade, but it is not 
statistically significant either.  
In addition, we expect that the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident may have had a 
negative effect on trade because of the economic sanctions that Western countries 
imposed on China in those years. The results, however, show that this impact is not 
significant and, if it were, the impact would probably be positive. This is not difficult to 
understand. Though in those years Chinas trade with its major Western trading partners 
such as the United States and Japan was negatively affected, this negative impact might 
have been overcompensated by Chinas efforts to expand its trade with its other trading 
partners.  
 Finally, in the sixth equation, except for the levy rate coefficient all results have 
the expected effects though the coefficient of taxes fails the t test. Provinces with higher 
GDP, cumulative FDIs, GDP per capita, and road intensity receive more FDIs. Also, 
coastal provinces are more attractive to multinational firms. Higher taxes may have a 
negative effect on FDI inflows, but this effect is not significant. Though no negative trade 
effect has been associated with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident in the fifth equation, 
the coefficient of the time dummy clearly indicates that the 1989 Incident  had a 
significant negative impact on FDI inflows (the same result is obtained in Ni 1998). It is 
interesting to note that the levy rate variable does not have a negative effect on FDIs. 
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Indeed this result is not surprising. So far no study has found hard evidence that 
environmental policies are crucial in the location choice of multinationals. 
 
Industrial waste gas discharges as the emissions variable 
Table 5.5 presents the results when industrial waste gas emissions and the levy 
rate on these emissions are used as endogenous environmental variables. The first 
equation does not change much. All estimates have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. In the second equation, the coefficient of the levy rate suggests 
that Chinas levy system is not significantly effective in controlling industrial waste gas 
emissions. Also unlike wastewater pollution, an inverted-U relationship between waste 
gas emissions and GDP is not identified. Instead, a positive linear relationship is 
suggested. Another difference is that the share of industrial output has a significant 
positive effect on waste gas discharges. If, as suggested by the estimation in Table 5.4, 
provinces with a higher industrial share may be more efficient in wastewater pollution 
control, then the same is not true for the waste gas pollution case. As before, state-owned 
factories show a lower efficiency in waste gas control.  
There are also some important changes in the third equation. The coefficient of 
GDP per capita is negative and significant, implying that higher GDP per capita does not 
lead to stricter enforcement of waste gas emissions control. Combining results from the 
second and the third equation may explain why many air-polluted cities can be found in 
China. Besides, population density does not show a statistically significant effect on the 
levy rate on waste gas discharges. Moreover, citizens environmental complaints might 
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Table 5.5 2SLS Results When Industrial Waste Gas Emissions (IGE) Included 
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have a positive effect on the levy rate but this effect is not statistically different from 
zero. Similar to the wastewater case, the environmental supply side is not statistically 
sensitive to the levy rate and a higher illiteracy rate implies a lower environmental 
enforcement. The fourth and the fifth equations remain unchanged since they exclude the 
emissions discharge and the levy rate variables. The sixth equation shows that the levy on 
waste gas might have a small negative effect on FDIs, but again, the effect is not 
statistically significant. 
 
SO2 discharges as the emissions variable 
The results of the SO2 emissions case are provided in Table 5.6. These emissions 
are very harmful industrial waste gases and hence regulated under the levy system. As 
expected and similar to the results obtained by Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler (1997), the 
levy rate on waste gases is a significantly effective means of SO2 emissions control. The 
results also suggest that there might exist an inverted-U relationship between SO2 
emissions and GDP levels, but this relationship is not statistically significant. It is worth 
noting that, according to the coefficient of industrial output share, provinces with higher 
industrial GDP shares are significantly more efficient in SO2 emissions removal (in the 
wastewater case, a similar result is suggested but lacks statistical significance). State-
owned enterprises once again are less environmentally friendly because they emit more 
SO2 than firms under other types of ownership. Other results in this table are, as 
expected, same as the corresponding results in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.6 2SLS Results When Industrial SO2 Emissions Included  
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CO2 discharges as the emissions variable 
Table 5.7 reports the results in the case that CO2 emissions are used as the 
endogenous emissions variable. The levy rate on industrial gas emissions is applied to the 
case as a proxy for CO2 emissions price because China does not impose separate charges 
on CO2 emissions. Also, some CO2 emissions may have been counted as part of industrial 
waste gas discharges, but keep in mind, our CO2 emissions data are from a different data 
source and emissions are not limited to industrial pollution sources. The only significant 
difference between the results of Table 5.6 and those of Table 5.5 is that the coefficient of 
the levy rate on CO2 emissions, though negative in sign, is not statistically different from 
zero. This result is reasonable since this levy rate is not purposed to control CO2 
emissions. The result also provides indirect proof that Chinas industrial wastewater and 
SO2 emissions control levy system, which has been identified in the results shown in 
Table 5.4 and 5.6, actually works. 
 
Particle and dust discharges as emissions variables 
 The particle and dust emissions endogenous variables are also regressed 
separately, though detailed examination of the data does not clearly indicate whether 
these two pollutants are included in Chinas industrial waste gas statistics or not. The 
results of these two regressions are reported in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 respectively. In 
Table 5.8 the levy rate on industrial waste gases shows no statistically justifiable effect 
on particle emissions and all other estimates show little deviations from those of the 
industrial gas emissions case. However, in the dust emissions case (see Table 5.9), some 
results are significantly different from those of the previous cases. The role of dust 
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emissions as a production factor is still manifested in the first equation, but any 
association between GDP and dust emissions in the second equation is statistically weak 
and insignificant. This suggests that dust emissions do not increase as the economy 
grows. The other result that contradicts our previous finding is the significant positive 
relationship between the levy rate and dust emissions. This statistically significant and 
positive relationship is also present in the third equation. Since the second equation is no 
longer an equation describing environmental demand due to the fact that the levy rate is 
not directly related to the price that the polluter pays for dust emissions, together with the 
results of the third equation, this positive relationship suggests that more dust emissions 
may lead to higher levy rates, i.e., stricter environmental policy enforcement.  
 
5.4.2  2SLS Estimation Results with Fixed Effects 
The following general form of structured equations j (j = 1,2,,6) is used to 
obtain the 2SLS estimation, now including a fixed effect: 
             yj = Yj ∗ j + Xj ∃ j + ∀ j  + (j + γj                             (5-5) 
where yj is an NT×1vector of observations of the dependent variable, Yj the data matrix 
of included endogenous variables, Xj the data matrix of included exogenous variables, ∗ j 
and ∃ j are parameter vectors to be estimated, and ∀ j and (j are respectively the matrices of 
the provincial individual and time period effects: 
∀ j = diag (∀ j1, , ∀ jN) ⊗  eT                                          (5-6) 
and  (j = eN ⊗  diag ((j1, , (jT)                                    (5-7) 
where eT is a T×1 vector of ones, eN an N×1vector of ones, and diag denotes a diagonal 
matrix. The disturbance terms γj represent an NT×1vector assuming conventional 
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 Table 5.7 2SLS Results When CO2 Emissions Included  
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Table 5.8 2SLS Results When Industrial Particle Emissions Included  
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Table 5.9 2SLS Results When Industrial Dust Emissions Included  
 Dependent   Variable   
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assumptions about these error terms. In estimating both the fixed time and the fixed 
individual effects, the first column of (j  is dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. 
 Estimation proceeds in three steps. First, the fixed time and individual effects are 
both controlled for. Second, only the fixed individual effects are considered. And third, 
only the fixed time effects are included. The estimation results of the three approaches to 
the six different pollutants are reported in Appendix C. Only the estimates of the fixed 
time effect approach are close to those in Table 5.4-5.9. The fixed individual effect 
estimator produces the most significantly different results, many of which provide no 
readily apparent economic interpretation.  
 
5.4.3  2SLS Estimation Results with Random Effects (EC2SLS) 
 Similar to Equation (5-5), the general two-way error components form of 
structural equation j can be written as 
yj = Yj∗ j + Xj∃ j + vj                                    (5-8) 
where yj, Yj, Xj, ∗ j and ∃ j are as defined in Equation (5-7). Here, vj is an NT×1vector of 
error terms, 
vj= (IN ⊗  eT) 0j+ (eN ⊗  IT) 8j+γj                           (5-9)      
where 0j= (0j1,, 0jN), 8j = (8j1,, 8jT), and γj= (γj11,, γj1T, γj21,, γjNT) are random 



















































                    (5-10) 
 
for j and l =1,2, ,6. 
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 The system is estimated with the error component two-stage least squares 
(EC2SLS) method proposed by Baltagi (1981) and Hsiao (1986). The EC2SLS estimates 
are shown in Appendix D. It is noticeable that the EC2SLS estimates are obviously 
different from the results obtained from 2SLS and 2SLS with fixed effects. Though most 
of the coefficients in the equations of production, emissions demand, emissions supply, 
and industrial share possess the expected signs and are economically interpretable, the 
poor performance of the estimator in trade and FDI equation reduces the credibility of the 
results. For example, in the sixth equation of Table D-1, only the levy rate on industrial 
wastewater has a statistically significant effect on FDI inflows and the coefficient of the 
levy rate variable on FDI is positive and large in magnitude (2.405). However, the same 
equation in Table D-2 shows that only cumulative FDI variable has a statistically 
significant effect on FDIs and this effect is negative. Indeed, the only difference between 
the two equations is that the former includes the levy rate on wastewater pollution while 
the latter uses the levy rate on waste gas emissions. It is difficult to reasonably explain 
why such a dramatic change in the results would happen. Also difficult is any attempt to 
interpret the above-mentioned results employing any existing economic theories. 
 
5.4.4  Which Estimation Method Works Best 
  
The results of the three different empirical estimation approaches, suggest that the 
results obtained with 2SLS estimator appear to be the most reasonable. Therefore, our 
initial attempt to exploit the advantage of the panel data set in this specific case study of 
China has provided a paradox between theory and results. More methodological research 
as to why this exploitation has been unsuccessful and how improvement can be made 
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would be interesting but outside the scope of this study. However, the following points 
may help to improve our understanding. 
According to Greene (1997), the inclusion of the fixed effects is reasonable when 
differences between individuals can be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression 
model. The fixed effects approach might be viewed as applying only to the individuals in 
the study, not to the ones outside the sample. Therefore, this approach would be more 
appropriate when the number of individuals included in the study is close to the size of 
the population. On the other hand, if individual observations can be considered as 
sampled from a large population, it would be more appropriate to view the fixed effects 
as randomly distributed across individuals and hence the random effects approach would 
be reasonable. In Chinas case, the sample of 28 provinces is almost exhaustive. This 
might suggest that the random effects approach, EC2SLS, would be an inappropriate 
estimator for this study. 
 Can one conclude that the fixed effects approach is the most appropriate approach 
for estimating the Chinese model? Consider the underlying assumptions of this approach. 
The fixed effects approach takes either the individual effect to be constant over time or 
the time effect to be the same across individuals. Obviously, the assumptions could be too 
strong to be applied to the diverse provincial economies of China. Rapid economic 
growth and fundamental social change in China make it hard to imagine that the 
provincial individual effect can be constant over the study period. This belief is partially 
supported by the evidence that half of the six equations do not have statistically 
significant estimates for the fixed provincial effects. Also, it is hard to imagine that in a 
diverse and unevenly-developed country like China, the time effect can be the same 
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across provinces. According to Jian, et al. (1996), economic development converges 
across provinces between 1978 and 1990 but diverges between 1990 and 1993. Similarly, 
the estimation results show that about one-half of the fixed time effects are not 
statistically significant either. Hence, it would be inappropriate to assume a common time 
effect over provinces. In addition, the fixed effects approach is costly in terms of degrees 
of freedom lost due to the use of the individual and time dummy variables. 
 Though the 2SLS approach may result in such misspecification problems, 2SLS 
estimators are shown to be more robust to various specification problems (Kennedy 1992, 
Ch. 10). Besides, the appropriateness of an estimator ultimately depends on whether it 
generates reasonable estimates. As already shown, the 2SLS method yields the most 
plausible results in this empirical study. Furthermore, the use of 2SLS does not mean a 
total omission of provincial differences and time shocks. Instead, the effects of these 
differences and shocks are nicely captured by the regional policy and geographic dummy 
variable and the time dummy variable. However, such regional and time effects have to 
be excluded in both the fixed and the random effects approaches due to multicollinearity 
problems. Therefore, in the following parts of the chapter, the analysis will proceed based 
on the 2SLS estimates. 
 Please note that the 3SLS estimator is not used in this study for several reasons. 
Though preferred to 2SLS for its efficiency advantage, it produces inconsistent estimates 
if an incorrect exclusionary restriction is placed on any of the system equations. The 
2SLS approach may have the same problem, but the problem is limited to the 
misspecified equations only and will not be spread throughout the system. Computational 
complexity is another problem that discourages the use of the 3SLS estimator. Attempts 
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to estimate the model using 3SLS were made for all the three types of models, but the 
presence of nearly singular matrices led to termination of computations before the final 
estimates were obtained. This suggests that different instruments for different equations 
may be required (Amemiya 1977 and Schmidt 1990).  
 
5.5 Model Validation 
 Four considerations are necessary to evaluate the validity of simultaneous 
equations systems estimated with 2SLS. Firstly, the case in which the system is linearly 
specified by removing the squared endogenous variable from the second equation is 
examined. The purpose of doing this is to see how great a variation in the coefficient 
estimates would result if the system is differently specified. Secondly, we also evaluate 
whether the estimated system is robust according to the selected time period. Thirdly, the 
sensitivity of the estimates is again analyzed by deleting all observations from three 
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin), which are obviously different from other 
provinces in terms of economic and social development. And lastly, the stability of the 
estimated system and the existence of equilibrium values for endogenous variables are 
examined by solving the estimated model for endogenous variables.  
 
5.5.1 Linear Specification 
 From Table 5.4-5.9, except for the wastewater case, an inverted-U relationship 
between emissions and GDP is not significantly identified. Even in the wastewater case, 
since the turning point is well above the current GDP levels, it seems reasonable to 
remove the squared logGDP term from the second equation and thus make the system a 
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linear one. Therefore, the conventional 2SLS approach can be applied to the linear 
system, i.e., the Taylor expansion is no longer required in the reduced form estimation. 
The estimation results of the linear system are reported in Appendix E. Compared with 
the results in Table 5.4-5.9, most results are theoretically consistent with those in Table 
5.4-5.9, though some changes in estimates can be easily discerned. However, changes in 
coefficients are generally in magnitude only. Changes in sign do happen to a few 
coefficients, but in such cases the coefficients are usually not statistically significant in 
either the nonlinear or linear models. Therefore, the interpretation for Table 5.4-5.9 in 
general also applies here. Taking into account the change made in system specification 
and in econometric estimation method, these changes in estimates are then not surprising. 
In effect, the results show that the theoretical underpinning of the model is rather strong. 
 
5.5.2 Estimation Results from a Shorter Time Period  
The results shown in Table 5.4-5.9 are 2SLS estimates bases on the data set from 
1987 to 1995. The system is re-estimated with the same econometric approach but with 
data of a shorter time period 1987-1993 (see Appendix F for the results). This means a 
more then 22 percent reduction in sample size. Also, since 1993, a volume-based 
industrial wastewater discharge fee has been introduced into Chinas pollution levy 
system. This suggests that the levy rate data as well as the environmental demand and 
supply behavior after 1993 may not be consistent with those in the previous years. Hence, 
sampling data from 1987 to 1993 also helps to check whether the model is sensitive to 
this possible structural change. From Appendix F, most of the estimates show only a 
marginal deviation from those in Table 5.4-5.9. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
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estimates are not sensitive to the chosen time period and the change of the levy system 
has no significant impact on the model. 
 
5.5.3 Estimation Results with Exclusion of three municipalities 
 Among the sampled twenty-eight provinces, three of them are municipalities 
directly under the central government: Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. The three cities are 
Chinas political, economic, and cultural centers. Compared with the other provinces, 
though small in size, these cities are densely populated and highly industrialized. Due to 
the significant difference between these three cities and other provinces, data from these 
cities may often tend to be outliers. Although observations from the three cities account 
for less than 11 percent of the total, deleting these observations and re-estimating the 
model with the same approach, one would expect changes in certain parameters. A 
theoretically sound model and an appropriate estimator should able one to explain these 
changes in estimates. The estimation results with no data from the three cities are 
reported in Appendix G. As expected, the changes in estimates are obviously more 
dramatic than those from estimation with shorter time period data, though the reduction 
in sample size of the former is less than one-half of the latter. It is worth noting that in the 
wastewater case (see Table G-1), only a few of the estimates have a significant change in 
magnitude. However, in the air pollution case (Table G-2 to G-6), more dramatic changes 
in coefficient estimates are widely observed, and the results even suggest that the 
inverted-U relationship might also exist between some air pollutant emissions and GDP 
levels. The results also imply that municipalities and provinces are more similar to each 
other in wastewater pollution control than in air pollution control. 
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5.5.4 Dynamic Response and Characteristics 
 In Model (28), three lagged endogenous variables (GDP, industrial output share, 
and FDI) are either explicitly or implicitly included. Therefore, the system is not only 
nonlinear but also more dynamic in nature, and its existence, stability and convergence 
conditions for the equilibrium values of endogenous variables should be examined. For a 
linear model, the examination of these conditions requires the characteristic roots (or 
their modulus) of the coefficient matrix corresponding to lagged endogenous variables in 
the reduced form to lie within the unit circle (Labys 1973 and Greene 1997). For a 
nonlinear model, however, this rule is not applicable due to the difficulty in obtaining the 
reduced form of such a model. One way of examining these conditions in this case is to 
solve the estimated system for the endogenous variables using a simulation procedure and 
this has been accomplished and appears in Section 5.7.  
 
5.6 Empirical Relationship between Trade and the Environment 
5.6.1 Introduction 
So far the empirical interrelationships between trade and the environment in 
Chinas case have not been examined because they are not explicitly revealed in any of 
the equations of the system. However, the suggested theoretical interactions between 
trade and the environment shown in Equation (4-13)-(4-19) and the empirical results in 
Table 5.4-5.9, should permit such an analysis. Several considerations are first necessary. 
(1) Though the logarithms of variables are used in empirical estimation, the causal 
relations among variables identified in Equation (4-14)-(4-19) still hold. However, the 
effects are no longer viewed as marginal effects. Instead, they should be interpreted as 
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elasticities. (2) In cases where the value of a variable is needed for computation, the 
sample mean of the variable is used and therefore the effects can be regarded as those 
applying to an average province in the sample. (3) The estimated values of the 
coefficients in Table 5.4-5.9 will be used for computation only if they are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Otherwise, the coefficients will be assigned a value of 
zero because they are not significantly different from zero. In addition, to avoid 
misinterpretation, coefficient estimates will not be used in computation if they do not 
possess a theoretically defendable sign. Therefore, if an effect is zero, the correct 
interpretation should be that the effect can not be identified with the model and the data 
used, rather than concluding, there is no impact. 
In order to fully reflect the impact of one variable on another, the value of the 
determinant of the system is required (see Equation (4-15)), a property often neglected in 
empirical studies with simultaneous equations models. The determinant was assumed to 
be positive based on intuitive reasoning. As the parameters needed for this computation 
are now available, one can check whether this assumption is true or not. Using data in 
Table 5.4-5.9, the determinants of the system are calculated respectively for all the six 
different pollutant cases. In order to examine the robustness of the results, the 
computation of the determinants is conducted in two ways. First, the computation is 
based on the estimates that are significant at the 5 percent level. For those estimates that 
are not significant at this level, zeros are used to replace them in the computation. The 
second method of computation simply use the original coefficient estimates with no 
control for statistical significance. The results are reported in Table 5.10. The system 
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determinates under different cases all are positive and have a value between 0.613 and 
0.821, indicating an amplifying effect of the system. 
 
5.6.2 Environmental impacts of Trade 
Two trade-policy exogenous variables, i.e., the exchange rate and the tariff rate, 
are introduced in the system. Though theoretically acceptable both in sign and in 
magnitude, the coefficient estimates of these two variables are not statistically significant. 
The focus of analysis in this subsection is therefore on the environmental effects of trade 
flows (total values of trade, i.e., exports plus imports). 
According to Equation (4-14a), the impact of trade flows on emissions are 
computed and reported in Table 4.15. The results suggest that trade would lead to more 
discharges of wastewater, waste gases, CO2 and particles, because trade induces an 
increase in economic scale (captured by term ∆ -1hA’fY ). However, trade can also lead to 
reduced wastewater discharges through its income effect (captured by term ∆ -1hA’frgY). 
But the total impact of trade on wastewater discharges is still positive. The result shows 
that a one percent increase in trade would increase wastewater discharges by 0.188 
percent. Incidentally, the model can not identify the impact of trade on SO2 and dust 
emissions. 
  Since the results show that trade may positively lead to increased pollution 
discharges, can it be inferred that China has a comparative advantage in pollution-
intensive goods? Indeed, the results provide no support for this hypothesis because no 
indication has been found that trade may change the composition of output and hence 
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Table 5.10  System Determinant Results 
Determinant ∆  
Models of different emissions 
Significant at 5% level No control for significance 
Wastewater 0.745 0.613 
Waste gas 0.725 0.709 
SO2 0.821 0.766 
CO2 0.709 0.697 
Particles 0.715 0.721 
Dust 0.801 0.765 
Source: the authors computation. 
 




Wastewater Waste gas SO2 CO2 Particles Dust 
Composition by trade a 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Income b -0.028 0 0 0 0 0 
Scale c 0.216 0.223 0 0.246 0.316 0 
Composition by income d 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0.188 0.223 0 0.246 0.316 0 
Source: the authors computation. 
a: trade induced composition effect, ∆ -1fSZT. 
b: income effect, ∆ -1hAfrgY. 
c: scale effect, ∆ -1hAfY.
 
d: income induced composition effect, ∆ -1hAfSZY.
 
 
Table 5.12  Impacts of an emissions charge on trade  
 
Model of  different pollutant emissions 
Impacts 
Wastewater Waste gas SO2 CO2 Particles Dust 
Scale a -0.067 0 -0.009 0 0 0 
Scale via FDI b -0.012 0 -0.002 0 0 0 
Total -0.079 0 -0.011 0 0 0 
Source: the authors computation. 
a: scale effect, ∆ -1AhEfrWY. 




generate more emissions (the term fsZT that captures this effect is straight zeros in Table 
5.11). 
 
5.6.3 Trade impact of an emissions charge 
 As already discussed, though the impact of an emissions charge on trade is not 
explicitly measured in the model, an emissions charge may affect trade by many indirect 
paths (see Figure 4.2 and Equation (4-19)). Since the direct impact (Vr) of an emissions 
charge on FDI is not significantly identified in any of the empirical cases, Equation (4-
19) is then reduced to two terms, that is, AhEfrWY, a direct impact on trade from a reduced 
economic scale due to the presence of emissions charges; and AhEfrVYWF, an indirect 
impact also from the reduced economic scale but via its impact on FDIs. These two trade 
effects are computed and are shown in Table 5.12. The negative impacts of an emissions 
charge on trade are identified in two pollution cases, but these impacts, as one might 
expect, are very small. Whats more, if the results may suggest that the levy rate on 
industrial wastewater discharges would have some adverse effects on trade, then the levy 
rate on air pollutant emissions shows no obvious impact. This is reasonable. As pointed 
out earlier, Chinas levy system in general is more effective in wastewater pollution 
control than in air pollution control.  
 
5.6.4 Impacts of trade flows on emissions charges 
 Since the empirical results suggest that the effect of trade on industrial GDP share 
is not statistically different from zero (i.e., ZT = 0), according to the model-defined 
relations in Equation (4-17a), trade may then have three possible impacts on the 
 173
emissions charge: the composition effect of income (hA’fSgEZY), the scale effect of 
income (hA’fYgE), and the technique effect of income (hA’gY). These impacts are 
computed for each of the pollution cases and reported in Table 5.13. It is interesting to 
notice that trade shows a positive impact only in the wastewater pollution case, where 
trade increases the wastewater levy rate through a technique effect. In all the air pollution 
cases, trade seems to have negative impact on the waste gas levy rate. But this result 
could be substantially weakened because of the inconsistency of the air pollution data 
used and of the poor performance of the system in modeling environmental demand and 
supply. 
 
5.6.5  Impacts of an emissions charge on FDI 
 Throughout the empirical estimation results, no statistically significant impact that 
an emissions charge may have on FDI has been found, even though this effect is 
explicitly defined in the sixth equation of the system. The result can be interpreted that 
differentials in emissions levy rates across provinces are not a significant factor for 
foreign firms to decide where to locate their production. However, one cannot conclude 
that emissions charges have no effect on FDI. In Equation (4-18) though the first term in 
braces disappears as Vr is virtually equal to zero, the second term,  ∆ -1AhEfrVY, still exists, 
suggesting that emissions charges may affect FDI via the path of reduced emissions and 
lowered GDP levels. This effect is computed and presented in Table 5.14. The results 
show that Chinas relatively tight controls on wastewater pollution may have a negative 
impact on FDI, but that the impact of Chinas air pollution levy on FDI may not. 
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Table 5.13  Impacts of trade on emissions charges 
 
Model of different pollutant emissions 
Impacts 
Wastewater Waste gas SO2 CO2 Particles Dust 
Composition a 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scale b 0 0 0 -0.105 -0.141 0 
Income c 0.056 -0.115 -0.115 -0.124 -0.136 -0.062 
Total 0.056 -0.115 -0.115 -0.229 -0.277 -0.062 
Source: the authors computation. 
a: composition effect, ∆ -1hAfSgEZY. 
b: scale effect, ∆ -1hAfYgE. 




Table 5.14  Impact of an emissions charge on FDI 
 
Model of different pollutant emissions 
Impact 
Wastewater Waste gas SO2 CO2 Particles Dust 
Scale a -0.095 0 -0.013 0 0 0 
Source: the authors computation. 




5.7 Model Simulation 
5.7.1 Introduction 
Much information can also be obtained from the TEM model by examining its 
dynamic characteristics using computational simulation. Only in this way can one 
observe simultaneously and dynamically how the endogenous and exogenous variables 
are interrelated. This is particularly true when explicit analytical solutions for the reduced 
form of nonlinear simultaneous equations are difficult or impossible to obtain. Before the 
era of computable general equilibrium models, macroeconomic and market econometric 
models were typically enclosed in an equilibrium or disequilibrium framework that 
enabled computational solutions of models over time and over space.  
This research began when computer methods permitted multi-equation models to 
be solved for simultaneous solution paths. Under controlled scenarios, these solutions 
were termed simulations. Simulations were conducted to explain dependent variables in a 
historical context, to examine how certain policy variables impacted on the dependent 
variables, and to forecast these variables. 
Advances in computer simulation enabled economists to consider models as 
formal systems that could be dealt with in terms of response surfaces or statistical 
experiments. Some of the early work by Naylor (1969, 1971) established formal methods 
and procedures for manipulating econometric and related models. The concept of 
experimental design was expanded so that model inputs could be varied systematically or 
stochastically and the simulation outputs observed not only as model solutions, but 
statistical tests also could be employed to perform model validation. Experimental design 
was also extended into exploratory experiments, for example, involving full factorial 
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designs, fractional factorial designs, rotatable designs, response surface and other 
designs.  
The significant results obtained by computer simulation experiments is well 
known. One of the more important was the analysis and forecasting experiments 
conducted with macroeconometric models, e.g., the Wharton model. Evans and Klein 
(1969) showed how simulation experiments could be conducted with the model, and the 
algorithm employed was made available by Klein and Evans (1969). Later Klein and 
Young (1980) provided advice on validating and forecasting econometric models with 
computer simulation methods. Other simulation experiments dealt with primary 
commodity market models as explained by Labys (1973, 1975, 1984, 1989) and by 
Adams and Behrman (1976). Today there is a proliferation of econometric modeling 
studies involving computer simulation analysis. Examples of more recent simulation 
developments of interest can be found in Mariano, Schuermann and Weeks (2000) and in 
Marimon and Scott (2001). 
This section descibes simulation analysis with the TEM model for the Chinese 
economy. Simulation here is defined as a numerical technique suitable for conducting 
experiments with mathematical and econometric models that describe the behavior of a 
complex system employing solution algorithms over time and space. The approach 
normally taken in conducting such simulations is to consider a model system as 
composed of endogenous and exogenous variables, parameters or coefficients, and error 
or residual terms. Whether it be for explanatory, forecasting or validation purposes, the 
response of the endogenous variables of the model (or the response surface) can be 
observed in relation to changes in the exogenous variables, changes in the coefficients of 
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the model, or variations in error terms with different underlying generating processes. 
The changes induced can derive from deterministic selection, probabilistic testing, or 
stochastic generation. 
Based on these guidelines, simulations have been conducted for the TEM model 
to learn more about the interactions between trade and the environment in the Chinese 
context and to further validate the model upon which the interactions are based. Three 
separate simulations are discussed: 
1. Deterministic solutions are conducted to learn more about how trade and 
environment variables interact with each other in a policy context.  
2. Stochastic solutions are performed by shocking the error structure of the model to 
determine the stability of the model and the impacts of uncertainty on model 
performance.  
3. Stochastic solutions are performed both on random errors and on the estimated 
coefficients of the model to test its validity based on the robustness of the estimated 
values of those coefficients. 
 
5.7.2 Simulation Procedure 
The computer simulations in this analysis are performed with EViews 4 since this 
latest version of the software provides a powerful functionality for model simulation. In a 
deterministic simulation, all equations in the TEM model are solved so that they hold 
without error during the simulation period, and all coefficients are fixed at their point 
estimates. That is, the equations of the model are solved so that each of the equations is 
exactly satisfied. This results in a single path for the endogenous variables which can be 
evaluated by solving the model once.  
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The computational algorithm is based on an iterative Gauss-Seidel method, which 
is useful for both linear and nonlinear models. The solution method is dynamic 
simulation, i.e., observed data are used for lagged endogenous variables if they are dated 
prior to the first period of the simulation, and thereafter it uses the values forecast by the 
model itself. The convergence criterion used is 0.00001. Values for endogenous variables 
of the model are computed for each observation in the solution sample. Since the solution 
sample is set to cover all 28 provinces and 9 time periods, each endogenous variable thus 
has 252 simulated values. 
In a stochastic simulation, the model is solved for a set of randomly drawn 
residuals and/or coefficients. That is, the model is solved so that the fitted residuals match 
randomly drawn errors, and/or the coefficients of the model are varied randomly. For 
each variable and observation of a stochastic simulation, a set of independent random 
numbers are drawn from the standard normal distribution, then these numbers are scaled 
to match the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the system calculated from the 
model equation residuals. Using the EViews 4 framework, simulation of the model 
generates a distribution of outcomes for the endogenous variables in every period. This 
distribution is approximated by repeatedly solving the model using different draws for the 
random components in the model and then calculating statistics, such as means and 
standard deviations, over different outcomes. In each repetition, as for the deterministic 
simulation, each endogenous variable has 252 simulated values. Therefore, though a 
stochastic simulation follows a similar procedure to that of a deterministic one, EViews 4 
provides several variations. First, when binding the variables, a temporary series is 
created for every endogenous variable in the model. Additional series in the workfile are 
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used to hold the statistics for the tracked endogenous variables. Second, the model is 
solved repeatedly for different draws of the stochastic components of the model. If 
coefficient uncertainty is included in simulation, then a new set of coefficients is drawn 
before each repetition. During the repetition, errors are generated for each observation in 
accordance with the residual uncertainty. At the end of each repetition, the statistics for 
the tracked endogenous variables are updated to reflect the additional results. 
Since the panel observations of the variables in the workfile are stacked first by 
province and then by time period, in both deterministic and stochastic simulations lagged 
endogenous variables in the model were based on actual historical values of the 
endogenous variables. This treatment helps to reduce the inconsistency in simulation 
results due to data arrangement. 
 Because the TEM model analyzes interactions between trade and the 
environment, ten scenarios, as described in Table 5.15, are considered. Clearly, all of the 
scenarios involve initial changes in the included endogenous variables. In order to 
investigate the effect of these changes on other endogenous variables, the model is solved 
by excluding the endogenous variables that initiate a change for the entire solution 
sample. That is, the excluded endogenous variables are treated as exogenous variables for 
purpose of simulation. To evaluate the net effect of each scenario, the results of a 
scenario obtained from a deterministic or a stochastic simulation are compared with its 
corresponding deterministic or stochastic baseline solutions. This comparison is 
measured by percentage changes of the mean average of an endogenous variable relative 
to that of its baseline solution. In a deterministic simulation, this represents an average of 
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Table 5.15 List of Simulation Scenarios 
Increase in Endogenous Variables 
Scenario 
Trade FDI Levy Rate 
Scenario 1 10%   
Scenario 2 20%   
Scenario 3  10%  
Scenario 4  20%  
Scenario 5   10% 
Scenario 6   20% 
Scenario 7 10%  10% 
Scenario 8 20%  20% 
Scenario 9  10% 10% 
Scenario 10  20% 20% 
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252 simulated values. In a stochastic simulation, however, this average becomes the 
mean of 252,000 simulated values for each of the scenarios analyzed is simulated with 
one thousand repetitions. Since stochastic simulations are very time consuming, all of the 
simulations are focused only on the industrial wastewater pollution and the industrial 
waste gas emissions cases; the levy rate and emissions data used in estimating the TEM 
system are most consistent in these two pollution cases. 
The simulations were conducted by first performing a set of deterministic 
simulations. The presentation of the results of these simulations in Tables 5.15-5.24 
follows the equation structure of the estimated model (as presented in Tables 5.4 and 
5.5). The stochastic simulations were conducted as outlined. The several simulation 
procedures employed involve applying shocks to the baseline solution and then to the 
various scenarios. The means and deviations of various baseline solutions for the 
wastewater pollution and for the waste gas emissions case are summarized in Table 5.16 
and 5.17, respectively. The impact of the introduction of error shocks and coefficient 
shocks on the deterministic baseline solutions for these two cases are accordingly 
reported in Table 5.18 and 5.19. 
 
5.7.3 Deterministic Solution 
 According to Howrey and Kelejian (1971), the application of deterministic 
simulation procedures to econometric models that contain nonlinearities in the 
endogenous variables can yield results diverging systematically from the corresponding 
historical values even if the econometric model is properly specified. This result helps to 
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Table 5.16 Means and Deviations of Baseline Solutions In Industrial Wastewater 
Pollution (IWW) Case 





























Trade Det. Solution  809.09 796.69 3.91 43.33 436587.4 44934.5 
Excluding trade with 













Excluding trade with 













FDI Det Solution 807.31 800.49 3.90 43.32 316719.0 61879.1 
Excluding FDI with 













Excluding FDI with 













Levy Rate Det 
Solution 806.49 809.75 4.11 43.32 312118.3 43031.7 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 














Levy rate & Trade 
Det. Solution 807.56 803.35 4.11 43.33 436587.4 45463.3 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 














Levy rate & FDI 
Det. Solution 805.79 809.69 4.11 43.32 315500.3 61879.1 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 
& FDI with error & 
















Table 5.17 Means and Deviations of Baseline Solutions In Industrial Waste Gas 
Emissions (IGE) Case 





























Trade Det. Solution  810.16 309.04 4.84 43.33 436587.4 46864.9 
Excluding trade with 













Excluding trade with 













FDI Det Solution 806.50 306.45 4.83 43.32 318432.2 61879.1 
Excluding FDI with 













Excluding FDI with 













Levy Rate Det 
Solution 806.28 305.92 5.17 43.32 314583.0 42806.9 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 














Levy rate & Trade 
Det. Solution 808.94 308.22 5.17 43.33 436587.4 46165.7 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 














Levy rate & FDI 
Det. Solution 805.18 305.74 5.17 43.32 317532.6 61879.1 
Excluding levy rates 














Excluding levy rates 
& FDI with error & 
















Table 5.18 Deterministic Baseline Solution (DBS) vs. Stochastic Baseline Solution 
(SBS) In Industrial Wastewater Pollution (IWW) Case 
Changes in Endogenous Variables Compared with DBS (%) 
 













1. Excluding trade 
with error shocks 
only 
0.81 12.55 6.34 0.07 0.00 98.13 
2. Excluding trade 
with error & coef. 
shocks 
0.82 12.86 6.40 0.07 0.00 99.82 
3. Excluding FDI 
with error shocks 
only 
1.35 12.80 6.32 0.06 14.58 0.00 
4. Excluding FDI 
with error & coef. 
shocks 
1.51 13.53 6.62 0.05 15.72 0.00 
5. Excluding levy 
rates with error 
shocks only 
1.48 11.39 0.00 0.07 14.99 104.03 
6. Excluding levy 
rates with error & 
coef. shocks 
1.53 12.06 0.00 0.07 15.74 106.01 
7. Excluding levy 
rates & trade with 
error shocks only 
0.95 11.15 0.00 0.06 0.00 90.94 
8. Excluding levy 
rates & trade with 
error & coef. shocks 
1.05 11.66 0.00 0.08 0.00 98.55 
9. Excluding levy 
rates & FDI with 
error shocks only 
1.49 11.82 0.00 0.07 14.60 0.00 
10. Excluding levy 
rates & FDI with 
error & coef. shocks  






Table 5.19 Deterministic Baseline Solution (DBS) vs. Stochastic Baseline Solution 
(SBS) In Industrial Waste Gas Emissions (IGE) Case 
Changes in Endogenous Variables Compared with DBS (%) 
 













1. Excluding trade 
with error shocks 
only 
0.76 8.06 9.17 0.07 0.00 97.06 
2. Excluding trade 
with error & coef. 
shocks 
0.87 8.59 9.64 0.08 0.00 99.82 
3. Excluding FDI 
with error shocks 
only 
1.50 8.13 9.11 0.06 15.44 0.00 
4. Excluding FDI 
with error & coef. 
shocks 
1.59 8.65 9.68 0.05 16.38 0.00 
5. Excluding levy 
rates with error 
shocks only 
1.48 7.58 0.00 0.06 15.51 101.34 
6. Excluding levy 
rates with error & 
coef. shocks 
1.62 8.12 0.00 0.07 17.04 108.05 
7. Excluding levy 
rates & trade with 
error shocks only 
0.82 7.37 0.00 0.06 0.00 98.35 
8. Excluding levy 
rates & trade with 
error & coef. shocks 
0.79 7.60 0.00 0.06 0.00 101.75 
9. Excluding levy 
rates & FDI with 
error shocks only 
1.44 7.39 0.00 0.07 15.36 0.00 
10. Excluding levy 
rates & FDI with 
error & coef. shocks  
1.54 7.97 0.00 0.08 16.17 0.00 
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explain the obvious differences between the deterministically simulated values and the 
actual values of some endogenous variables such as FDI and trade as shown in Table 5.16 
and 5.17. The result also suggests that nonlinear models such as the TEM should not be 
simply validated in terms of comparisons between the simulated values and the actual 
sample values. However, this does not imply that simulation procedures in this case 
would produce no useful results regarding model validation. As Howrey and Kelejian 
show mathematically, the differences between the simulated and the actual values are 
systematic and consistent in nature. Comparisons between the simulated values obtained 
from different scenarios and those of the corresponding baseline solutions, therefore, can 
generate meaningful information to examine model validity as stability and consistency. 
The deterministic simulation results of the industrial wastewater pollution and the 
industrial waste gas emissions case based on above-mentioned comparisons are reported 
in Table 5.20 and 5.21, respectively. Table 5.16 shows that a 10% (20%) increase in trade 
values can lead to a 1.53% (2.93%) increase in wastewater discharges and a 0.36% 
(0.69%) increase in levy rates. That is, a 1% increase in trade can lead to about 0.15% 
increase in wastewater pollution and 0.035% increase in emissions charge; these changes 
are close to those of comparative statics ( 0.188% and 0.056%, see Table 5.11 and 5.13). 
The difference in magnitude between these results can be partly due to the fact that in 
comparative static analysis the effects that either are statistically insignificant or have a 
theoretically unexplainable sign are excluded from computation, while in model 
simulation all these effects are counted. Very likely for the same reason, while the 
comparative statics results suggest higher levy rates on wastewater pollution may lead to 
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reduced trade and FDI inflows, the deterministic solution shows that higher a levy rate 
can have a negative impact on trade but its impact on FDI is positive. 
 The results of Scenario 7 and 8 in Table 5.20 suggest that if levy rates increase as 
trade expands at the same rate, wastewater pollution can be reduced and positive GDP 
growth can also be achieved. According to the outcome of Scenario 9 and 10 in the same 
table, however, an increase in levy rates and FDI together alone can result in a reduction 
not only in wastewater pollution but also in GDP levels. Combining these results, trade is 
hence essential to achieve coordinated development between the economy and the 
environment. 
 The deterministic simulation results in the industrial waste gas emissions case, as 
shown in Table 5.21, also conform with those reported in Section 5.6. As noted earlier, 
since levy rates on waste gas emissions present a negative relationship with GDP growth 
in this case during the study period, it is not surprising that an increase in trade and FDI 
can lead to higher GDP levels but lower levy rates. Therefore, it is not surprising either 
that an increase in trade and in levy rates can result in more waste gas emissions and 
higher GDP growth because the increase in emissions charge on waste gas is not 
strengthened but weakened by economic growth. Though a simultaneous increase in levy 
rates and FDI can lead to a reduction in waste gas emissions, economic growth in this 
case is almost insignificant. Therefore, in order to effectively combat air pollution, 
emissions charges should rise rather than decrease as the economy grows because this is 
in line with environment as a normal good.  
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Table 5.20 Deterministic Simulation Results in Industrial Wastewater (IWW) 
Pollution Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 1.71 1.53 0.36 0.04 10.00 1.79 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 3.30 2.93 0.69 0.07 20.00 3.46 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.25 0.22 0.05 0.01 1.40 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.47 0.42 0.10 0.01 2.69 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.84 -5.54 10.00 0.01 -0.40 1.58 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -1.60 -10.32 20.00 0.01 -0.76 3.04 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
0.96 -3.81 10.00 0.04 10.00 3.41 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.85 -7.17 20.00 0.08 20.00 6.62 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
-0.63 -5.34 10.00 0.01 0.77 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 
-1.20 -9.96 20.00 0.02 1.47 20.00 
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Table 5.21 Deterministic Simulation Results in Industrial Gas Emissions (IGE) Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 2.13 1.99 -0.99 0.03 10.00 2.33 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 4.12 3.85 -1.88 0.06 20.00 4.50 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.32 0.30 -0.15 0.00 1.45 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.61 0.57 -0.29 0.01 2.79 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.27 -1.61 10.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.83 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -0.52 -3.05 20.00 0.00 -0.57 -1.58 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.90 0.25 10.00 0.03 10.00 1.47 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
3.66 0.48 20.00 0.06 20.00 2.83 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
0.07 -1.31 10.00 0.01 1.27 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 




5.7.4 Stochastic Error Solution  
The purpose of simulation with stochastic errors is to assess the stability of the 
TEM model and the impacts of uncertainty on model performance. Stability implies that 
the endogenous variables of a model approach closely their equilibrium values or a 
particular solution of the model over time and space, given the values of the exogenous 
variables and the stochastic error terms. According to Labys (1973), the nature of  
stability properties of an econometric model constitutes an important measure of its 
validity, and the behavior of a valid model should conform to the same pattern whether or 
not stochastic error shocks are included. 
As Howrey and Kelejian (1971) point out, the deterministic simulation of a model 
with nonlinear endogenous variables provides results systematically diverging from 
actual observations. The stochastic baseline results also show a consistently systematic 
deviation from the actual values (see Tables 5.16 and 5.17) and from those of the 
deterministic baselines (see Tables 5.18 and 5.19). All the stochastic solutions have 
greater average means and smaller average deviations (though why there exists such a 
systematic difference between the stochastic and the deterministic solutions requires 
more research). That is, given the nature of error shocks as a combination of all missing 
variables of the TEM system, the total effect of the missing variables on each of the 
endogenous variables in the model is positive. Similar to the deterministic simulation 
case, such systematic differences should not affect the comparisons between the 
stochastic simulated results of different scenarios and those of the corresponding 
stochastic baseline solutions. 
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The stochastic error solutions for the industrial wastewater pollution and the 
industrial waste gas emissions case are summarized in Table 5.22 and 5.23, respectively. 
The figures in these tables are changes in average means of the endogenous variables 
compared with their corresponding stochastic baseline solutions. Compared with the 
deterministic solutions in Table 5.20 and 5.21, the stochastic error simulation results are 
very close to deterministic ones except for the results for the FDI variables. A significant 
difference between the stochastic and the deterministic solution for the FDI variable is 
not surprising given that FDI is the most unpredictable and uncertain endogenous 
variable in the TEM system as indicated by the summary statistics of the variables in 
Table 5.2. Hence, the TEM model is reasonably stable to error structure shocks and the 
impacts of uncertainty on model performance are, in general, not significant. 
 
5.7.5 Stochastic Error and Coefficient Solution  
 In addition to error shocks, uncertainties of the estimated coefficients of the 
model are also incorporated in the stochastic simulations to test the robustness of the 
estimated values of those coefficients. Economists have long been interested in the 
behavior of an econometric model where the coefficients are treated as random variables 
(Naylor 1971). Early studies along this line encountered serious difficulty in solving the 
model when its coefficients were shocked. Using EViews 4, simulations with additional 
coefficient shocks can be readily conducted by linking the simulation model to the 
existing estimated model. No doubt the stability of a model to coefficient shocks is 
another important measure of its validity, because if the solution of the model is sensitive 
to coefficient perturbations, validity as credibility of the model will be obviously 
questionable. 
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The results of this stochastic solution are shown in Table 5.24 and 5.25. In 
comparison with the results in Table 5.18 and 5.23, random draws of the values of 
coefficients do not create obvious deviations in outcomes for most endogenous variables 
in both the industrial wastewater pollution and the industrial waste gas emissions cases. 
Again, the FDI variable is an exception because of the uncertain nature of the variable 
itself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the model is rather robust to changes in the 
estimated values of the coefficients. 
In summary, the TEM system behaves fairly consistently in all the deterministic 
and the stochastic simulations and shows reasonable stability to both the error and the 
coefficient shocks. It is also worth noting that, in both the deterministic and the stochastic 
simulations, the solution of the TEM model converges quickly. Hence, the existence, 
stability and convergence conditions for the TEM system would appear to be 
computationally supported. 
 
5.8  Conclusions 
 Using Chinese provincial-level panel data, the TEM model has been estimated 
employing three estimation procedures. These approaches include a 2SLS estimator with 
no fixed or random effect, a fixed effect 2SLS estimator, and a random effect 2SLS 
estimator. Empirical results suggest that the 2SLS estimator with no fixed or random 
effects appears to work best for the Chinese model application. Model validation and 
simulation further shows that this non-linear simultaneous equations TEM model and its 
2SLS estimation results are reasonably robust. 
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 Examination of the empirical interactions between trade and the environment 
confirms the importance of using a simultaneous model to identify the sources of these 
influences. For instance, results show that increased trade can lead to increased 
wastewater discharges through a scale effect, but trade can also lead to reduced 
wastewater discharges through its income effect. Similarly, an emissions charge may 
have both a direct negative impact on trade from a reduced economic scale and an 
indirect negative impact also from the reduced economic scale but via its impact on FDIs. 
These results suggest that a tradeoff between economic growth and environmental 
protection might have taken place in China during the period examined. 
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Table 5.22  Stochastic Error Simulation Results in Industrial Wastewater (IWW) 
Pollution Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 1.74 1.54 0.41 0.02 10.00 1.42 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 3.40 3.28 0.80 0.05 20.00 4.36 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.28 0.27 0.11 0.01 1.26 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.39 0.08 0.08 0.01 2.13 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.82 -5.42 10.00 -0.01 -0.50 -3.73 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -1.55 -9.77 20.00 0.02 -1.21 -3.99 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
0.91 -3.94 10.00 0.06 10.00 5.32 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.77 -7.54 20.00 0.08 20.00 8.13 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
-0.58 -5.67 10.00 0.00 1.36 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 





Table 5.23  Stochastic Error Simulation Results in Industrial Gas Emissions (IGE) 
Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 2.18 1.96 -0.91 0.02 10.00 2.22 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 4.11 3.83 -1.83 0.06 20.00 5.27 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.30 0.48 -0.09 0.01 1.28 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.64 0.67 -0.14 0.02 2.79 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.37 -1.88 10.00 0.01 -0.23 -0.80 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -0.52 -3.18 20.00 -0.01 -0.30 -2.12 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.83 0.16 10.00 0.04 10.00 0.55 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
3.62 0.26 20.00 0.05 20.00 0.43 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
0.00 -1.30 10.00 0.00 0.98 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 





Table 5.24 Stochastic Error Coefficient Simulation Results in Industrial Wastewater 
(IWW) Pollution Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 
1.75 1.60 0.58 0.04 10.00 2.64 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 
3.38 2.72 0.77 0.08 20.00 5.56 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 
0.16 0.09 0.00 0.03 1.51 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 
0.37 0.23 -0.09 0.03 2.40 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.71 -5.60 10.00 0.00 0.22 1.76 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -1.57 -10.46 20.00 0.01 -0.08 2.99 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
0.80 -4.22 10.00 0.04 10.00 2.84 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.64 -7.94 20.00 0.07 20.00 5.50 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
-0.60 -5.29 10.00 0.01 1.02 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 
-1.24 -10.01 20.00 0.02 1.75 20.00 
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Table 5.25 Stochastic Error Coefficient Simulation Results in Industrial Gas 
Emissions (IGE) Case 
















1. A 10% increase in 
trade values 2.11 2.06 -0.98 0.04 10.00 5.56 
2. A 20% increase in 
trade values 4.05 3.76 -1.73 0.05 20.00 5.05 
3. A 10% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.20 0.35 -0.07 0.02 0.96 10.00 
4. A 20% increase in 
FDI inflows 0.71 1.17 -0.38 0.02 3.17 20.00 
5. A 10% increase in 
levy rates -0.30 -1.49 10.00 0.01 -0.60 -0.42 
6. A 20% increase in 
levy rates -0.55 -3.08 20.00 -0.01 -0.72 -2.43 
7. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
1.89 0.33 10.00 0.05 10.00 1.70 
8. A 20% increase in 
levy rates and in 
trade values 
3.66 0.42 20.00 0.07 20.00 2.34 
9. A 10% increase in 
levy rates and in FDI 
inflows 
-0.11 -1.42 10.00 0.00 0.22 10.00 
10. A 20% increase 
in levy rates and in 
FDI inflows 





POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The relation between trade and the environment is an important issue in many 
developing countries. This is particularly true for China. On one hand, economic 
development requires that China liberalize its trade and integrate itself into the global 
economy. On the other hand, China has realized that adequate efforts should be made to 
improve its increasingly deteriorating environment in order to achieve sustainable 
economic development. Chinas dilemma, given the lack of a more comprehensive 
perspective, resembles that of this study: (1) what are the environmental implications of 
increased trade? and (2) what are the trade implications of stricter environmental 
policies? The importance of the present effort is to study these questions based on a 
simultaneous trade and the environment model that employs a provincial panel data set. 
The major findings, policy implications, and conclusions of the study are summarized in 
this chapter. 
  
6.2  Major Findings 
 Increased trade can lead to greater industrial wastewater pollution, and industrial 
waste gas, CO2, and particle emissions. This increase in pollution is due to a trade-
induced economic scale effect. That is, increased trade can cause an expansion of 
economic activities, and assuming the nature of these activities to be unchanged, the total 
amount of pollution generated would increase. However, as suggested in the wastewater 
 199
pollution case, this increase in pollution could be alleviated by the trade-induced income 
effect, but this would happen only when an effective environmental policy is in place. In 
addition, no evidence has been found in this study that China may have a comparative 
advantage in pollution-intensive goods. 
 An effective emissions charge would have a negative impact on trade, though the 
impact is very small. This negative effect comes from a reduced economic scale resulting 
from this environmental policy. A reduced economic scale would have a direct negative 
impact on trade and an indirect impact via its negative influence on FDI. However, this 
negative trade effect can not be identified when pollution control proves to be ineffective. 
 The findings concerning the impact of trade on emissions charges is mixed. If a 
higher income level means stricter environmental enforcement as identified in the 
wastewater pollution case, then trade could lead to a higher emissions charge through an 
income effect. Otherwise, this effect would be negative. 
 No direct impact of an emissions charge on reducing FDI has been confirmed in 
this analysis, suggesting that differences in environmental regulations would not 
adversely affect foreign firms to invest in China. This may also imply that provinces need 
not tend to compete with one another for FDI by lowering their environmental standards. 
However, an effective emissions charge may have an indirect impact on FDI since an 
effective charge would lead to reduced emissions and hence to lowered GDP levels. 
 Chinas pollution levy system is an effective approach for reducing wastewater 
control. Concerning air emissions control, however, the levy system seems to be less 
effective; the effectiveness is observed only in the SO2 emissions case. This finding is 
consistent with the particular efforts that China has made to control these two types of 
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pollution. According to Dong and Holt (2001), between 1991 and 1995, China invested 
16 billion RMB yuan on controlling SO2 emissions and 27 billion RMB yuan on 
industrial wastewater treatment. The former accounts for 43 percent of Chinas total 
investment in air pollution control and the latter for 69 percent of the total in water 
pollution control over the same period. It is also found that levy rates on wastewater 
discharge rise as income increases, while levy rates on waste gas emissions demonstrate a 
negative relation with income. This result suggests that local governments are not willing 
to enforce environmental regulations on air pollution control that can be considered as 
strictly as on water pollution control. An economic explanation is that water pollution is 
easy to monitor and that the damage caused is local. Since air pollution is transboundary 
and difficult to monitor, local governments might have the tendency to receive a free 
ride. 
 The present findings also confirm the existence of an environmental Kuznets 
curve: an inverted-U relationship between the amount of industrial wastewater discharges 
and GDP levels. However, this relationship is not identified between air emissions and 
GDP levels. As suggested earlier, wastewater pollution is more effectively controlled in 
China than air pollution. This finding would imply that the total amount of pollution 
could be decreased as the scale of economic activities increases, but only when an 
effective environmental policy is in place. The finding could contribute to the existing 
environmental Kuznets literature in two aspects. First, it shows for the first time that an 
inverted-U relationship may also exist between pollution and economic scales, both 
measured in total quantities. Second, it explicitly associates the existence of an inverted-
U relationship with the effectiveness of environmental regulations. The latter is further 
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supported by the results of the reduced sample estimation where data from the three 
municipalities were deleted. Once the coefficient estimates of levy rates on waste gas 
emissions become statistically significant, an inverted-U relationship between air 
emissions and GDP levels is also present in most air pollution cases. No adequate 
explanation exists as to why Chinas levy system seems to be effective as an air pollution 
control instrument when the three municipalities are excluded from the analysis. 
 State-owned enterprises are found to be less environmentally efficient. In all the 
examined cases, an increase in the output share of state-owned enterprises would 
positively increase the amount of pollution discharges, suggesting that those firms would 
indeed be more successful in neglecting environmental regulations. 
 Education levels of individuals appear to be an important factor in the successful 
enforcement of environmental regulations. A decrease in the illiteracy and semi-illiteracy 
rate would lead to a higher levy rate on both wastewater and waste gas discharges, and 
hence would reduce pollution. 
 
6.3 Policy Implications 
 Trade may lead to increased pollution via expanded economic activity, but the 
negative environmental impact of trade can be minimized and even cancelled by 
supporting domestic environmentally-friendly industries that achieve comparative 
advantage in less polluting goods and by imposing stricter environmental regulations. 
This may require China to develop a series of industrial policies that are not only 
appropriate for a WTO member country but also would benefit environmentally 
supportive industries. These policies should not be a simple means of subsidy or 
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protection that conflict with WTO principles. Instead, China should pursue competitive 
markets, develop a related management system, and provide assistance to 
environmentally friendly industries through appropriate means of financing, 
technological development, and distribution of R&D results. At the same time, in order to 
mitigate the negative environmental impacts of trade, the production and export of highly 
pollution-intensive products must be strictly limited. Efforts could be aimed at upgrading 
technology and improving production efficiency so that the domestic environment does 
not suffer because of export growth. In addition, the import of advanced technology and 
environmentally compatible technology should be encouraged while imports that harm 
the environment or pertain to hazardous wastes should be discouraged and, if possible, 
banned. 
 China also needs to seize the green opportunities that result from its accession to 
the WTO to upgrade its own environmental standards, to strengthen environmental 
legislation, and to improve law enforcement. An improvement in environmental quality 
and a decrease in the volume of pollution discharges will be possible only when effective 
environmental regulations and strict low enforcement are in place. Hence, efforts could 
be made to fill important responsibility vacuums at provincial, national, and 
international levels. The infrastructure required to govern trade, investment, and finance 
should provide adequate coverage of environmental concerns. And the governments 
ability at national and provincial levels to practice environmental management should 
meet the challenges posed by an accelerated increase in trade and foreign direct 
investment inflows. 
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 Individuals as well as public interest groups in China should be influenced to be 
more aware of and more empowered to deal with international trade and environmental 
issues. The experience of developed countries shows that local communities can provide 
policy recommendations on sustainable development, can monitor environmental law 
enforcement, and can influence local and national governments and foreign countries to 
improve their behavior. In addition, the awareness of citizens and their successful 
involvement also depends on their educational attainment. Therefore, it is important for 
China to increase government expenditures on education, to make education affordable 
for the poor, and to reduce the nations illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rates. 
 Though an environmental policy can have a negative effect on economic growth 
and hence on trade and FDI inflows, this is not always the case. The revisionist theory 
suggests that efficient environmental regulations may actually stimulate innovation, 
efficiency gains, economic growth and competitiveness. The government should thus 
compose environmental policies that deal with trade and environmental problem based on 
a more holistic approach. Policies should be made to provide incentives for firms to 
improve economic efficiency by innovation or adoption of the state-of-the-art 
technology. It has been suggested that state-owned enterprises are not only economically 
but also environmentally inefficient. While deepening the reform of SOEs, local and 
central governments should further promote the development of collective and private 
enterprises. The inner provinces in particular should create more favorable economic 
policies to boost non-state-owned enterprises.  
 Chinas accession to the WTO will undoubtedly lead to a remarkable increase in 
FDI inflows. It has also been suggested that a lower environmental standard and lenient 
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law enforcement would offer no extra attraction to foreign investors. On the contrary, 
both local and the central governments should make substantial efforts to reduce the 
negative impact of FDI on the environment. Specifically, authorization should be given 
only to foreign firms that will adopt new technologies that minimize pollution. 
Production facilities that employ the latest in pollution reduction technology also benefit 
from higher capital productivity. In addition, incentives should be provided to those firms 
that minimize their pollution levels in order that their production technology could serve 
as learning for domestic firms in areas of environmental protection. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 Interactions between trade and the environment have become an important theme 
in economic research, because of the pressure that the accelerated pace of globalization 
has placed on environment and trade. Not only is world trade increasing rapidly but also 
global industrialization related to trade has spawned severe environmental degradation; 
this is particularly true for developing countries. Attempts to analyze the linkages 
between these areas are many but have taken opposite positions, dominated either by 
examining the impact of environmental regulations on trade or by investigating the 
impact of trade on the environment. This study is an ambitious attempt to fill this 
literature gap by reviewing existing economic studies of the major environmental and 
trade issues and the methods necessary to analyze those issues first, and then by 
highlighting an expanded simultaneous trade and environment model of China. The 
present simultaneous trade and environment model extends beyond Deans framework by 
incorporating an international trade and an FDI inflow equation. Hence, the present 
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model enables one not only to investigate the impact of trade on environmental variables 
and vice versa, but also to divide those impacts into scale, composition, and technique 
effects. In addition, this model has also evaluated the existence of the environmental 
Kuznets curve.  
The results of the study provide useful insights in understanding the 
interrelationships between trade and the environment in general and for China in 
particular. They also demonstrate the effectiveness of a simultaneous equations models 
for achieving these results. Concerning limitations of the study, the proposed 
simultaneous equations model is a highly stylized simplification of the Chinese 
provincial economy and has obvious imperfections. For example, the negative impact of 
pollution on economic activity is neglected. Similarly, the model fails to reflect possible 
positive impacts that environmental regulations may have on an economy. In addition, 
the environmental data used in the study have evident limitations. As already noted, 
pollution data are limited to industrial sources. Therefore, the implication of pollution 
generated from consumption and other sectors is totally neglected. Besides, the pollution 
levy rates computed in the study are not consistent in nature due to the changes in 
Chinas levy system adopted during the period 1987-95. And, these levy rates are a very 
rough proxy for emissions prices.  Further more, the levy system is only one of Chinas 
many pollution prevention and control measures (Dong and Holt 2001). Exclusion of 
other measures in the model could possibly lead to results that are incomplete and 
possibly misleading. The results reported in this study are directional rather than precise.  
 The research implications of this study are as follows. First, there is a need for 
more case-specific empirical studies on trade and environmental issues. As already noted, 
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interactions between trade and the environment can best be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis that allow little generalization. In order to generate meaningful policy implications 
and provide pertinent guidelines for policy makers to achieve coordinated development 
between the economy, trade and the environment, future research should be directed to 
more specific case studies. Second, both more theoretical and more empirical studies are 
required to investigate the impact of environmental degradation on trade and economic 
growth, i.e. sustainable development. There are many publications that explain how trade 
can affect the environment, and also many studies on how environmental policies would 
affect international trade. However, our knowledge of the trade and economic 
consequences of environmental degradation is still relatively limited. Third, greater 
efforts should be made to investigate trade and environment issues using disaggregate 
industrial-level data such as those employed in input-output models and CGE models. 
Since the environmental impact of production differs from industry to industry and 
environmental policies have different impacts on different industries, CGE models enable 
one to examine the trade and environment relationship at the industry level and hence to 
produce more detailed and more accurate analyses of this relationship. And lastly, more 
theoretical and empirical research is also needed to incorporate a spatial element into the 
investigation of trade and environment issues. These issues often include reference space 
or location. Yet, in most of the trade and environment literature, location is not part of the 
analysis, mostly because appropriate data do not exist. Inclusion of a spatial dimension 
would no doubt better our understanding of the nature of the problem. Further application 
of the present modeling approach in China as well as in other countries thus depends on 
the quality of data that would improve policy analysis and impact forecasts. 
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Appendix A: Flowgraph and Comparative Statics Results 
 
A.1 The effects of a trade policy on emissions 
Flowgraph analysis 
Open path from dt to dT: 
 E1(dt→dT→dY→dE) = WthAfY 
 E2(dt→dT→dS→dE) = WtZTfS 
 E3(dt→dT→dY→dr→dE) = WthAgYfr 
 E4(dt→dT→dY→dS→dE) = WthAZYfS 
Relavent loops in the system: 
 L1(dT→dY→dT) = hAWY 
 L2(dT→dY→dF→dT) = hAVYWF 
 L3(dT→dS→dE→dY→dT) = ZTfSAhEWY 
 L4(dT→dS→dE→dY→dF→dT) = ZTfSAhEVYWF 
 L5(dY→dE→dY) = fYAhE 
 L6(dY→dr→dE→dY) = gYfrAhE 
L7(dY→dS→dE→dY) = ZYfSAhE 
L8(dT→dY→dr→dF→dT) = hAgYVrWF 
L9(dE→dr→dE) = gEfr 
L10(dT→dY→dE→dr→dF→dT) = hAfYgEVrWF 
L11(dT→dY→dS→dE→dr→dF→dT) = hAZYfSgEVrWF 
L12(dT→dS→dE→dr→dF→dT) = ZTfSgEVrWF 
 According to Heise (Heise, D.R., 1975, Causal Analysis, New York: John Wiley 





















   (A1) 
where * is a special operation in which the multiplications in the numerator and in the 
denominator are carried out before division, terms are deleted if they multiply the effects 
of touching paths, and division is carried out only after such terms have been deleted. In 
addition, it not difficult to find out that the denominator derived from such operation is 
the determinant of the system, ∆ . Therefore, equation A1 becomes: 
dt









      = 1−∆ (E1 + E2 + E3 + E4 ) 
      = [ ])('1 YSYYrTSt ZffgfhAZfW +++∆ −     (A2) 
 
Comparative statics  
 The result shown in equation (A2) can also be obtained by applying comparative 
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A.2 The effects of a trade policy on FDI 
Flowgraph analysis 









































            = )( 91721
1 LEEEE −+++∆ − L  
 
             = tW
1−∆ [hA(fS gE Vr ZY+ fS gE Vr+VY+gY Vr-fr gE VY)  
  +ZT(AhE (fS VY + AhE fS gY Vr+fS gE Vr)]    (A3) 
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Comparative statics  
 The result shown in equation (A3) can also be obtained by applying comparative 
statics to system equation (4-13). To save space, the comparative statics procedure is not 
reported here. 
 
A.3 The effects of a trade policy on emissions charges 
Flowgraph analysis 







































       = )( 521
1 EEE +++∆ − L  
       tW
1−∆= [ZT (fS gE + AhE fS gY) + hA(fS gE ZY + fY gE + gY)]  (A4) 
 
A.4 The effects of an emissons charge on FDI 
Flowgaph analysis 
Open paths from dr to dFDI: 
 E1(dr→dFDI)=Vr 
 E2(dr→dE→dY→dF)=frAhEVY 































           = )( 7151311121
1 LELELELEEE −−−−+∆ −  
           1−∆= {Vr [1- hA WY- AhE (fS WY ZT +fY + fS ZY)] + AhE fr VY} (A5) 
 
A.5 The effects of an emissions charge on trade 
Flowgraph analysis 
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1 LELEEEE −−++∆ −  
       
1−
∆=  [Vr wF (1-AhEfY  AhEfSZY) + AhE (frWY + frVYWF)]  (A6) 
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Appendix B: Eviews Codes for 2SLS, 2SLS with Fixed Effects and EC2SLS 
 
B.1 2SLS estimation 
' 2SLS regression 







smpl 1 !NT 
 
'Create a group of instruments for the model to be estimated 
' Xs,   X = instruments 
 
group x0 log(l) log(k) log(soe) log(c) log(pd)  log(tax) log(er) log(ti)  log(pgdp1) log(rmt) log(ed) 
log(tn)*log(tp) log(cfdi1) log(s1) log(v) log(n) 
 
group xs log(l) log(k) log(soe) log(c) log(pd)  log(tax) log(er) log(ti)  log(pgdp1) log(rmt) log(ed) 
log(tn)*log(tp) log(cfdi1) log(s1) log(v) log(n) d dt 
 
!k=x0.@count 
for !i=1 to !k 





' Reduced form estimation 
'ls(n) gdp Xs 
 
equation eq1 log(y) c log(e) log(t) log(l) log(k) @ Xs  
equation eq2 log(e) c log(y) log(y)*log(y) log(levy) log(s) log(soe) @ Xs 
equation eq3 log(levy) c log(e) log(pgdp) log(c) log(pd) log(ed)  @ Xs 
equation eq4 log(s) c log(t) log(y) log(s1) log(v) d @ Xs 
equation eq5 log(t) c log(y) log(fdi) log(er) log(rmt) log(tn)*log(tp) d dt @ Xs  
equation eq6 log(fdi) c log(y) log(levy) log(pgdp1) log(ti) log(tax) log(cfdi1) d dt @ Xs  
 
freeze(eq1out) eq1.tsls(h) log(y) c log(e) log(t) log(l) log(k) @ Xs 
show eq1out 
freeze(eq2out) eq2.tsls(h) log(e) c log(y) log(y)*log(y) log(levy) log(s) log(soe) @ Xs 
show eq2out 
freeze(eq3out) eq3.tsls(h) log(levy) c log(e) log(pgdp) log(c) log(pd) log(ed)  @ Xs 
show eq3out 
freeze(eq4out) eq4.tsls(h) log(s) c log(t) log(y) log(s1) log(v) d @ Xs 
show eq4out 
freeze(eq5out) eq5.tsls(h) log(t) c log(y) log(fdi) log(er) log(rmt) log(tn)*log(tp) d dt @ Xs  
show eq5out 





B.2 2SLS estimation with fixed effects 
' 2SLS with Fixed Effects 







smpl 1 !NT 
 




for !i=1 to N 
 series dum{!i}=0 








for !j=1 to T 
 series dumt{!j}=0 





'Create a group of instruments for the model to be estimated 
' Xs,   X = instruments 
 
group x0 log(l) log(k) log(soe) log(c) log(pd)  log(tax) log(er) log(ti)  log(pgdp1) log(rmt) log(ed) 
log(tn)*log(tp) log(cfdi1) log(s1) log(v) log(n) 
 
group xs log(l) log(k) log(soe) log(c) log(pd)  log(tax) log(er) log(ti)  log(pgdp1) log(rmt) log(ed) 
log(tn)*log(tp) log(cfdi1) log(s1) log(v) log(n)  
 
!k=x0.@count 
for !i=1 to !k 





equation eq1 log(y) c log(e) log(t) log(l) log(k) @ d dt Xs  
equation eq2 log(e) c log(y) log(y)*log(y) log(levy) log(s) log(soe) @ d dt Xs 
equation eq3 log(levy) c log(e) log(pgdp) log(c) log(pd) log(ed) @ d dt Xs 
equation eq4 log(s) c log(t) log(y) log(s1) log(v) @ d dt Xs 
equation eq5 log(t) c log(y) log(fdi) log(er) log(rmt) log(tn)*log(tp) @ d dt Xs  
equation eq6 log(fdi) c log(y) log(levy) log(pgdp1) log(ti) log(tax) log(cfdi1) @ d dt Xs  
 
freeze(eq1out) eq1.tsls log(y) c log(e) log(t) log(l) log(k) @ d dt Xs 
freeze(eq2out) eq2.tsls log(e) c log(y) log(y)*log(y) log(levy) log(s) log(soe) @ d dt Xs  
freeze(eq3out) eq3.tsls log(levy) c log(e) log(pgdp) log(c) log(pd) log(ed) @ d dt Xs  
freeze(eq4out) eq4.tsls log(s) c log(t) log(y) log(s1) log(v) @ d dt Xs 
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freeze(eq5out) eq5.tsls log(t) c log(y) log(fdi) log(er) log(rmt) log(tn)*log(tp) @ d dt Xs  











B.3 2SLS estimation with random effects (EC2SLS) 
' EC2SLS using transformed data 







smpl 1 !NT 
 
'Create the groups and matrices for the model to be estimated 
' ydep, y = dependent variables 
' Ws,  W = RHS variables 
' Xs,   X = instruments 
' Zs,   Z = instruments that are not RHS variables 
 
' Compute various matrices needed 
matrix(T, 1) e=1 
matrix(N, 1) en=1 
matrix Abar=@kronecker(@identity(N)/T, e*@transpose(e)) 










' Remove the means from all variables 
 
' Loop over the series names 
for %var y e levy s t fdi cfdi1 l k soe tax er ti c pd  pgdp1 rmt ed n s1 v pgdp 





group x0 log(l) log(k) log(soe) log(c) log(pd)  log(tax) log(er) log(ti)  log(pgdp1) log(rmt) log(ed) 
log(tn)*log(tp) log(cfdi1) log(s1) log(v) log(n) 
 




for !i=1 to !k 





group Xs tsoe ttax ter tti tl tk tc tpd tpgdp1 trmt ted ttariff tcfdi1 ts1 tv tn 
!m=x1.@count 





' Estimate equation 1  
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep ty 






' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 




for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  
 mtos(yh, ydep) 
 mtos(Wh,Ws) 
 mtos(Xh,Xs) 
   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 




' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  












result1.displayname EC2SLS Estimates for eq1 
show result1 
 
' Estimate equation 2  
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep te 






' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 




for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  
 mtos(yh, ydep) 
 mtos(Wh,Ws) 
 mtos(Xh,Xs) 
   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 




' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  








matplace(result2, thetaEC, 1,1) 
colplace(result2,stdevEC,2) 
 
result2.displayname EC2SLS Estimates for eq2 
show result2 
 
' Estimate equation 3 
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep tlevy 







' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 




for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  
 mtos(yh, ydep) 
 mtos(Wh,Ws) 
 mtos(Xh,Xs) 
   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 




' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  








matplace(result3, thetaEC, 1,1) 
colplace(result3,stdevEC,2) 
 
result3.displayname EC2SLS Estimates for eq3 
show result3 
 
' Estimate equation 4  
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep ts 






' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 





for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  
 mtos(yh, ydep) 
 mtos(Wh,Ws) 
 mtos(Xh,Xs) 
   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 




' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  








matplace(result4, thetaEC, 1,1) 
colplace(result4,stdevEC,2) 
 
result4.displayname EC2SLS Estimates for eq4 
show result4 
 
' Estimate equation 5 
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep tt 






' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 




for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  




   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 




' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  








matplace(result5, thetaEC, 1,1) 
colplace(result5,stdevEC,2) 
 
result5.displayname EC2SLS Estimates for eq5 
show result5 
 
' Estimate equation 6 
 
' Insert variables names for current model into group commands here 
group ydep tfdi 






' Compute the 3 2SLS estimates corresponding to ccp matrices, namely 




for !i=1 to 3 
  matrix Wh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*W 
 matrix Xh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*X 
 matrix yh=@transpose(ccp{!i})*y0 
  
 mtos(yh, ydep) 
 mtos(Wh,Ws) 
 mtos(Xh,Xs) 
   
 equation eq{!i}.tsls ydep Ws @ Xs 
 scalar sig2{!i}=eq{!i}.@ssr/n{!i} 
 if sig2{!i} >= 1e-10 then 
  matrix WPW{!i}=@inverse(eq{!i}.@coefcov)*eq{!i}.@se*eq{!i}.@se/sig2{!i} 
  matrix WPy{!i}=WPW{!i}*eq{!i}.@coefs 
 else 
  matrix WPW{!i}=0*eq{!i}.@coefcov 





' Compute the EC2SLS estimator, based on these 3 group 2SLS  








matplace(result6, thetaEC, 1,1) 
colplace(result6,stdevEC,2) 
 




matplace(EC2SLS, result1, 1,1) 
matplace(EC2SLS, result2, 6,1) 
matplace(EC2SLS, result3, 11,1) 
matplace(EC2SLS, result4, 17,1) 
matplace(EC2SLS, result5, 22,1) 
matplace(EC2SLS, result6, 27,1) 
 








Appendix C: 2SLS Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
Table C-1 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Time and Individual Effects (Industrial Wastewater Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.813 
(4.215) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.154 
(-5.226) 
   0.629 
(1.536) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.262 
(2.472) 
































  0.035 
(1.204) 
 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.295 
(1.314) 




  3.709 
(3.345) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 













     -0.304 
(-0.592) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 
















Table C-2 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Individual Effects (Industrial Wastewater Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.120 
(1.076) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.138 
(-4.034) 
   0.036 
(0.081) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.505 
(3.973) 
































  0.013 
(0.415) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.412 
(1.820) 




  -0.209 
(-0.290) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 













     -0.499 
(-1.457) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table C-3 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Time Effects (Industrial Wastewater Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.349 
(5.102) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.624 
(-11.573) 
   0.530 
(2.361) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.200 
(1.874) 
































  -0.172 
(-3.843) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.323 
(-3.718) 




  0.109 
(4.109) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 













     0.158 
(0.506) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 
















Table C-4 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Time and Individual Effects (Industrial Gas Emissions 
(IGE) Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.780 
(6.948) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.291 
(-7.058) 
   -0.020 
(-0.072) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.329 
(1.484) 
































  0.085 
(2.142) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.158 
(0.515) 




  6.389 
(4.107) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.732 
(-0.977) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.268 
(-0.521) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 
















Table C-5 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Individual Effects (Industrial Gas Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.233 
(1.433) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.242 
(-6.354) 
   -0.344 
(-1.263) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.489 
(2.242) 
































  0.077 
(1.743) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.778 
(2.412) 




  -2.241 
(-2.255) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -3.444 
(-1.781) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.401 
(-1.156) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table C-6 2SLS Estimates with Fixed Time Effects (Industrial Gas Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.296 
(-3.665) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.207 
(-3.459) 
   0.070 
(0.351) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.648 
(5.148) 
































  0.033 
(0.610) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.204 
(-1.849) 




  -0.012 
(-0.432) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     0.732 
(6.066) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.121 
(0.384) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 
















Appendix D: EC2SLS Estimation Results 
Table D-1 EC2SLS Estimates (Industrial Wastewater (IWW) Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.716 
(3.376) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.361 
(-3.189) 
   3.405 
(2.165) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.365 
(2.159) 
































  0.034 
(1.179) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.219 
(1.027) 




  3.127 
(2.939) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 













     -0.639 
(-1.080) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 
















Table D-2 EC2SLS Estimates (Industrial Gas Emissions (IGE) Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.662 
(5.174) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.083 
(-0.810) 
   0.756 
(1.135) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.153 
(0.579) 
































  0.084 
(2.135) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.150 
(0.514) 




  4.822 
(2.412) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.875 
(-1.061) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.472 
(-0.922) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table D-3 EC2SLS Estimates (CO2 Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.924 
(3.812) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.045 
(-0.575) 
   0.756 
(1.135) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.045 
(-0.221) 
































  0.106 
(2.157) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.087 
(-0.218) 




  4.331 
(2.084) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.875 
(-1.061) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.472 
(-0.922) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table D-4 EC2SLS Estimates (SO2 Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.354 
(4.256) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.048 
(-0.454) 
   0.756 
(1.135) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.072 
(0.267) 
































  0.088 
(1.952) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.173 
(0.495) 




  2.520 
(1.245) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.875 
(-1.061) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.472 
(-0.922) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table D-5 EC2SLS Estimates (Particle Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.386 
(4.811) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.153 
(1.147) 
   0.756 
(1.135) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.357 
(1.051) 
































  0.085 
(1.920) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.074 
(0.217) 




  1.909 
(1.150) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.875 
(-1.061) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.472 
(-0.922) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Table D-6 EC2SLS Estimates (Dust Emissions Case) 










































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  1.163 
(3.060) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.248 
(1.236) 
   0.756 
(1.135) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.333 
(0.649) 
































  0.072 
(1.429) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  0.152 
(0.442) 




  2.148 
(1.279) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 
      
Tariffs 
(LogTN*logTP) 









     -1.875 
(-1.061) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.472 
(-0.922) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 




      
Time Dummy 
DT 

















Appendix E: Linear Model 2SLS Results 
Table E-1Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (Idustrial Wastewater Discharge (IWW) Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.328 
(4.600) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.329 
(-2.480) 
   -0.629 
(-0.836) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.262 
(-1.396) 
































  -0.153 
(-2.723) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.273 
(-3.066) 




  0.063 
(1.983) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.611 
(3.047) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.072 
(-0.383) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 































Table E-2Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (Idustrial Waste Gas Emissions (IGE) Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.402 
(-4.829) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.368 
(3.658) 
   0.798 
(1.597) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 1.040 
(6.027) 
































  0.079 
(1.220) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.143 
(-1.024) 




  -0.038 
(-1.128) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.709 
(3.331) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.283 
(-1.314) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table E-3Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (CO2 Emissions Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.413 
(-4.931) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.149 
(1.425) 
   0.798 
(1.597) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.749 
(4.578) 
































  0.072 
(1.139) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.198 
(-1.469) 




  -0.020 
(-0.611) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.709 
(3.331) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.283 
(-1.314) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table E-4 Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (SO2 Emissions Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.394 
(-4.547) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.136 
(0.917) 
   0.798 
(1.597) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.137 
(-0.668) 
































  0.076 
(1.201) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.196 
(-1.481) 




  -0.029 
(-0.815) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.709 
(3.331) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.283 
(-1.314) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table E-5 Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (Particle Emissions Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.419 
(-4.913) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.353 
(2.254) 
   0.798 
(1.597) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.386 
(1.511) 
































  0.065 
(1.044) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.230 
(-1.683) 




  -0.008 
(-0.288) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.709 
(3.331) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.283 
(-1.314) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table E-6 Linear Model 2SLS Estimates (Dust Emissions Case) 



















































      
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.139 
(-1.617) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 1.458 
(7.090) 
   0.798 
(1.597) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.643 
(-2.226) 
































  0.067 
(1.042) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.037 
(0.276) 




  -0.072 
(-2.183) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.709 
(3.331) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.283 
(-1.314) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Appendix F: 2SLS Results with Data from 1987-1993 
Table F-1 Industrial Wastewater Pollution (IWW) Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.319 
(3.789) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.604 
(-7.923) 
   0.270 
(0.851) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.083 
(0.529) 
































  -0.218 
(-3.420) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.424 
(-4.581) 




  0.143 
(4.658) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.708 
(3.099) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.209 
(0.565) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 































Table F-2 Industrial Waste Gas Emissions (IGE) Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.431 
(-5.663) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.039 
(-0.530) 
   -0.165 
(-0.669) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.699 
(5.742) 
































  0.040 
(1.005) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.359 
(-3.428) 




  -0.041 
(-1.252) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.041) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.177 
(0.483) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table F-3 CO2 Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.438 
(-5.561) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.032 
(-0.416) 
   -0.165 
(-0.669) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.575 
(3.909) 
































  0.038 
(0.955) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.377 
(-3.677) 




  -0.036 
(-1.178) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.041) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.177 
(0.483) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table F-4  SO2 Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.490 
(-6.087) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.308 
(-2.784) 
   -0.165 
(-0.669) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.334 
(-1.697) 
































  0.022 
(0.534) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.443 
(-4.391) 




  -0.008 
(-0.257) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.041) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.177 
(0.483) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table F-5  Particle Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.458 
(-5.805) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.090 
(0.631) 
   -0.165 
(-0.669) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 0.245 
(1.002) 
































  0.035 
(0.881) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.407 
(-3.811) 




  -0.033 
(-1.253) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.041) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.177 
(0.483) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table F-6  Dust Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.289 
(-3.390) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.406 
(3.773) 
   -0.165 
(-0.669) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -1.328 
(-5.826) 
































  0.037 
(0.993) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.271 
(-2.758) 




  -0.064 
(-2.164) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.041) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.177 
(0.483) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Appendix G: 2SLS Results with Exclusion of Three Municipalities 
Table G-1 Industrial Wastewater Pollution (IWW) Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  0.420 
(6.362) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IWW (log r) 
 -0.528 
(-6.255) 
   0.198 
(0.689) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.422 
(2.357) 
































  -0.207 
(-3.569) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.341 
(-3.720) 




  0.149 
(3.964) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.695 
(3.217) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     -0.033 
(-0.159) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 































Table G-2 Industrial Waste Gas Emissions (IGE) Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.149 
(-2.003) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.284 
(-1.920) 
   -0.287 
(-1.267) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 1.340 
(9.390) 
































  0.016 
(0.293) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.321 
(-2.715) 




  0.086 
(2.094) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.668 
(3.106) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.084 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table G-3 CO2 Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.170 
(-2.337) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.229 
(-3.244) 
   -0.287 
(-1.267) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 1.391 
(10.074) 
































  0.022 
(0.360) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.288 
(-2.161) 




  0.071 
(2.258) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.668 
(3.106) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.084 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table G-4 Industrial SO2 Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.214 
(-2.890) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.422 
(-3.557) 
   -0.287 
(-1.267) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.036 
(-0.129) 
































  0.013 
(0.213) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.285 
(-2.200) 




  0.091 
(2.963) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.668 
(3.106) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.084 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table G-5 Industrial Particle Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.218 
(3.022) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 -0.354 
(-4.303) 
   -0.287 
(-1.267) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 1.614 
(8.318) 
































  0.026 
(0.423) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.319 
(-2.270) 




  0.057 
(1.977) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.668 
(3.106) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.084 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
































Table G-6 Industrial Dust Emissions Case 





















































    
Income 
(log (Y/P)) 
  -0.124 
(-1.596) 
   
Emissions 





   
Levy Rate on 
IGE (log r) 
 0.175 
(1.982) 
   -0.287 
(-1.267) 
Industrial output 
share (log S) 
 -0.526 
(-1.862) 
































  0.049 
(0.809) 
   
Education 
(log ed) 
  -0.056 
(-0.383) 




  -0.010 
(-0.280) 
   
Industrial 
Share-1 
(log S-1 ) 














(log E R) 














     0.668 
(3.106) 
Tax  rate 
(log Tax) 
     0.084 
(0.390) 
GDP per capita 
(log PGDP-1) 
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